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Framing The Market: Representations Of
Meaning And Value in Law, Markets, And
Culture
ROBIN PAUL MALLOYt
t Professor of Law and Economics, and Director, Program in Law & Market
Economy; College of Law, and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Ad-
ministration at Syracuse University. By agreement, both the author and the
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW hold full rights in this work and can deal with it in all re-
spects without the need of any further permissions or consents from the other
party. This article forms the foundation for the approach taken in my forth-
coming book LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS
IN LEGAL REASONING (2003). The book provides a full introduction to the terms,
concepts, and methods of economics as used in legal reasoning. It explores the
way in which economics is used in legal argument, and it includes case
discussion, illustrative examples, and discussion problems. It is designed as an
introduction to use with a variety of courses and as a core book for a course in
contemporary jurisprudence. The article also builds on my book LAW AND
MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000).
I wish to thank the following group participants and individuals for their help-
ful feedback on earlier versions of this work: participants at the Spring 2001
Jurisprudence Workshop at Albany Law School; participants at the 2001 Re-
gional Law and Society Meeting at Buffalo Law School; participants at the 2001
Law, Culture, and Humanities Meeting; participants at the 2001 Law & Society
Meeting; David Brennen, John Brigham, Alan Childress, Shubha Ghosh, Wythe
Holt, Emily Houh, Haricohan Islamamoglu, and Timothy Lytton. I also thank
my research assistant, Nazak Nikakhtar for assistance on a number of foot-
notes.
2 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Introduction: Embracing the Humanities ....... 103
I. Contested "Signs" of the Market ............. 129
A. Self-interest and the Public Interest ...... 130
B. Framing the Market in Contemporary
Film ................................. 135
C. Framing the Market in Case Opinions ..... 143
D. Framing Contested Measures of Market
Perform ance ........................... 153
II. An Interpretive Framework ................ 156
A. Foundations in Law and Market
Econom y ............................... 157
B. A Relationship Between Law,
Markets, and Culture .................... 163
C. Mapping Exchange Relationships:
A Triadic Approach ...................... 174
D. The Form of Legal Argument ............ 185
III. Some Basic Examples of Mapping
Exchange Relationships ................... 193
A. Interpretive Reference: Scale,
Measure, and Position ................... 194
B. Two Examples ......................... 199
1. Example One:
Sexual Favors ........................ 199
2. Example Two: Car Sales ............... 201
IV. Peirce's Interpretive Model:
A Further Examination .................... 203
FRAMING THE MARKET
A. Exchange and the Limits
Of Interpretation ...................... 204
B. The Connection to Esthetics,
Ethics, and Logic ....................... 214
C. Exchange Communities: Beyond
Methodological Individualism ............. 220
Concluding Thoughts ...................... 223
INTRODUCTION: EMBRACING THE HUMANITIES
In the classic film 2001: A Space Odyssey, a large black
monolith appears on the surface of a primitive but evolving
planet earth.1 The monolith intrudes upon the landscape
and taunts the imagination. Its nature-its implications for
the future unknown, yet it attracts the attention and
admiration of ruling primates. The experience of touching
and of interacting with the unfamiliar object transforms
thought, influences the course of evolutionary progress, and
frames the interpretive quest for meaning throughout the
epic film.
In much the same way the emergence of law and eco-
nomics scholarship, over the past thirty years, has in-
trigued the legal imagination. It has transformed the legal
landscape and reframed our basic understandings with re-
spect to the nature of law and society. In examining this
transformation, this article explores the nature of law in its
market and cultural context. It examines the way in which
we, as social beings, experience the relationship between
law, markets, and culture. This is a very different point of
inquiry than that of traditional law and economics, which is
primarily concerned with a narrative of economics as sci-
ence. In contrast to this narrative, I explore economics as a
cultural-interpretive vehicle for advancing particular sub-jective meanings and values from behind a veil of
objectivity.
Even though traditional approaches to law and eco-
nomics lack objectivity and are constrained by political bias,
it is appropriate to acknowledge the pioneering work of
1. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MGM 1968).
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such people as Gary Becker,2 Guido Calabresi, Ronald
Coase,4 and Richard Posner,5 all of whom advanced new and
2. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 191-93 (1968); GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (22d ed. 1971) [hereinafter "THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION"]; Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976) [hereinafter "THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR"]; GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION
(3d ed. 1993); GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET
BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT (2000); GARY S. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY
(1971); GILBERT R. GHEz & GARY S. BECKER, THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND
GOODS OVER THE LIFE CYCLE (1975); GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES
(1996); GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF LIFE: FROM BASEBALL TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION TO IMMIGRATION, How REAL-WORLD ISSUES AFFECT OUR EVERYDAY LIFE
(1996) (a collection of essays on everyday topics).
3. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089 (1972); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying
Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES,
AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985).
4. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter "THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST"]; RONALD H. COASE,
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine
Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theorem: Making Law in a World of Zero
Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1 (1998); Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase
Theorem: Through a Glass Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1994); Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,
25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982); G. Warren Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Social
Cost: A Footnote, 11 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1968); Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal
Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (1990); George Daly,
The Coase Theorem: Assumptions, Applications, and Ambiguities, 12 ECON.
INQUIRY 203 (1974); Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Com-
ing to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV.
273 (1998); Wayne Eastman, How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoners' Di-
lemma, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (1996).
5. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed.
1998) [hereinafter "POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW"]; Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979);
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL
AND LEGAL THEORY (1999) [hereinafter "POSNER, MORAL & LEGAL THEORY"]; LAW
AND ECONOMICS: THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN
ECONOMICS (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997) [hereinafter "LAW
AND ECONOMICS"]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW (Fran-
cesco Parisi ed., 2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981);
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER,
SEX AND REASON (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
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thoughtful ways of understanding law and legal institu-
tions. They, and others, made important contributions in
many areas of law, and this should be recognized even
though there may be disagreement with the subjective and
political framing of their legal reasoning.6 Collectively, they
helped develop new frames of reference, and new patterns
of legal reasoning. As a result, we now have new rhetorical
(1990) [hereinafter "POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE"]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS
OF PRIVATE LAW (Francesco Parisi ed., 2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC LAW, (Francesco Parisi, ed., 2001). See also Debate: Is Law and Econom-
ics Moral?, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 147 (1990) [hereinafter "Debate: Is Law and Eco-
nomics Moral?"] (live debate between Robin Paul Malloy and Richard A. Posner
with published articles and arguments from each of the two participants).
6. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future
of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433 (1997); WERNER ZvI HIRSCH, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1999); UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW
AND ECONOMICS (1997); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM (1997); THOMAS J. MICELI,
ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, LITIGATION (1997);
POSNER, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 5; Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV.
377 (1994); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1972); M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort
Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of Corrective Justice and
Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017 (1998); Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analy-
sis of Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999); John Elofson, The Di-
lemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the
Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1
(1996); Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1181 (1996); Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law:
Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001); Amy Farmer, Crime Ver-
sus Justice: Is There a Trade-Off?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 345 (2001); Jerry Ellig, The
Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595 (1995); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985); Peter J. Hammer et al., Kenneth Arrow and the Changing Economics of
Health Care: "Why Arrow? Why Now?", 26 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 835
(2001); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 851 (2001); F.M. Scherer, Some Principles
for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (2001); Donald
C. Guy & James E. Holloway, The Recapture of Public Value on the Termination
of the Use of Commercial Land Under Takings Jurisprudence and Economic
Analysis; 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 183 (2001); Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman,
When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental
Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999); David W. Case, The Law and Econom-
ics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10773 (2001);
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Solutions to the Intractability of Distributional
Concerns, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 279 (2002); Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyber-
space, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1999).
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tools for discussing matters of liability, risk allocation,
criminality, and property, among others. Our legal vocabu-
lary has embraced new terms such as transaction costs,
externalities, efficiency, wealth-maximization, preference
shaping, reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
cost-benefit analysis.' We have also absorbed conceptual
frameworks such as those referenced by such names as the
Coase Theorem,9 the prisoner's dilemma, 10 the tragedy of
the commons," the anti-commons," the theory of path
7. See generally POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 5; ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000); DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN
A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS (1992); DAVID D.
FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO Do WITH LAW AND WHY IT
MATTERS (2000) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER]; LAW AND ECONOMICS
ANTHOLOGY (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Thomas S. Ulen eds., 1998) [hereinaf-
ter "ANTHOLOGY"].
8. For examples of this kind of analysis in case decisions see Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994); Ross v. Wilson, 308 N.Y. 605 (1955); Unites States v. City of
Niagara Falls, 706 F. Supp. 1053 (1989). See generally Alan J. Meese, The Ex-
ternality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201 (2001); Larry A. Dimatteo, A
Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM.
Bus. L.J. 633 (2001); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified
Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV.
249 (1998); Shubha Ghosh, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Termination
Rights: A Fresh Look at the Employment at Will Debate with Applications to
Franchising and Family Law, 75 ORE. L. R. 969 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L.
& ECON. 233 (1979); Shi-Ling Hsu & John Loomis, A Defense of Cost-Benefit
Analysis for Natural Resource Policy, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10239 (2002); Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); The Signifi-
cance and Proper Role of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings
Law, 64 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 661 (2001); Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Ex-
pectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995); Robert M. Washburn, "Rea-
sonable Investment-Backed Expectations" as a Factor in Defining Property Inter-
est, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63 (1996).
9. See generally THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST, supra note 4; COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 7, at 82-87; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY:
REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 103-04 (2000) [hereinafter
"LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY"]; Shubha Ghosh, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Termination Rights: A Fresh Look at the Employment at Will Debate with
Application to Franchising and Family Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 983 (1996).
10. See generally BARNES & STOUT, supra note 7, at 33-34; MALLOY, LAW AND
MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 12-13; FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER supra note 7,
at 87-92.
11. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
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dependency,1" public choice,14 and game theory.15 Thus, for
better or for worse, and without regard to one's politics, law
and economics has transformed legal reasoning and
captured an authoritative position in the legal imagination.
Recent trends are even more expansive as law and
market scholarship becomes more divergent in its own
interpretive points of reference. We have seen, for instance,
the impressive expansion of law and market thinking
brought on by a variety of approaches that might collec-
tively be called the "new law and economics."'6 Examples of
(1968); GARRET HARDIN & SciPio GARLING, THE IMMIGRATION DILEMMA:
AVOIDING THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS (1995); TIMOTHY M. SWANSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: TRAGEDY FOR THE COMMONS?
(1996); BARNES & STOUT, supra note 7, at 28-34.
12. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Prop-
erty in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 634 (1998).
13. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127
(1999); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pat-
tern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001);
Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, Pragmatism, and a Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000); MALLOY,
LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 102.
14. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); Jonathan R.
Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Ex-
change, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1988); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II
(1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the
Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 284 (1992); DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Robert D. Tollison, Public
Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW, supra note 5, at 397; BARNES & STOUT, supra note 7, at 409-529;
MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 99-101, 103-04.
15. See generally Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory
and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993); HERVE MOULIN, GAME THEORY
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1986); DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME
THEORY (1991); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); JOHN F. NASH, ESSAYS ON GAME THEORY
(1996).
16. See generally Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the
New Law and Economics of Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479 (2000); Christopher T.
Marsden, Cyberlaw and International Political Economy: Towards Regulation of
the Global Information Society, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 355 (2001);
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Second Wave of Law and Economics, 46 U. TORONTO L.
J. 181 (1996); Gregory S. Crespi, Teaching the New Law and Economics, 25 U.
TOL. L REV. 713 (1994); C.G. VELJANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW-AND-ECONOMICS
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"new" approaches include ventures into behavioral law and
economics (referencing work in behavioral psychology and
sociology),17 the law and economics of norms (referencing
theories of norm building and of informal relationships and
organizations), institutional law and economics
(1982); Douglas L. Leslie, The New Law and Economics of Labor Law, 41 INDUS.
PROC. INDUS. REL. RES. ASS'N ANN. MEETING 227 (1989); Symposium, Post-Chi-
cago Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3-191 (1989).
17. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein, ed. 2000). Sun-
stein provides a nice collection of introductory works in this area. Like my own
work, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS takes issue with the limits and con-
straints imposed by the simplifying assumptions of traditional economics.
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, however, references a different set and type
of sources than law and market economy, and it approaches analysis in a differ-
ent way. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS looks to refine our understanding of
choice as a modification of rational thought, but otherwise stays within the
bounds of a traditional law and economic method. See generally Cass R. Sun-
stein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998); Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and
Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 225 (1986); THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR, supra note 2; Tania Rostain, Educating Homo
Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics
Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 973 (2000).
18. See e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Law, Economics and Norm: Decentralized
Law For a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach To Adjudicating the
New Law Merchants, 144 U. PA. L. R. 1643 (1996); JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST,
ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF
ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994). See
MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 136-37; Richard H.
McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology
Law and Social Norms, 110 YALE L.J. 25 (2001) (book review); Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and, the Behavioral Foundations
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. R. 1735 (2001); JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF
SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989); George A. Akerlof, A Theory of So-
cial Custom of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, 94 Q. J. ECON.
749 (1980); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1095 (1986); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS,
COOPERATION AND WELFARE (1986). See also EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE
EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977); Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of
Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1983). The law and
economics of norms is, in many ways, a traditional approach to economics and
the law. Generally, the law and economics of norms simply extends the ap-
proach of traditional law and economics into informal rule making. Where tra-
ditional law and economics investigates the efficiency of particular legal rules,
the work on norms uses the same tools to look at norms, customs, and practices
that are not a part of the formal or positive law. The basic investigation is one
of demonstrating that efficient norms and practices win out over less efficient
ones. In this respect it is very traditional. For a recent article addressing this
field, see Richard H. McAdams, supra.
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(referencing institutional economics rather than the more
traditional appeal to neoclassical economics),' 9 feminist law
and economics (referencing feminist theory),3° and interpre-
tive and representational law and economics (referencing
the humanities, various forms of interpretation and rhetoric
theory, and law and society).2 1
19. See generally MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 6, at 101-29, 130-56
(1997) (discussing Institutional law and economics, then discussing Neoinstitu-
tional law and economics); DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); Douglas North, Transaction Costs,
Institutions and Economic Performance, in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OCCASIONAL PAPERS No. 30 (1992); HENRY CARTER
ADAMS, RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND ECONOMICS AND
JURISPRUDENCE (Joseph Dorfman ed., 1954); RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND
CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914); JOHN R.
COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1934); John R. Commons, Law and Eco-
nomics, 34 YALE L. J. 371 (1925); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE
CLASS (1899); WARREN J. SAMUELS & A. ALLAN SCHMID, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); ROBERT A. SOLO, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1967); C. E. AYRES, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS
(1944).
20. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract:
From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Con-
tract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:
How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953
(2000); Marlene O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Ex-
ploring the Fiduciary / Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Agreements,
in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 234 (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995); MARIANNE
A. FERBER & JULIE A. NELSON, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND
ECONOMICS (1993); Barbara Ann White, Feminist Foundations for the Law of
Business: One Law and Economics Scholar's Survey and (Re)view, 10 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1999); Katherine Wells Meighan, In a Similar Choice: A Uni-fying Economic Analysis of Gillian's Amy and Jake, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
139 (1994); FEMINISM & POLITICAL THEORY (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990); Jeanne
M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and
Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1993); Terry O'Neil, Self-Interest
and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to
Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L.
REV. 646 (1992); Martha T. McCluskey, Insurer Moral Hazard in the Workers'
Compensation Crisis: Reforming Cost Inflation Not Rate Suppression, 5 EMPL.
RIGHTS & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 55 (2001).
21. See, e.g., Denis J. Brion, The Ethics of Property: A Semiotic Inquiry Into
Ownership, 12 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF L. 247 (1999); Denis J. Brion,
Rhetoric and the Law of Enterprise, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 117 (1991); Roberta
Kevelson, Transfer, Transaction, Asymmetry: Junctures Between Law and Eco-
nomics From the Fish-Eye Lens of Semiotics, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 7 (1991);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995); Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy: The Triadic Linking of
Law, Economics, and Semiotics, 12 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF L. 285 (1999);
Robin Paul Malloy, Toward A New Discourse of Law and Economics, 42
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In this article, attention is focused on the emergent
interest in interpretive and representational approaches to
law and market theory, and on the experiential process by
which legal and market reasoning is transformed. The
starting place for much of this work can be related to two
early books by McCloskey: The Rhetoric of Economics;22 and
If You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise.23
More recent books include: Hernando DeSoto, The Mystery
of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else; Regina Gagnier, The Insatiability of
SYRACUSE L. REV. 27 (1991) [hereinafter "Malloy, New Discourse"]; Richard H.
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000);
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649 (2000). See also infra notes 22 - 28 (identifying some leading examples of
books on an interpretive approach to law and market theory).
22. DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, (1998) [hereinaf-
ter "MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC"]. This is a classic work on understanding the rhe-
torical structure and strategic use of economics.
23. DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, IF YOU'RE SO SMART: THE NARRATIVE OF
ECONOMIC EXPERTISE (1990) [hereinafter "MCCLOSKEY, ECONOMIC EXPERTISE"].
This work picks up with many of the themes of the RHETORIC book. See infra
note 22. Basically, economics is a useful and powerful language and it can ac-
tually be used to substantively affect resource allocations and distributions, but
it is not a "science" in any true sense of the word. See generally DONALD N.
MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS (1994) [hereinafter
MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE]; Robin Paul Malloy, Legal Economic Discourse: A Re-
view of 'If You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise' by Donald
McCloskey, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 324 (1992) [hereinafter "Malloy, Review: If You're
So Smart"]; Donald N. McCloskey, The Lawyerly Rhetoric of Coase's 'The Na-
ture of the Firm', 18 J. CORP. L. 425 (1993) [hereinafter "McCloskey, Lawyerly
Rhetoric"].
24. HERNANDO DESOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) [hereinafter
DESOTO, CAPITALISM]. In this book, DeSoto makes an important contribution to
our understanding of the role of law in promoting a market economy. It is par-
ticularly important that he addresses law in terms of its ability to create sym-
bolic representations that have value in exchange and which promote economic
activity. His discussion of legal representation involves an excellent example of
applied semiotic analysis. He explains how the lack of ready access to formal
legal representations, semiotic devices, hinder economic activity in less devel-
oped countries.
In the West, by contrast, every parcel of land, every building, every
piece of equipment, or store of inventories is represented in a property
document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden process that connects
all of these assets to the rest of the economy. Thanks to this represen-
tational process, assets can lead an invisible, parallel life alongside
their material existence. They can be used as collateral for credit. The
single most important source of funds for new business in the United
States is a mortgage on the entrepreneur's house. These assets can also
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Human Wants: Economics and Aesthetics in Market
Society; Israel M. Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process:
Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics;2
Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy: Reinterpret-
ing the Values of Law and Economics;27 and Bart Noote-
boom, Learning and Innovation in Organizations and
Economies."28 While each of these books takes on a particular
aspect of the representational relationship between law and
economics, each demonstrates the significance of
interpretation theory to an understanding of law, markets,
and culture.
provide a link to the owner's credit history, an accountable address for
collection of debts and taxes, and the basis for the creation of securities
(like mortgage-backed bonds) that can then be rediscounted and sold in
secondary markets. By this process, the West injects life into assets
and makes them generate capital.
Id. at6.
25. REGENIA GAGNIER, INSATIABILITY OF HUMAN WANTS: ECONOMICS AND
AESTHETICS IN MARKET SOCIETY (2000). This is an excellent book that starts by
taking direct aim at the work of Richard Posner and other traditional practitio-
ners of an economic analysis of law. She also includes historical analysis with
reference to such people as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill.
Throughout the work, she engages the reader in a careful evaluation of the val-
ues and interpretive elements of economics. See also EMMA ROTHSCHILD,
ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
(2001) (providing a reinterpretation of market ideas which gives some added
background support for Gagnier's work); Shubha Ghosh, Enlightening Identity
and Copyright, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1315 (2001) (review of Rothschild's book).
26. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992) [hereinafter
KIRZNER, MEANING]. In looking at market process theory, Kirzner investigates
the market in a manner similar to that of someone applying a Peircean ap-
proach. This is particularly true with respect to his analysis of the dynamic and
complex nature of markets. The market system generates meanings and values
that can not be captured in static equilibrium models. See also ISRAEL M.
KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985) [hereinafter KIRZNER,
CAPITALIST PROCESS].
27. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9. It is important to
note that law and market economy theory involves a method grounded in the
semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. This method is different from the method
used in traditional law and economics, and this difference facilitates market
analysis on terms and assumptions that are independent of traditional con-
straints.
28. BART NOOTEBOOM, LEARNING AND INNOVATION IN ORGANIZATIONS AND
ECONOMIES (2000). Nooteboom demonstrates a wonderful insight with respect to
interpretive matters as he investigates a variety of issues confronting the
modern organization operating in a global economy. He presents insightful
analysis of market process theory, and makes important contributions to the
understanding of creativity and entrepreneurship.
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In exploring an interpretive and representational ap-
proach, this article embraces the humanities, including ref-
erences to esthetics, ethics, and logic. It explores the sub-
jective nature of markets, the lack of universality in a
number of economic concepts, and the role of interpretive
institutions in generating value and redistributing re-
sources. Moreover, it advances an understanding of the
relationship between law, markets, and culture indicating a
need to democratize and enhance access to the meaning and
value formation process.
At the outset, however, it must be noted that there are
numerous approaches to interpretation theory and to the
cognitive processes that ground interpretation.29 The focus
in this work is, therefore, limited to the interpretation the-
ory of one of America's greatest philosophers who was also a
founder of the theoretical school identified as American
Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce."
29. See, e.g., GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISM OF
LAW (2000); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 67 (1980); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 85 (1983); PETER
GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD AND
TECHNIQUES (1986); LAW, INTERPRETATION AND REALITY: ESSAYS IN
EPISTEMOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND JURISPRUDENCE (Patrick Nerhot ed., 1990);
THE RHETORIC OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994); JAMES
BOYD WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING (2001); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling
Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9 (1994); William S. Blatt,
Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 629 (2001); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Cul-
ture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of
Legal Argument 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991); Edward L. Rubin, Public
Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwa-
ter, But Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309 (2002); Symposium, Be-
yond Critique: Law, Culture, and the Politics of Form, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595-
2041 (1991) (contributions by Steven L. Winter, Pierre Schlag, Alicia Juarrero-
Roque, Jeremy Paul (on legal semiotics), J.M. Balkin (on legal semiotics),
Rosemary J. Coombe, Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, and Guyora Binder).
30. My theory of interpretation is grounded in and influenced by the Semi-
otic Theory of Charles Sanders Peirce. See 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE (Nathan
Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) [hereinafter "1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE"];
2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE (The Peirce Edition Project ed., 1998) [hereinafter "2
THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE"]. See generally ROBERTA KEVELSON, CHARLES S. PEIRCE'S
METHOD OF METHODS (1987) [hereinafter KEVELSON, METHOD]; ROBERTA
KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS (1988) [hereinafter KEVELSON, LAW];
ROBERTA KEVELSON, PEIRCE, SCIENCE, SIGNS (1996) [hereinafter KEVELSON,
PEIRCE AND SCIENCE]; KARL-OTTO APEL, CHARLES S. PEIRCE: FROM PRAGMATISM
TO PRAGMATICISM (1995) [hereinafter APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM]; VINCENT M.
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Peirce's work has only recently become widely accessi-
ble to researchers because much of it existed in scattered
and unpublished manuscripts. 1 This massive collection of
some 90,000 manuscript pages has only recently become
available as a result of years of work by Peirce scholars and
COLAPIETRO, PEIRCE'S APPROACH TO THE SELF: A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE ON
HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY (1989) [hereinafter "COLAPIETRO, PEIRCE-SELF"]; ROBERTA
KEVELSON, PEIRCE'S ESTHETICS OF FREEDOM (1993) [hereinafter "KEVELSON,
PEIRCE AND FREEDOM"]; CARL R. HAUSMAN, CHARLES S. PEIRCE'S EVOLUTIONARY
PHILOSOPHY (1993) [hereinafter "HAUSMAN, PEIRCE"]; CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY,
PEIRCE (1992) [hereinafter HOOKWAY, PEIRCE]; JAMES JAKOB LISzKA, A GENERAL
INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMEIOTIC OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (1996); FLOYD
MERRELL, PEIRCE, SIGNS, AND MEANING (1997) [hereinafter "MERRELL, PEIRCE-
MEANING"]; FLOYD MERRELL, SEMIOSIS IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1995);
WINFRIED NOTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 39-47 (1995); PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS OF PEIRCE (Justus Buchler ed., 1955) [hereinafter PEIRCE, WRITINGS];
VINCENT G. POTTER, CHARLES S. PEIRCE ON NORMS & IDEALS (1997) [hereinafter
"POTTER, NORMS & IDEALS"]; REASONING AND THE LOGIC OF THINGS: CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE (Kenneth Laine Ketner ed., 1992) [hereinafter PEIRCE-
REASONING]; JOHN K. SHERIFF, CHARLES PEIRCE'S GUESS AT THE RIDDLE:
GROUNDS FOR HUMAN SIGNIFICANCE (1994); ROBERT SCHOLES, SEMIOTICS AND
INTERPRETATION (1982).
31. See LISZKA, supra note 30. See generally NOTH, supra note 30, at 39
(Peirce is "now unanimously acclaimed as America's greatest philosopher").
Peirce is said to be the most significant representative of American philoso-
phy-more significant than his contemporaries, James and Dewey. APEL,
PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30, at i-xxvii, 1-14 (in an introduction to a
book by a German author seeking to bring Peirce's work into a German transla-
tion). Peirce was not only the founder of pragmaticism-he is "certainly the
greatest American thinker of all." APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30,
at 5. Peirce was active in the "Metaphysical" Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts
where he influenced James and Holmes, among others. PEIRCE-REASONING,
supra note 30, at 8. His relationship was particularly close to William James.
See PEIRCE-REASONING, supra note 30, at 5-36. Peirce published 10,000 pages
and had manuscripts of more than 80,000 additional pages, but never published
a single work that presented his general theory in a unified or systematic
manner. PEIRCE-REASONING, supra note 30, at 8. He rejected Euclidean
Geometry; broke with the pragmatic approaches of James and Dewey in a
rejection of its nominalism, and believed our language was ultimately controlled
by the structure of reality and not by our interests. Peirce projected a Kantian
influence in his work, but developed a different theory. He is not merely a
Kantian. See APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30, at xxv; see also
HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 154. Peirce rejected Hegel's dialectical logic
"more or less vigorously his whole life long." APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra
note 30, at 24. Peirce's logical synthesis differs from Hegel. See HOOKwAY,
PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 151-154. The interested reader can consult any of the
core books used as references in this work to learn more about how Peirce is
distinguishable from a variety of other philosophers and schools of thought.
Such is not the purpose of this article.
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by the efforts of the Peirce Project at Indiana University. 2
As a result of the difficulty of accessing much of Peirce's
work, he has been relatively unknown to legal researchers,
even as he has been recognized as a prime figure in the
philosophy of language and of science.
Peirce's work on interpretation and representation the-
ory is categorized under the term or subject of semiotics,
which means the study of "signs."34 By this term, Peirce
simply meant to reaffirm the idea that humans are sign-
making and sign-interpreting beings. Signs, as such, in-
clude language as spoken and written, visual images, col-
ors, symbols, art, architecture, music, and a variety of other
ways in which ideas are communicated.35 In this article, I
refer to semiotics as a cultural-interpretive approach be-
cause this term seems to express the semiotic ideas of an
individualized interpretive actor situated within a collective
32. See 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note 30; 2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE,
supra note 30; see also sources cited supra note 31.
33. See sources cited supra notes 30-31. My scholarship is influenced, in
part, by Roberta Kevelson's work on the interpretation of Peirce. I worked with
Kevelson for twelve years on a variety of projects and was a Research Fellow for
ten years when she operated the Center for Law and Semiotics at Pennsylvania
State University. A sample of Kevelson's work includes: ACTION AND AGENCY:
FOURTH ROUND TABLE ON LAW AND SEMIOTICS 135-56 (Roberta Kevelson ed.,
1991); CODES AND CUSTOMS: MILLENIAL PERSPECTIVES 153-76 (Roberta Kevelson
ed., 1994); CONSCIENCE, CONSENSUS, AND CROSSROADS IN THE LAW (Roberta
Kevelson ed., 1995); THE EYES OF JUSTICE: SEVENTH ROUND TABLE ON LAW AND
SEMIOTICS (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1994); FLUX, COMPLEXITY, AND ILLUSION:
SIXTH ROUND TABLE ON LAW AND SEMIOTICS (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1993);
KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30; 3 LAW AND SEMIOTICS (Roberta Kevelson ed.,
1989); LAW AND THE CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES: NINTH ROUND TABLE ON LAW AND
SEMIOTICS (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1996); KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra
note 30; PEIRCE AND LAW: ISSUES IN PRAGMATISM, LEGAL REALISM, AND SEMIOTICS
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1991); KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30;
KEVELSON, METHOD, supra note 30; Roberta Kevelson, Property as Rhetoric in
Law, 4 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 189 (1992) [hereinafter Kevelson, Rhetoric];
Roberta Kevelson, Transfer, Transaction, Asymmetry: Junctures Between Law
and Economics From the Fish-Eye Lens of Semiotics, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 7
(1991).
34. Semiotics, as the study of signs, positions all sign systems and ideas as
part of a process of social meaning. In this sense, a sign is significant to the ex-
tent that it has meaning or consequence in the real world. See NOTH, supra note
30; KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 33, 38; LISZKA, supra
note 30. See also sources cited supra notes 31 & 33, infra notes 35-36.
35. See ARTHUR ASA BERGER, SIGNS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SEMIOTICS (1984, 1989); JOHN DEELEY, BASICS OF SEMIOTICS
(1990); ROBERT HODGE & GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS (1988); SEMIOTICS:
AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY (Robert E. Innis ed., 1985); NOTH, supra note 30.
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and cultural context, and because a culture is, in essence,
an implicit interpretive system. This is how one experiences
the intersection of law and market economy, not as an
isolated and atomistic individual, but as an individualized
participant in an interpretive community.
In popular culture perhaps the best known semiotician
is Umberto Eco, for he has numerous successes in both the
popular and academic communities.36 However, it is Peirce's
work that is of particular interest to people exploring the
relationship between law and market theory because it
shares an affinity with a number of core ideas expressed in
the works of Adam Smith, 7 and with work in Austrian
economics.38 The compatibility with Austrian economics is
36. See UMBERTO Eco, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION (1990) [hereinafter
ECO, LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION]; UMBERTO Eco, THE OPEN WORK (Anna Can-
cogni trans., 1989); UMBERTO Eco, THE SEARCH FOR THE PERFECT LANGUAGE
(1995); UMBERTO Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1984); THE
SIGN OF THREE (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. Sebeok eds., 1983) [hereinafter
"Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE"]; UMBERTO Eco, A THEORY
OF SEMIOTICS (Thomas A. Sebeok ed.,1976) [hereinafter "ECO, A THEORY OF
SEMIOTICS"]. His popular works include UMBERTO Eco, FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM
(William Weaver trans., 1989); UMBERTO Eco, MISREADINGS (William Weaver
trans., 1993); UMBERTO ECO, THE NAME OF THE ROSE (1983) (made into a popu-
lar hit movie, THE NAME OF THE ROSE (Fox Films 1986), starring Sean Connery.
37. See, e.g., MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 41-42.
Smith used a semiotic approach in his metaphor of the relationship between a
clock and the idea of time. This is similar to the relationship between market
models and the exchange process to which they refer. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 168 (LibertyClassics 1969) [hereinafter "SMITH, MORAL
SENTIMENTS"]; ADAM SMITH, ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS (W.P.D.
Wightman et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter "SMITH, ESSAYS"]. Smith argued that
we exist in a social context and not as isolated beings. SMITH, ESSAYS, supra, at
64-69, 106, 161, citing SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra, 71, 200-260, 352, 422
(discussing the impartial spectator) and citing SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, su-
pra, 264 (discussing the way in which general rules emerge from experience).
See also ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 14-37, 200-290, 311-330,
401-407 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (discussing the idea of social organization
based on many factors and not the idea of social contract); id. at 14-37, 200-290,
311-330, 401-407 (addressing the dynamic stages of economic and legal evolu-
tion); 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 420-445 (Edwin Cannon ed., 1976) [hereinafter "I ADAM SMITH,
WEALTH OF NATIONS"]; 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 231-244 (Edwin Cannon ed., 1976) (discussing the
dynamic stages of economic development); ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON RHETORIC
AND BELLES LETTRES (J.C. Bryce ed., 1983) (providing a similar analysis with
respect to the dynamic development of language). Other secondary sources are
also cited in MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9.
38. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960)
[hereinafter "HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY"] ;HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION,
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most apparent with respect to the idea of "market process
theory" as expressed in the work of such well-known
economists as Friedrick Hayek and Israel Kirzner.39 Peirce's
work also shares a conceptual grounding that is similar to
economist Joseph Schumpeter's theory of "creative
destruction," which is central to an understanding of
creativity in economics. ° In addition, because Peirce was
interested in developing a theory of the sciences, his semi-
otic approach lends itself to the deconstruction and inter-
pretation of empirical and social science work, such as that
done within the framework of an economic analysis of law.
Peirce's concern for understanding the way in which we ex-
perience the sciences makes his cultural-interpretive ap-
proach readily applicable to the study of law and market
theory. Thus, it is not surprising that Peirce's work has
been cited and favorably discussed by Richard Posner in
two of his recent books,1 and by Mercuro and Medema in
their successful book on law and economics.42 While Peirce
is not well understood by people such as Judge Posner, it is
AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973); 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976); 3 FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE
PEOPLE (1979); KIRZNER, CAPITALIST PROCESS, supra note 26; KIRZNER,
MEANING, supra note26; CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, HAYEK AND MODERN LIBERALISM
(1989); ALEXANDER H. SHAND, THE CAPITALIST ALTERNATIVE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO NEO-AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1984).
39. See sources cited supra note 38. On the connection between Hayek and
Peirce's semiotics, see KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 178-79, 181, 255, 266;
KEVELSON, METHOD, supra note 30, at 81, 93-94; KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND
FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 118-120, 123-127, 205-210; KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND
SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 36, 45, 93-110.
40. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-
106 (3d ed., 1950) (discussing the process of "creative destruction" which relates
to the process of creativity in semiotics and in law and market economy as ex-
plained in MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 78-135).
Schumpeter understands the market as dynamic and evolutionary in a way
that is similar to understanding Peirce as a pragmatic evolutionary realist.
SCHUMPETER, supra, at 82. "The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with
capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process." Id. at 82. "Capital-
ism... is by nature a form of economic change and not only never is but never
can be stationary. And this evolutionary character of the capitalist process is
not merely due to the fact that economic life goes on in a social and natural en-
vironment. . ." Id.
41. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 27, 105, 118, 153-54, 162, 192,
259, 450, 462-464; POSNER, MORAL & LEGAL THEORY, supra note 5, at 99, 104,
264.
42. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 6, at 103.
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clear that they at least recognize that his work has a con-
tribution to make to our understanding of the connection
between law and market theory.
Peirce's work should be of interest to anyone concerned
with getting a better understanding of the relationship be-
tween law, markets, and culture. Peirce was not a conser-
vative and he worked to develop a progressive and dynamic
understanding of pragmatism. His work permits us to place
market theory in a progressive posture so that it can be
used to address human needs rather than profit motives.
In order to properly understand this new way of fram-
ing the market, one must recognize that traditional schol-
ars of law and economics have not generally embraced in-
terpretation theory. Perhaps this is because interpretation
theory clearly brings the humanities to bear upon the inves-
tigation and evaluation of law and market theory. It does
this by helping to shape and inform our pragmatic under-
standing of market relationships, and by providing the
normative foundations for legal and market operations.
This humanistic approach is sometimes misunderstood by
many people in law and economics for they seek to make
law appear more, rather than less, scientific and thus avoid
references to the humanities." This is unfortunate and
seems to be motivated by a desire to use "science" to pre-
serve and bolster an objective, neutral, and some might say
"masculine" frame of reference for law.44 Law is not, how-
43. The traditional law and economics approach is centered on concerns for
efficiency, and for making the law more objective and predictable by reference
to economics. See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 7; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7;
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7; FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER, supra note 7; WERNER Z.
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1999); FOUNDATIONS
OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998); ROBIN PAUL
MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1-93 (1990) [hereinafter MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; MERCURO &
MEDEMA, supra note 6; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 5;
MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 49-60
(1996); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485
(1980); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV.
815, 835-51 (1990).
44. See FERBER & NELSON, supra note 20, at 69-93 (discussing the narrow-
ness of the field); MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC, supra note 22; MCCLOSKEY, ECONOMIC
EXPERTISE, supra note 23 (challenging the "science" in economics). See generally
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION AND OTHER
ESSAYS 1-179 (1961); MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23; Debate: Is Law
and Economics Moral?, supra note 5; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF REASON (2nd ed. 1979)
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ever, a natural science. Even though references to the
natural and social sciences can be helpful, law involves hu-
man practices and experiences that are not fully explain-
able or understandable in scientific terms. Interpretation
theory can help us identify ways of improving legal rea-
soning and decision making by reclaiming a useful balance
between the humanities and the sciences.
Many law and economics scholars will misunderstand
and reject this view because they mistakenly believe that
they are engaged in the pursuit of objectivity and science.
In reality, they are trapped in their own interpretive para-
digm and fear the consequences of unmasking their veil of
objectivity. Even as they seemingly embrace variations on
the traditional paradigm, as in behavioral law and eco-
nomics, and the economics of norms, they limit their accep-
tance to works that perpetuate the same basic commitment
to objectivity and the narrative of economics expertise. As
these scholars continuously self-cite each other in a meta-
phorical "circling of the wagons," others are busy construct-
ing new experiential approaches based on feminist theory,
and interpretive and representational approaches, among
others.
In contrast to the general lack of attention paid to in-
terpretation theory and the process of representing mean-
ings and values by many traditional law and economics
[hereinafter "COUNTER-REVOLUTION"].
In the course of its slow development in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries the study of economic and social phenomena was
guided in the choice of its methods in the main by the nature of the
problems it had to face .... Students of political economy could de-
scribe it alternatively as a branch of science or of moral or social phi-
losophy without the least qualms whether their subject was scientific
or philosophical.... During the first half of the nineteenth century a
new attitude made its appearance. The term science came more and
more to be confined to the physical and biological disciplines which at
the same time began to claim for themselves a special rigorousness and
certainty which distinguished them from all others. Their success was
such that they soon came to exercise an extraordinary fascination on
those working in other fields, who rapidly began to imitate their
teaching and vocabulary. Thus the tyranny commenced which the
methods and techniques of the Sciences in the narrow sense of the term
have ever since exercised over the other subjects.
COUNTER-REVOLUTION at 19-21. (Hayek is making the point that science has
limits. He is not arguing against science, but is pointing out that many methods
of inquiry are being lost or devalued by the desire to make everything "sci-
entific.").
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scholars critics of the marketplace have embraced the ap-
proach.4 Critical theory scholars have, in fact, made many
important contributions to our understanding of the experi-
ential nature of law. Unfortunately, their work generally
references one of a number of popular French (and Euro-
pean) deconstructionists but seldom, if ever, mentions
Peirce.46 This may be because Peirce's theory lends itself to
an understanding of the potential benefits of exchange and
of market operations. 7 Furthermore, Peirce's theory is not
nihilistic, nor is it radically anti-realist. 8 Peirce was a
pragmatic evolutionary realist whose theory has an affinity
with important elements in market philosophy, as men-
tioned above. 9 Perhaps for these reasons, Peirce is gener-
ally mistaken for a conservative and ignored by the critical
theorists who tend to dominate legal discourse on interpre-
45. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST THEORY
(1999); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989); FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).
46. See, e.g., Robert W. Benson, Peirce and Critical Legal Studies, in PEIRCE
AND LAW: ISSUES IN PRAGMATISM, LEGAL REALISM, AND SEMIOTICS 15 (Roberta
Kevelson ed., 1991) (a survey of cites contained in a review of numerous articles
on critical legal theory revealed almost no cites to Peirce, while ample cites
were given to others doing related work); DAVID S. CAUDILL, LACAN AND THE
SUBJECT OF LAW: TOWARD A PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (1997);
JACQUES DERRIDA, EDMUND HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY: AN INTRODUCTION
(John P. Leavey, Jr. trans., 1989); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
(Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976); JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign, and Play in
the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY 878
(Richard Macksey & Eugenio Donato trans., 1970); JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING
AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN
GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Wade Baskin trans., Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye &
Albert Riedlinger eds., 1966); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1975); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Les Mots et les
choses trans., 1970); JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (Alan Sheridan trans., Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1977);
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (James Harle
Bell et al. trans., Rodney Needham ed., 1969); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, RACE AND
HISTORY (1953); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1966).
47. See generally MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 23-
56 (a general overview of what is discussed in more detail throughout the book).
48. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 1-5, 52-53, 144-225.
49. For general discussion on semiotics and referencing, see ECO, SEMIOTICS,
supra note 36, at 115-21 (index), 163-71 (referring); LISZKA, supra note 30, at
49-51 (index).
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tation theory. This is unfortunate, however, because the ex-
periential nature of Peirce's work provides a bridge for ef-
fectively translating many of the concerns of critical theory
into market terms. It is for precisely this reason that
Peirce's views should be of interest to people exploring the
interpretive contours of the relationship between law and
market theory. Peirce's work facilitates a dramatic shift in
our approach to understanding the relationship between
law and market theory. It opens up a number of possibili-
ties to those of us who understand the importance of mar-
kets, appreciate the sense in which we are all embedded
within markets, and yet question, doubt, or even reject
some of the constraints of the traditional approaches to an
economic analysis of law.
This article, therefore, examines the way in which the
"institutions" of language, communication, and interpreta-
tion function to re-distribute and create wealth. It also ex-
plores ways in which an interpretive approach can make us
better and more effective lawyers by facilitating an under-
standing of law in its market context. This can be done in at
least three ways. First, Peirce's approach enhances our
ability to use framing devices to identify value-enhancing
opportunities in the exchange process. 50 Framing involves
identifying a category or general viewpoint from which a
fact pattern or problem will be addressed. Second, it facili-
tates the use of referencing devices that enhance our ability
to mediate between contested matters within a given inter-
pretive framework.5 ' Referencing involves the identification
50. See id. Framing can shift between categories in the law, between law
and non-law, and between political and ideological perspectives, among others.
Two cases that work together to illustrate a change in value framing over time
are Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). On virtually identical
facts, and considering virtually identical state laws to restrict coal-mining ac-
tivities the U.S. Supreme Court reached directly opposite conclusions. In Penn-
sylvania Coal, the state law was found to be a taking that interfered with rights
established in a private, two-party consensual exchange. Sixty-five years later,
in Keystone, the Court, working under a new value frame with respect to regu-
lation, accepts the state determination that the underlying relationships have a
public implication, and that they can be regulated for the public interest with-
out resulting in an unlawful taking of private property.
51. See infra Part II.C.,D., III.A. (discussing framing, referencing and refer-
ents in a triadic approach). For an example of the strategic use of referencing,
see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The opinion considers the in-
terpretation and application of the "takings clause." A key difference between
the majority and the minority view of the case involves the interpretive refer-
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and selection of particular criteria, from among several, for
use in analyzing issues within a given frame. And, third, it
explains how semiotic devices can be used to create value
by transforming legal convention-by creating new repre-
sentations that extend the networks and patterns of ex-
change.52 Representation involves the way in which abstract
ideas and concepts are made comprehensible and able to be
exchanged, as in using a written deed to represent an estate
interest in land so that it can be sold or mortgaged.
While some scholars of interpretation theory may find
the above categories (frames, references, and representa-
tions) ambiguous, each is offered as a useful tool for struc-
turing analysis of law in a market context. It helps to first
think in terms of the broad cultural-interpretive frame of
an argument and then to look at narrower points within
that frame in terms of references. In practice the difference
between framing and referencing is often a matter of em-
phasis and degree.
Each of these points can be initially illustrated with
some simple examples.
ence for the decision. The majority holds that the City regulation involves a
quasi-judicial function and thus the burden of proving both an essential nexus
and rough proportionality falls upon the City. Furthermore, the City must carry
the burden by showing substantial competent evidence. Since the City cannot
meet this referencing standard, the property owner wins. The minority view of
the case makes reference to a different standard. In viewing the regulation as a
legislative act, it holds the City to a much lower standard. It places the burden
on the property owner to show that the regulation fails on the basis of a fairly
debatable test. The point is that the power to select the interpretive reference
for the dispute drives the outcome, and the decision makers are able to advance
their meaning and value hierarchy by selecting and shaping an appropriate ref-
erence
52. See infra Part III.C.,D, IV.A. The idea of representation is also present
in the case of Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990). The case involved a dispute over the rights a person should have in cer-
tain medical treatment products developed from studies done using some of his
or her body fluids. The key issues relate to the extent to which there is a con-
nection between the two, and the way in which it might be said that Moore has
a legally recognizable representation in the products. More fundamentally we
ask how the case represents the human body. For example, is the human body
to be understood as something sacred or as just another commodity for sale in
the marketplace? See generally David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human
Dignity, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152 (2001); Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Al-
corn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ Dona-
tion, 16 IssuEs L. & MED. 213 (2001); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the
Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000).
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As to the idea of framing, consider a typical real estate
mortgage financing transaction.53 Imagine that a developer
has formed a corporate entity to deal in real estate transac-
tions. In an effort to raise needed cash for a new venture,
the developer seeks to borrow against $10 million in equity
that it has in an office building. At the outset, one needs to
consider the way in which this financing transaction might
be framed. It might be framed as a loan secured by a mort-
gage on the office building. In this setup the developer re-
tains full ownership of the building and gives a mortgage
lien as collateral for the promise of repayment. On the other
hand, the transaction could be set up as a sale and lease
back of the property. Here the developer sells the building
to a buyer to raise cash and then leases it back to use the
space. The proceeds of sale provide funding as a substitute
for the mortgage loan, and the lease payments to the buyer
mimic the repayment of a mortgage. Now the transaction
involves a sales contract, coordinated leasing terms, and no
mortgage. A third way of doing this transaction might
involve the sale or pledge of the stock in the corporate
entity holding legal title to the property. In this framing of
the transaction the exchange is shifted out of real property
law and into the law governing corporate stock transfers.
Each of these three transactional frames is common
practice and collectively they illustrate several different
ways of approaching the problem. Each framing of the
transaction triggers different aspects of law, and different
cash flow, tax, and other economic consequences.
Once a specific frame and transactional view has been
decided upon, there are still many points to be considered
and evaluated. Within the chosen frame there are multiple
ways of structuring the details of the transaction. Interpre-
tive references may be made to internal rates of return, out
of pocket costs, sunk costs, opportunity costs, market pene-
tration, and net and gross cash flows, among others. Dif-
ferent references used to evaluate the desirability of a given
transactional frame will provide different conclusions about
the consequences of the proposed project
In a similar way, particular drafting points may be ref-
erenced against different interpretive criteria to evaluate
the status of the terms as covenants, warranties, or one of
53. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 3-43 (2d ed. 2002).
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three types of conditions (simultaneous conditions, condi-
tions precedent, and conditions subsequent). The point be-
ing, those different interpretive references may result in
different risk allocations and in different legal and eco-
nomic opportunities. 4 This is true even when operating
within the given transactional frame. Moreover, under-
standing the meanings that each side attaches to particular
words, terms, or conditions used in documenting a transac-
tion is essential to advancing a client's transactional expec-
tation. Being an effective advocate for either side, therefore,
involves an ability to understand the framing and refer-
encing of the transaction from each side.5
Within a given market community, exchange relation-
ships may involve different interpretive references or per-
spectives, but still fall within similar value frames. One can
quickly appreciate this idea, and the contrasting issues in-
volved when moving from a concern for interpretive refer-
encing to one of value framing.6 Consider, for example, a
real estate transaction involving an American developer
negotiating for a project in a transitional economy such as
China. Here, the developer must contend with issues be-
yond interpretive reference points within the same basic
value frame. Here, she must appreciate the interpretive
implications of different value frames-different concep-
tions of property, capitalism, profit, individual autonomy,
and different formulations of the proper balance between
private and public interest in market exchange. 7 Conse-
54. See id.
55. There are a number of classic examples of this type of interpretive
problem in structuring exchange. In the area of contract law, consider two cases
that appear in most first-year law-school casebooks. See Frigaliment Importing
Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (litigating the
meaning of the word "chicken" as used in a contract: did "chicken" include more
expensive "fryers" or simply made reference to lower value "stewing chickens"?);
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (litigating confusion as to
which of two ships by the name of Peerless was the one that was the subject of
the contract between the parties).
56. See Sharon Hom & Robin Paul Malloy, China's Market Economy: A
Semiosis of Cross Boundary Discourse between Law and Economics and Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 815 (1994); MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET
ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 12-15, 66-70. See also KEVIN SINCLAIR & IRIS WONG
PO-YEE, CULTURE SHOCK! A GUIDE TO CUSTOMS AND ETIQUETTE-CHINA (1990)
(one in a series of tour guide books for travelers). See generally CHINESE WOMEN
TRAVERSING DIASPORA: MEMOIRS, ESSAYS, AND POETRY (Sharon K. Hom ed.,
1999) (exploring meaning in alternative cultural-interpretive frames).
57. See infra note 56 (cultural context makes a difference).
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quently, understanding the deal requires an ability to effec-
tively use the tools of interpretation theory to successfully
navigate the cross-cultural waters of commerce. This is of
increasing importance as the process of globalization con-
tinues.
We can also identify value-framing conflicts between in-
terpretive communities within one country. Consider, for
example, the case of American Nurses' Association v. Illi-
nois. This case involved a class action suit that challenged
the appropriate frame of reference for determining wages
for certain classifications of workers.59 The plaintiffs in the
case, brought on behalf of nurses and typists employed by
the State of Illinois, alleged that the state pay scales were
unfair and discriminatory." The claim was that jobs associ-
ated with women paid less than jobs traditionally done by
men." On the surface of the text, the dispute seemed to be
one of contested facts concerning the determination of wages
when a comparison was made between the "work of women"
and the "work of men." 2 The underlying tension in the case,
however, really involved deeply contested values regarding
market operations. 3 The State of Illinois, for instance, de-
fended its wage structure by showing that it was imple-
mented with reference to the wage rates established by the
supply and demand for particular types of employees in the
general labor market. 4 The plaintiffs, however, rejected the
fairness of the marketplace argument and interpreted the
market reference as inappropriate. 5 To them, markets were
inherently biased in favor of men, and market references
simply served to perpetuate the unfairness of the labor
market to women.
Understanding the underlying debate in a case such as
American Nurses' Association, and working to effectively
mediate the tension between the two conflicting interpre-
tive value frames, requires an understanding of the con-
flicting meanings and values dividing the two sides of the
58. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).




63. See id. at 719-20. See generally ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, EQUITY AND
GENDER: THE COMPARABLE WORTH DEBATE (1989).




case. The dispute is not simply about facts; it is about val-
ues and the interpretation of market relationships. Both
sides can recognize that getting the court to understand the
dispute from their own particular frame and reference will
affect the outcome, and ultimately the allocation of eco-
nomic resources.66 Thus, interpretation theory facilitates a
deeper understanding of conflicts such as the one illus-
trated by American Nurses' Association, while directing at-
tention to the use of law in positioning social and gender
relations.67
In addition to explaining the significance of framing
and referencing, this article addresses the way in which
Peirce's semiotic interpretation theory facilitates ex-
change.68 In general, semiotics deals with the way in which
abstract ideas are represented.9 This simply means that it
deals with the devices, concepts, and tools that we use to
communicate and interact with each other." The ability to
represent different forms of property ownership in terms of
deeds, leases, and mortgages, for instance, permits ex-
change in ways that would not be possible without such
representational or interpretive devices.7 A deed repre-
senting fee ownership of real property, for example, permits
a homeowner to control a property as a physical object and,
66. Once the court selects a particular interpretive frame and reference con-
cerning the nature of the dispute and its resolution, the outcome and implica-
tions must be justified within that frame and reference. In a sense, one might
think of selecting the appropriate frame and reference as generally related to
the idea of the judge acting on a cultural-interpretive hunch; and once the judge
makes a framing and referencing choice, the logic of that choice constrains the
decision. See generally Denis J. Brion, The Pragmatic Genesis of Constitutional
Meaning, 10 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 159 (1997); John Dewey, Logical Method
and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924); Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact,
26 ILL. L. REV. 645 (1931); Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Mark C. Modak-Truran, Prag-
matic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55 (2001); Char-
les M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 231 (1990).
67. When this case is analyzed in a cultural-interpretive manner, one better
understands the conflict while also appreciating the way in which dominant
frames and references are used to inform gender politics. See generally FERBER
AND NELSON, supra note 20.
68. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 23-56, 148-
153.
69. See id. at 23-56.
70. See sources supra notes 30, 35, 69.
71. See DESOTO, CAPITALISM, supra note 24, at 4-10, 39-67.
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at the same time, use it as collateral for a secured loan, or
lease it for rental income."2 Law, through legal convention,
permits the property to serve multiple market functions.
Not only does it provide a home and shelter, it can provide
access to credit and to cash flow. In a similar manner, the
ability to use a credit card as a recognized symbol or repre-
sentation of financial ability enhances market exchange by
eliminating the need for individuals to carry large sums of
gold when they shop or travel.73 In so doing, it raises the
possibility of extending exchange beyond the boundaries of
small or informal communities, and thus expands the po-
tential for meaningful and profitable market interaction. In
this way, the transformation of the interpretive frames and
references of legal representation enhances our ability to
create value.74
All of these initial points are just samples of the way in
which an interpretive approach advances our understand-
ing of the relationship between law and market theory.
These points will be further elaborated upon in the re-
maining parts of the article. Discussion will also implicate
the following:
Knowledge and information are fragmented and con-
strained by differences in individual and group experience
and culture. Thus, legal and market institutions vary with
reference to the cultural-interpretive framework in which
they operate. Market concepts are therefore not universal
in application, and opportunities exist for capturing or cre-
ating value in mediating between different groups.
Cultural-interpretive frameworks can vary by such fac-
tors as historical context, race, gender, age, education,
class, and geographical location, among others. The vari-
ance in these frameworks creates asymmetrical position-
ings that can be used to shape markets, to segment mar-
kets, and to discriminate within and between markets.
Understanding law in its market context, and making
sound market judgments, does not require adherence to an
efficiency or wealth-maximization criterion. Efficiency and
wealth maximization are oftentimes ambiguous and highly
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ing these contested ideas requires an implicit, if not ex-
press, reference to esthetics,75 ethics, and logic.
In an interpretive approach, successful market econo-
mies can be understood as being facilitated by legal institu-
tions that promote a concern for others-for third parties
and for a public interest that is not always advanced by the
fragmented pursuit of self-interest. In this regard, it is im-
portant to explore exchange in ways that go beyond as-
sumptions of methodological individualism.
In explaining this interpretive and representational ap-
proach, it is important for the reader to understand that I
am suggesting a new and additional way of exploring the
relationship between law and market theory. I am explor-
ing the relationship between law and market theory as it
might be understood from the perspective of law and soci-
ety,6 or law, culture, and the humanities.77 I am not setting
out to write a critique of other approaches to law and eco-
nomics, nor am I inventing a new kind of economics. 8 I am
exploring the way in which interpretation theory can be ap-
plied to legal economic relationships to explore "hidden"
meanings and values. And this includes understanding
other approaches to law and economics as alternative inter-
pretive frames and references.79
75. Throughout the article, I use the spelling "esthetic" rather than "aes-
thetic" because this is the way it is spelled by Peirce in his usage. See, e.g.,
POTTER, NORMS & IDEALS, supra note 30, at 4 (quoting Peirce).
76. Here, I am referencing an affinity with the Law & Society Association,
at http://www.lawandsociety.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
77. Here, I am referencing an affinity with the Law, Culture, and Humani-
ties Association, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/lch/index.htm (last visited Nov.
11, 2002).
78. Sometimes people jump to conclusions about my work. I am using a dif-
ferent method than that used by people doing an economic analysis of law: my
assumptions and my framework are different. My primary goal is to open up a
new discourse about the relationship between law, markets, and culture, and
one should read this work with this in mind.
79. For example, I do not argue that efficiency is irrelevant. Rather, it
should not be given primacy in examining the relationship between law and
market theory-it is one of a number of important cultural-interpretive frames
and references to consider. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note
9, at 136-48. Furthermore, to once again avoid confusion, I want the reader to
understand that I am not claiming to have invented a new kind of economics. I
am exploring the relationship between law, markets, and culture in a way that
is new when compared to traditional approaches to the economic analysis of
law. In my work, I consider various approaches in law and economics to be
frames and references of importance to legal reasoning. In the simplest terms, I
refer to my subject as law and market economy because I am not doing either
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My primary concern with respect to traditional law and
economics is one that points to the failure of legal econo-
mists, generally, to encourage more people to explore the
application of interpretation theory in this field. This is im-
portant because we can all learn a great deal about social
organization, and about law and society, by applying inter-
pretation theory to law and economics. But more impor-
tantly, we do a disservice to law, and to the development of
legal reasoning, if we permit only market critics to explore
and represent the implications of interpretation theory to
countless judges, students, and practitioners of law.
In this article, therefore, I explore the "institutional"
connections between language, communication, and inter-
pretation as they relate to both law and market economy."
In particular, I examine the role of culture in informing the
process of interpretive choice, and the functioning of law as
a mediator and conventionalizer of contested market
meanings and values. Moreover, I suggest a need to recon-
sider current legal and policy conclusions, including those
that have been shaped and influenced by an economic
analysis of law-an economic analysis of law that has been
under-informed as to interpretation theory and as to the
relationship between law, markets, and culture. I show that
economics is unable to provide us with optimal answers to
pressing socio-legal questions. But when properly posi-
tioned as a cultural-interpretive device, economics can help
us filter information to develop a finite set of plausibly good
courses of action; and once a normative decision is made to
pursue a specific course of action, economics can facilitate a
more cost-effective, or the least costly, way of proceeding.
In explaining these ideas, I proceed in several steps.
First, I explore contested interpretations of the market as
represented in examples from contemporary film, case law,
and competing market performance measures. Second, I
present an interpretive framework and analysis of the rela-
tionship between law, markets, and culture. Third, I show
how an interpretive framework can provide a new way of
analyzing legal and economic disputes. To do this, I explain
the idea of interpretive reference and give two examples.
Fourth, I present a closer look at the basics of Peirce's
law and economics, or an economic analysis of law.




model of interpretation as a way to better understand the
interpretive framework developed in the article. Fifth, and
finally, I offer a few closing comments.
I. CONTESTED "SIGNS" OF THE MARKET
The manner in which we understand the market and
the relationship between law and market economy is
through a process of interpretation. We process the signs
and signals that are communicated to us, and translate
them into meanings and values. Even the process of eco-
nomic calculation requires interpretation, as we must per-
ceive and interpret the valuation of various costs and bene-
fits."1 Similarly, market choice requires an interpretive
process to identify, evaluate, and act upon market options.8 2
These interpretive processes can be examined from a vari-
ety of perspectives, including those of cognitive theory, be-
havioral theory, and assorted approaches to interpretation
theory. This article explores only one of these approaches. It
focuses on the use of cultural-interpretation theory as re-
lated to an applied semiotics influenced by the work of
Charles S. Peirce.83
This part of the article explores contested interpreta-
tions and understandings of the market. It is designed to
set the groundwork for analysis of the way in which a
changing point of view or shifting frame of reference alters
the meanings and values of exchange. In illustrating sev-
eral key areas of contested interpretations of the market,
the article grounds the idea that substantive economic con-
sequences, in terms of resource allocation and distribution,
result from influence over the cultural-interpretive connec-
tors of framing, referencing, and representing in law. It also
points to the ambiguity of much work in law and economics,
inasmuch as shifting cultural-interpretive frames, refer-
ences, and representations allows for ranges of plausibly
good economic results. In other words, economics cannot
help us identify an optimal course of action, but it can be
helpful in directing our attention to a finite set of alterna-
tive choices, all of which may be desirable or socially plau-
81. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 36-50, 70-77,
85-90, 137-48.
82. See id.
83. See id. See also sources supra notes 30, 33 (references to Peirce).
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sible. These choices or sets of plausibly good courses of ac-
tion appear ambiguous when contrasted with the idealized
conception of economics as the ability to calculate optimal
courses of action while bringing clarity to legal reasoning.
Despite these ambiguities, economics, as a cultural-inter-
pretive device, does help us filter the choice-making proc-
ess, and after a normative decision is made to pursue any
particular course of action from a range of plausibly good
ones, economics can assist us in achieving our goal in a
more cost-effective way.
While there are many aspects of the social and market
exchange relationship that can be explored, this part of the
article highlights the cultural-interpretive tension between
the pursuit of self-interest and the promotion of the public
interest. It does this by making reference to illustrative ex-
amples in contemporary film, case opinions, and compara-
tive measures of economic performance.
A. Self-interest and the Public Interest
The traditional approach to market analysis starts from
a presumption that there is a relative or close equivalence
between the pursuit of self-interest and the promotion of
the public interest. This idea is implicit in the standard
economic assumption that, in competitive markets, mar-
ginal private benefits equal marginal social benefits, and
marginal private cost equals marginal social cost.84 This
means that self-interest equals the public interest, and that
there are no negative or positive externalities from market
exchange. The private side of the equation equals the public
side. The same idea dates all the way back to Adam Smith
and his notion of the invisible hand.8 Smith argued, for in-
84. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 6, at 15-16 (discussing assumptions of
the market, such as marginal public benefit equals marginal social benefit,
MPB=MSB, meaning that private interest equals public interest; marginal pri-
vate benefit equals the product price, MPB=PP, meaning that there are no posi-
tive externalities or public goods effects; and marginal private cost equals mar-
ginal social cost, MPC=MSC, meaning that there are no negative externalities).
85. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 89-90 (citing
to I ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 37, at 477-78 (discussing the
invisible hand); SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 37, at 304 (same)).
Smith points out that self-interest is not a proper motivation. SMITH, MORAL
SENTIMENTS, at 71-72. He denounces Hobbes and his theory of self-interest and
self-love. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, at 499-508. He explains that self-interest
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stance, that when individuals pursue their own self-inter-
est, they end up promoting the public interest, even though
it is no part of their original intention. 6 He suggested that
an invisible hand guides us to benefit the public even as we
think first and foremost of ourselves.87 His basic point is
that we must offer goods and services that the public values
if we are to attract the attention, resources, and praise that
benefit us. Thus, if I want to get wealthy as a computer
manufacturer and my only concern is for my own self-inter-
est, I will have to produce the products and services the
public demands or I will not make money. In this way, the
pursuit of my private or self-interest corresponds to the
promotion of the public interest.
This "equivalence theory" of markets can make sense
under traditional assumptions of perfect competition. Such
markets assume that all actors: 1) act rationally; 2) in their
own self-interest; 3) with good and full information; 4) un-
der conditions where all goods and resources are freely
transferable; 5) where all markets permit free and easy en-
try and exit; and 6) prior distributions of wealth and re-
sources do not unfairly impact on competition. In this ideal
world, we are all buyers and sellers of something.8 For in-
stance, I sell my labor for a wage and use my income to pur-
chase food and shelter. At the same time, we observe that
sellers have no power, since perfect competition means that
sellers must respond to consumer demands and preferences
or lose market share to others who will gladly step in to
meet the need. This system means that countless individual
is different from selfishness. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, at 161-65. For an in-
teresting history of the idea of self-interest, see SELF-INTEREST: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Kelly Rogers ed., 1997).
86. See sources supra note 85.
87. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 89-90 (citing
Adam Smith).
88. See FERBER AND NELSON, supra note 20, at 37-68 (discussing assump-
tions); MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 43, at 48-56 (1990) (discussing
assumptions and the problems with these assumptions); MALLOY, LAW AND
MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 125-29 (discussing reciprocity in exchange);
Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841
(1999). See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970) (discussing perfect competition markets
without entry barriers); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293 (1992).
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consumers drive the allocation of resources by pursuing
their own self-interest in the marketplace.
In the real world, we know that the assumptions of the
perfectly competitive market do not always hold true.
Sometimes people do not act rationally, and sometimes we
act altruistically rather than with self-interest. We do not
have perfect information, and access to information is not
evenly distributed. We also know that transferring goods
and services is not always easy, just as it is not always easy
to pack up and move to a distant location in pursuit of a job.
It is difficult to leave family, friends, and one's roots. Simi-
larly, markets are not always open to free entry and exit.
Some markets have huge economies of scale or require li-
censes, or have other formal and informal restrictions in
place. Likewise, we know that prior distribution does make
a difference to competition. People that come into the mar-
ket with more training, prior experience, and greater re-
sources have better odds of being successful. This is true
even though it is also true that the market does not guaran-
tee success: some very rich people have gone broke because
they were unable to stay competitive against new up-
starts.89
One possible conclusion that might be drawn from this
analysis is simple. The more a transactional relationship
appears to resemble key elements of our hypothetical model
of perfect competition, the more it validates letting indi-
viduals arrange the relationship on their own. Their pursuit
of self-interest will come close to approximating the public
interest. On the other hand, the less resemblance between a
given market context and the hypothetical of perfect compe-
tition, the closer we must look at considering ways in which
to facilitate the coordination of private and public interest.
In this regard, we must consider the ways in which law
89. EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL SPECULATION 252 (1999) (discussing Hunt brothers' effort to corner
the international silver market in 1979-80); Laurie Cohen, Hunts Charged in
Silver Scheme: 5-Year Probe Says Group Manipulated Market, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
1, 1985, at Cl; Michael A. Hiltzik, Hunt Brothers Accused of Manipulating Sil-
ver Futures in '79 and '80, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1985, Pt. 4, at 1, Col. 5; Roy
Rowan, A Talkfest with the Hunts, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 1980, at 162. See Anita
Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1,
57 (2001); Robert Hahn, Foreword to Competition Policy and the New Economy,
32 UWLA L. REV. 159 (2001); James F. Moore, U.S. v. Microsoft: The Bigger
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at 12-BU.
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might be used to enhance the process of exchange so as to
make it come closer to the ideal.
There are several factors that can cause a variance be-
tween private (self-interest) and the public interest. These
factors include: high transaction or coordination costs when
multiple parties of interest are involved; lack of good infor-
mation; irrational discrimination directed at certain market
participants; extensive externalities; path dependencies;
public goods or commons problems; and poorly defined legal
rights, among others.9"
There is, of course, another, perhaps more fundamental,
problem with equating the pursuit of self-interest with the
promotion of the public interest. In traditional approaches
to law and economics, this assumption works to focus atten-
tion on the actions of detached and atomistic individuals. It
also operates to frame the vast majority of socio-legal dis-
putes as ones of contested facts, within the given economic
framework, rather than of contested values between claim-
ants in differently situated interpretive communities. This
framing may be wrong, and it is at least highly contestable
since it is generally linked to an assumption of methodo-
logical individualism.91 This means that it is linked to the
assumption of detached and purely rational individuals.
But individuals, as interpretive beings, are not isolated, de-
tached, and atomistic; instead, they are embedded within
communities. And successful market economies may suc-
90. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing Legal En-
titlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (regard-
ing transaction costs when multiple parties are involved); George Akerlof, The
Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 239 (Avery W. Katz ed., 1998)
(regarding information availability in the market); THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 14-15 (regarding irrational discrimination in
the marketplace); BARNES & STOUT, supra note 7, at 40-42 (regarding external-
ities); MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 101-02 (regarding
path dependency and citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUES (1951)); Hardin, supra note 11, at 1243 (regarding tragedy of the com-
mons and overuse of public resources); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 94-95
(demonstrating delineation of legal rights).
91. Methodological individualism refers to the traditional economic focus on
individuals as rational and self-interested calculators of efficiency. See MARK
BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 46, 49, 50, 227-28 (1980) [hereinafter
"BLAUG, METHODOLOGY"]; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 6, at 114-15 (institu-
tional economics focuses on "mutual interdependence rather than atomistic in-
dependence"); MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 57-69 (an
interpretive critique of the concept).
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ceed, in part, precisely because they construct legal institu-
tions capable of representing a public interest that is not
expressed by the fragmented pursuit of individual self-in-
terest.92
Even Adam Smith understood, for instance that indi-
viduals exchange and act within a social fabric. Economic
calculus does not occur in isolation, nor is it detached from
a conception of meaning and value informed by social inter-
action and point of view. Consequently, to the extent that
markets involve the actions of individuals embedded within
a social fabric, we need to know something about how these
individuals understand and communicate. We need to un-
derstand human action in terms of the meaning and value
formation process. We need to understand market choice
not as a form of mathematical calculus, but as a process of
experiential interpretation involving individuals embedded
within and between cultural-interpretive communities. 94
Market choice and market action are, therefore, socially
situated, and we need to think in terms of the legal institu-
tions that can enable us to exchange beyond our own cul-
tural-interpretive boundaries.
Consequently, market transactions are constrained and
influenced by an individual's experience, position, and
frame of reference within a community. The idea of pro-
moting the pursuit of self-interest as a means of advancing
the public interest is, therefore, contingent upon one's in-
terpretive conception of self and public-of self and other-
of autonomy (freedom) and coercion (necessity).95 From a
cultural-interpretive point of view, this means that market
analysis is contested not only in terms of facts, but also in
terms of values. And, from the perspective of legal decision-
making, it is important to develop a pragmatic under-
92. See supra Part IV.C and related notes.
93. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 64-69, 106-
115, 118; SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 37, at 71, 200-60, 352, 422
(discussing the impartial spectator). Smith also discusses the need to humble
the pursuit of self-interest and to realize that we all operate within a social con-
text. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 37, at 161-62.
94. See generally MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9 (this is
the general theory developed in the book).
95. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 33, at 1-47. Freedom is
the opposite of necessity. Id at 16; HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra




standing of the contested frames and references at issue in
a given dispute.
We can begin to understand the contested nature of the
relationship between law and markets by examining a few
illustrations from contemporary film, case opinions, and
comparative measures of economic performance.
B. Framing the Market in Contemporary Film
Contemporary films include numerous examples of con-
tested interpretations of market values and meanings.
These film images and representations are useful to explore
as they reflect and illuminate tensions in underlying legal,
cultural, and economic relationships. These film clips can
include images of urban gentrification and the market ex-
ploitation of African Americans as presented in a number of
scenes in the movie Boyz N The Hood,96 or a discussion of
reverse discrimination in hiring in the movie Jungle Fever.97
Similarly, films such as Do The Right Thing98 explore the
claims that a community might have upon a business oper-
ating in a given neighborhood. One can also find very useful
scenes in such diverse films as Class Action," and Disney's
Pocahontas. For law to mediate these tensions and com-
mand respect across diverse communities, it cannot pre-
sume a singular and universal interpretation of the mar-
ketplace.
Two films, Wall Street and Other People's Money,"' con-
tain significant scenes involving corporate stockholder
96. BOYZ N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991) (including discussion of bi-
ased college testing standards, under funded school, unsafe neighborhoods, po-
lice brutality, and the economic destruction of neighborhoods resulting from the
sale of guns, liquor, and drugs to African Americans by whites).
97. JUNGLE FEVER (Universal City Studios 1991) (the main character, an Af-
rican American architect named Flip, objects when his white bosses hire an
Italian American secretary after Flip had requested that an African American
be hired; his bosses accuse Flip of wanting to impose illegal reverse discrimina-
tion).
98. DO THE RIGHT THING (MCA Universal 1989) (discussed in this section of
the article).
99. CLASS ACTION (Twentieth Century Fox 1990)(discussed in this section of
the article).
100. POCAHONTAS (Walt Disney 1995) (discussed in this section of the arti-
cle).
101. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987); OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
(Warner Bros. 1991). See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at
168-70 (the discussion here expands on an example used in my earlier book).
20031
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
meetings, and raise interesting issues about the nature of
market values and the purpose of exchange. They also raise
questions about the nature of the firm, the characteristics
of ownership, and the community obligations of business.
Both films involve a takeover bid by an investor seeking to
break up a company as a way of enhancing stockholder
value. The lead characters in each film make appeals to the
stockholders urging the stockholders to vote in favor of the
takeover, and for liquidation of the firm in an effort to
maximize stockholder value.
In Wall Street, Gordon Gekko, played by Michael
Douglas, takes the center stage at a stockholder meeting
held in the surroundings of a well-appointed convention
center. In the room, there are plenty of well-dressed stock-
holders who are seated on chairs at the floor level, looking
up to a platform stage upon which sits the president and his
thirty-three corporate vice presidents. After the corporate
president warns stockholders that Gekko is a destroyer of
companies, and that they should reject any takeover offer
from him, Gekko takes up the microphone, from the floor,
and declares, "I am not a destroyer of companies, I am a
liberator of them." Gekko goes on to tell stockholders to vote
in favor of his takeover bid because he will make them rich.
He tells them "greed is good, greed simplifies, greed clari-
fies, greed in all of its forms makes the marketplace work."
He tells them to ignore the concerns of the inefficient man-
agement of the company, and to pursue their own self-in-
terest, to follow their greed in the pursuit of wealth. The
clarity of the self-interested pursuit of greed will bring
them to a freedom that only Gekko can deliver.
Similarly, in Other People's Money, Danny DeVito,
playing Larry the Liquidator, makes an appeal to stock-
holders to vote in favor of his takeover bid because he will
make them money. He tells them that the company, while
profitable, is worth more dead (liquidated) than alive. He
tells stockholders to vote for making the best return on
their money, and that they have no obligation to the em-
ployees of the company or to the community where its fac-
tory is located. Their only obligation is to make the best
profit for themselves.
In contrast to these views, Gregory Peck, playing the
role of the eighty-one-year-old founder and president of the
New England Wire and Cable Company in Other People's
Money, argues that a company is worth more than the value
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of its stock. He says that a business is about people. It is
about people who work together pursuing a common pur-
pose, and who share the same friendships and live in the
same community. He cautions the stockholders to avoid
selfish and greedy actions and instead asks them to vote
with their feelings. He asks them to vote for the continua-
tion of a profitable business. He asserts that a business is
more than a collection of capital goods. He tells them that a
business is a community.
In contrast to the scene from Wall Street, the stock-
holder meeting in Other People's Money occurs at the fac-
tory, and the film's director presents us with images of the
"blue collar" town and workers who are present both inside
and outside of the meeting. The meeting is not set in some
sterile convention hall as in Wall Street, but is held in the
very town that will be affected by closing the plant. The
dispute is not about an inefficient management team; it is
about a company that is no longer as productive as other
investments because new technologies are cutting into its
market. The common theme between these films is the
same, however. Each involves the takeover of a company by
a rational, but "heartless," Wall Street "money-man" de-
claring that the only obligation people owe one another is to
maximize wealth in the pursuit of self-interest.
In both Wall Street and Other People's Money, the take-
over advocates address the legal owners of the company, the
stockholders, and tell them to maximize their wealth by
voting to liquidate the companies while they are still valu-
able. In contrast, Peck's character frames the appeal differ-
ently. He basically asserts that a company has obligations
to its "stakeholders," and not just to its legal owners. He po-
sitions the proper market analysis as including the commu-
nity, the schools, residents, workers, and others that have
contributed to the company over the years. The company is
not simply a detached and impersonal capital good; it is
more than a physical object; it is a web of interconnected in-
terests and values. He argues that resource determinations
should account for a broader set of interests than those re-
flected by legal owners simply pursuing self-interest. In
part, therefore, Peck's character questions the value frame
and the interpretive reference set by the wealth maximizing
character, Larry the Liquidator. By changing the value
frame and the interpretive reference, Peck's character can
logically promote a different economic calculus.
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In viewing these scenes, one gets a close-up look at the
real tension between two different visions of the market. It
becomes clear that the disagreements are as much, or more,
about values as they are about facts. It is not just a debate
about the profitability of the various companies in question,
for instance, but about the values to be promoted and en-
dorsed by a market economy.
These two film clips also deal with tensions surround-
ing the meaning of property. Both involve corporate take-
overs and, in a similar way, each raises fundamental ques-
tions about ownership and the corporate form. Each asks us
to consider who owns a company-the stockholders, the
management, the workers, the community? How does own-
ership relate to having a "stakeholder" interest? Are claims
by the community in this type of situation any different
than the ones made by fans when their favorite major
league football or baseball team threatens to pull out and
move to a new city? Do corporations exist simply to maxi-
mize profit for the stockholders? Is there such a thing as
good corporate citizenship? What is the basic nature and
role of the firm in law and society, and how do alternative
conceptions of the firm, and of the market, relate to matters
of information costs, risk assessment and management,
production costs, market price, firm valuation, and labor
relations? These considerations set up an examination of
the exchange relationships within the firm, and between
the firm, its constituent parts, and the community. Under-
standing the relationships helps us establish a map or plan
for a more detailed investigation of factors to address in le-
gal reasoning and public policy making.
Another insightful contemporary film that contests the
meanings and values of the marketplace is Spike Lee's Do
The Right Thing.10 2 There are a couple of important scenes
to consider in this film. The first involves a discussion be-
tween Sal, the owner of Sal's World Famous Pizzeria, and
his oldest son, Pino, who works at the Pizzeria. Sal operates
his Pizza shop in a neighborhood that has been trans-
formed. Once it was an Italian American community that
Sal identified with, but over the twenty-five-year period
that Sal has been there, the neighborhood has become home
to an Hispanic and Mrican American community. Sal is
very Italian and his shop celebrates this by having a "wall
102. DO THE RIGHT THING, supra note 98.
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of fame" where there are pictures of great Italian Ameri-
cans. The problem is that Sal's customers are African
American and Hispanic, and they do not identify with the
same heroes.
At several points in the film, some of his teenage cus-
tomers complain that they want to see "some Black heroes
on the wall of fame." This causes a lot of heated debate and
tension. It is interesting that Sal's response is positioned in
the classic framework of neoclassical economics. Sal argues
that "it is his shop, he built it, he worked it, he owns it, and
he will put whomever he wants on his wall of fame." Sal's
response is understandable and justifiable in the individu-
alist framework of traditional law and economics. On the
other hand, Sal fails to appreciate the nature of the claim
being raised. While the teenagers are talking about specific
pictures on a wall, they are also "representing" a broader
question about the community responsibility of a business.
In this sense, the issues seem close to those raised by the
two movies just discussed. Here, the question is not so
much about who owns a corporation as it is about the claim
that a community has on the people and activities within its
boundaries. Sal is a part of the neighborhood, but like the
detached and atomistic figure of "homo-economicus," he is
not a part of the community. He claims his pizza shop is an
island, but the community questions his ability to be there
without being a part of the people he serves.
In another scene from the same film, Sal is talking with
Pino inside the pizza shop. The son looks through the win-
dow and outside to the neighborhood and complains that he
hates working in this place. He hates all the black people, it
drives him crazy, and his friends laugh at him for working
in that community. Sal tells his son that these people who
laugh at him for working in this neighborhood are not his
friends. He asks, "Who puts the food on your table, who
pays for your clothes, and who puts a roof over your head?
These people, and I am proud that they have grown up on
my food." In this scene, Sal is once again representing the
traditional law and economics view. He is not really con-
nected to his customers as people, as friends, as part of his
community, but he sees them, through a glass enclosure, as
a means to serving his own self-interest. They are the
source of his income, and, in pursuing his own self-interest,
he has promoted the public interest by providing these peo-
ple with food. In the end, Sal seems to be telling his son
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that his friends are not really friends because they do not
understand how the market works. They do not understand
how Pino gets an economic advantage from selling pizza to
the people in this neighborhood. These so-called friends
should not make fun of Pino for serving African American
and Hispanic people; they should applaud Pino for so clev-
erly serving his own self-interest.
At the end of the film violence breaks out as community
members trash and burn Sal's Pizza shop. The hope is for
law to provide a mediating mechanism to avoid this kind of
violence. To do this, however, law (and theory of law and
economics) must account for alternative market experi-
ences. Law cannot presuppose a singular or universal mar-
ket frame if it is to provide credible and meaningful resolu-
tion to the tensions depicted in the film. Thus, this clip,
once again, raises important issues about the patterns of
exchange and the nature of social meanings in market soci-
ety. It opens the door to a discussion of self-interest and the
degree to which it permits market actors to treat others as
objects of trade or simply as a dehumanized means to their
own economic ends. Pursuing useful information about the
nature of these exchange relationships and contested inter-
pretations is important to developing a responsive and
pragmatic approach to law, because the appropriateness of
a response will be judged differently depending upon the
use of any given value frame or interpretive reference.
Likewise, alternative frames and references promote differ-
ent resource distributions that should be accounted for in
legal decision-making.
Two other contemporary films to consider include Class
Action,' and Disney's Pocahontas.'
One scene from the film Class Action involves a discus-
sion of cost and benefit analysis related to the question of
repairing a defect in an automobile that a company has on
the market. This scene is reminiscent of the Ford Pinto liti-
gation, and is reflective of the more recent rash of lawsuits
involving allegedly defective Firestone tires."°5 In the film,
103. CLASS ACTION, supra note 99.
104. POCAHONTAS, supra note 100.
105. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 547, 568-70 (2000); LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE? FORD'S
PINTO TRIAL (1980); Bob Van Voris & Matt Fleischer, Feeding Frenzy over
Firestone, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 11, 2000, at Al; Jeffrey A. Fick, Calif Jury Rules
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the automobile in question has a defective turn signal
switch that causes sparks to ignite the vehicle in certain
types of collisions. The sparks cause the vehicle to explode,
and a number of plaintiffs are suing the company for burns
and deaths. In this particular scene, the company president
explains to the corporate lawyers that statistical studies
were done by the company indicating that it would be
cheaper to deal with potential lawsuits than to recall and
fix all of the cars. "It's a simple cost and benefit analysis."
Thus, the company knowingly chose to leave the defective
cars on the market and allow people to be injured and
killed.
The scene provides a glimpse into a purely "rational
choice" discussion that leaves the viewer wondering about
the nature of justice, and the decision-making process of the
corporate enterprise. The scene clearly depicts the nature of
discussion within a given cultural-interpretive value frame,
and viewers are challenged to understand the implications.
Viewers are confronted with the consequential meaning of
promoting a system of social organization grounded in sim-
ple cost and benefit analysis, and driven by a desire for
wealth maximization. They are also challenged to formulate
alternative strategies based on competing values, and dif-
ferent interpretive frameworks.
The question that remains is: if the company cannot use
cost and benefit analysis, what can it use as a guide to deci-
sion-making? A reasonable response might involve refram-
ing the question. One might ask: what considerations and
information beyond a cost and benefit analysis should be
used to guide us in decision-making? In this respect, the
challenge is to see that multiple frames and references can
be used together, at the same time. There is no need to ac-
cept a simple dualistic frame that positions the choice as
between using only cost and benefit analysis, or suggesting
a complete rejection of cost and benefit analysis. Life in a
modern market economy is too complex for simple dualistic
responses. Moreover, social and market choices are too
complex to be simplified into mere factual disputes. As this
example illustrates, the underlying dispute is more pro-
found than a contest between two different teams of experts
Ford Explorer 'Defective', USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2002, at B1. See generally Nor-
wood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to Obey the
Law?, 45 DEPAuL L. REV. 729 (1996).
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and their calculation of the proper costs and benefits for
announcing a recall on the defective automobile. The deeper
issue concerns the proper value frame to be used in identi-
fying and evaluating the appropriate facts to be considered
in making a decision with major individual and community
implications.
We can even find images of deep-seated social tension
about the meanings and values of the marketplace in films
for children. Disney's Pocahontas presents the contrast of
two competing frames of reference for market analysis. One
view, put forward by the character of John Smith, is based
on a belief in science, technology, and the separation of man
from the natural world."6 The other view, represented in
the character of Pocahontas, is grounded in a connection to
nature, and based on an emotive sense of belonging and a
non-monetary sense of value. 7 The scene, therefore, posi-
tions tension between two competing value frames and dif-
ferent sets of interpretive references.
In one particular scene, Captain Smith is alone with
Pocahontas in the woods. He is telling her about his home
in London, and explaining the way in which the English
will show Pocahontas and her people how "to make the
most of their land." He explains how England has civilized
"savages" all over the world and showed them how to indus-
trialize and make progress. Smith sees the land and its re-
sources in terms of the ability to commodify them for pur-
poses of economic gain and wealth maximization.
Pocahontas responds that her people already know how to
make good use of the land, and that they are not savages
just because they are different from the English. She ex-
plains the connection between nature and her people, and
wonders if Smith can ever understand the value of the land
without calculating its monetary worth.
In a sense Pocahontas reiterates the theme of each of
the other films. Each reflects a deeply contested public dis-
course regarding the nature of market life. Each contests
assertions of ownership and of the pursuit of self-interest as
a sustainable and worthy criterion for social organization.
Each raises questions of valuation and of participation in
106. See FERBER AND NELSON, supra note 20, at 1-93 (discussing the objec-
tive male perspective in economics and the bias that this has relative to the dif-




the decision-making process. Each offers competing frames
and references and challenges us to develop supportable
and persuasive justifications for invoking one frame rather
than another. Similarly, each provides us with an under-
standing of the way in which alternative cultural-interpre-
tive frames promote different potential distributions, as
well as competing meanings and values.
Collectively, these scenes from selective contemporary
film illustrate, at a popular culture level, the highly con-
tested interpretive conflicts represented in modern legal
and economic discourse. Debates concerning these same is-
sues fill law reviews, law school curriculums, courthouses,
and legislative hearings. Gaining a better understanding of
these discursive tensions, and their implications for law
and market economy, requires an interpretive approach to
law and economics. Furthermore, once we understand the
framing and referencing conflicts that ground these inter-
pretive conflicts, we can employ a variety of social science
tools to assist us in clarifying and enlightening the process
of pragmatic legal decision-making.
C. Framing the Market in Case Opinions
There are numerous case opinions that contain illustra-
tions of contested visions of market relationships. Since
space is limited, however, this section of the article only
discusses a few cases with the hope that they will serve as
an adequate example of cultural-interpretive framing issues
at play in using market analysis to address pressing socio-
legal problems. There has been no systematic attempt to
select the "best" or most favorable case opinions; rather, a
simple selection of useful cases has been made.
In Merritt v. Faulkner, 0 8 a prisoner in the Indiana State
Prison, Billy Merritt, challenged the denial of appointment
of counsel in a civil action. While in prison, Merritt experi-
enced medical problems with his eye related to sickle cell
disease."9 As a result of incomplete and alleged incompetent
medical treatment, and as a product of the alleged deliber-
ate indifference of prison officials, Merritt suffered the loss
108. 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983). See also
ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 43, at 126 (providing a
similar discussion of this case).
109. Id. at 762.
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of his eyesight.11 ° In reviewing the denial of appointed coun-
sel for Merritt, the majority of a three judge panel of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was improper
to deny appointed counsel to Merritt, who, as an indigent
prisoner, was seeking to advance a claim against prison of-
ficials based on the denial of his civil rights.
The majority opinion, delivered by Judge Swygert, rec-
ognized that "[i]ndigent civil litigants have no constitu-
tional or statutory right to be represented by a lawyer.""' 2
Yet, he found that "when rights of a constitutional dimen-
sion are at stake, a poor person's access to the federal
courts must not be turned into an exercise in futility.""' 3
Furthermore, he stated that "[i]n some civil cases meaning-
ful access requires representation by a lawyer.""' 4 The Court
then went on to set out five non-exclusive factors to be con-
sidered and balanced in determining an indigent individu-
als right to appointed counsel in such a case. These factors
included:
(1) whether the merits of the indigent's claim are colorable; (2) the
ability of the indigent plaintiff to investigate crucial facts; (3)
whether the nature of the evidence indicates that the truth will
more likely be exposed where both sides are represented by coun-
sel; (4) the capability of the indigent litigant to present the case;
and (5) the complexity of the legal issues raised by the com-
plaint."'
Using these factors, the court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in not providing Merritt with ap-
pointed counsel."6
Judge Posner offered a separate opinion.1 7 Posner
framed his analysis of the case in market terms. He argued
for a presumption against appointed counsel in such a civil
action," ' his general reasoning being that any individual
with a good case for tort liability would be able to get a law-
yer because of the economic incentive of recovering a con-
110. Id.
111. See id. at 763-68.
112. Id. at 763.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 764.
116. Id.




tingency fee." 9 Thus, it was unnecessary to do an after-the-
fact-balancing test because the market could more readily
and efficiently pass upon the merits of the case. If it were a
strong case with substantial prospects of prevailing against
the state, the indigent would show up with an attorney. In
other words, the market would respond to the need and the
potential for economic gain. The fact that Merritt showed
up without an attorney resolved the matter against the in-
digent claimant.
Posner's position is altogether consistent with framing
this issue within an individualist, self-interested market
model. He suggests that prisoners have ample access to in-
formation about lawyers,' and that lawyers have ample
access to information about potential civil claims within the
prison system. He imagines a competitive market for pro-
viding civil legal services to indigent prisoners, and he re-
jects the majority opinion's statement that "[a]n underlying
assumption of the adversarial system is that both parties
will have roughly equal legal resources."'' To the contrary,
Posner asserts that "[t]his has never been an assumption of
the adversarial system.'
2
Such a view is consistent with Posner's assumptions
about a perfectly competitive market. In the perfectly com-
petitive market, there is no assumption about equality of
resource allocation, and inequalities in prior distributions
are dismissed as unproblematic. Posner frames his investi-
gation in terms of the organizing principles of self-interest.
In this frame, the lawyer and the indigent prisoner will
both be lead by an invisible hand to achieve justice without
the need for government intervention into the marketplace.
But Posner's framing misses an important element that is
at work in the framing of the majority opinion with which
he disagrees.
A problem with Posner's opinion, even if one were to ac-
cept the idea of a well functioning and competitive market
in this context, is that it leaves the indigent claimant with
no legal representation unless there is a significant contin-
gency fee available. This means that slight injuries, or in-
juries that are important but difficult to quantify in eco-
119. Id. at 769-70.
120. Id. at 770.




nomic terms may well go unaddressed. This is because the
market responds to the willingness and ability to pay. And
when an injury is slight, the potential fee to a lawyer will
be negligible. Thus, there will be little if any incentive for a
lawyer to aid the indigent claimant. A similar problem
arises with slight or technical violations of the Constitution.
The violation may impose only a minor cost or burden on
the individual but the redress of the violation may be costly
to society. Thus, a simple cost and benefit analysis may lead
one to over look the technical or minor violation. It would
make rational economic sense to do so. The problem with
this conclusion, however, is that it ignores the positive
externalities that flow to the benefit of others from requir-
ing the State to uphold the Constitution and to respect the
human dignity of all its citizens.123
In other words, litigation that addresses constitutional
considerations about the relationship between individuals
and the state has implications for people beyond those that
are the immediate parties to the suit." Where Posner uses
a "zoom lens" to focus in on a two party transaction to cal-
culate efficiency, the majority seemingly takes a "wide-an-
gle" look at the public interest represented by the underly-
ing issues at stake in the dispute. Where Posner imagines
that the pursuit of self-interest leads to the promotion of
the public interest, the majority identifies a problem with
this rationale. The majority opinion expresses a concern
that justice, even justice based on a desire for efficiency,
might not prevail where extensive positive externalities are
present.
125
Consequently, the case can be interpreted in different
ways. It can be understood in terms of a difference in the
123. A positive externality involves a benefit that "spills over" to third par-
ties. The immediate parties to the transaction are unable to capture all of the
benefits from the exchange relationship. See generally, COOTER AND ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 40-41.
124. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 7, at 42-43 (defining aspects of public
goods); NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING NEW
ROLES, ISSUES, AND TRENDS 23-78 (David C. Hammack & Denis R. Young eds.,
1993) [hereinafter NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS] (explaining public goods issues
and examples in the role of nonprofit organizations); PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET
FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed., 1992); JOHN G. HEAD,
PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC WELFARE (1974); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE
55-58 (2002).
125. RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS (2001); COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 7, at 42-43; ROSEN, supra note 124, at 55-58.
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cultural-interpretive referencing of individual rights, and of
the relevant market concepts to be considered. The case is
not so much about disputed facts concerning Merritt's in-
jury or the cost of an attorney to represent him. It is about
the underlying values we seek to promote in our particular
form of constitutional and representative government. We
must, therefore, work to develop a logical and useful
method of analysis that includes both fact-based and value-
based components-one that balances the relationship be-
tween the humanities and the sciences.
One can identify similar contested interpretations of
market framing in cases dealing with issues of commodifi-
cation and entitlement respecting the human body.'26 Con-
sider, for example, the case of In the Matter of Baby M.121
The Baby M case involved a private contractual attempt
by three individuals to rearrange the family formation pro-
cess. 12 The exchange in question involved William Stern,
Elizabeth Stern (his wife), and Mary Beth Whitehead (the
surrogate mother).'29 Mr. and Mrs. Stern were unable to
have a child, but desperately wanted to start a family. They
were discouraged by the adoption process and wanted a
child that would reflect some of their own genetic makeup.
This prompted the Sterns to enter into a contract with
Whitehead, providing for Mr. Stern's sperm to be used to
artificially inseminate Whitehead."' Whitehead agreed to
carry the resulting child to term and upon birth to deliver
the baby to the Sterns.' Upon delivery of the baby Mrs.
Stern would adopt the child and Mary Beth Whitehead
would terminate and relinquish all maternal rights.3 2 For
her services, Whitehead was to be paid $10,000 and the
126. See, e.g., In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Moore v.
Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
127. 537 A.2d 1227.
128. Id. at 1234. See June Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in De-
termining the Validity of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581
(1988); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Ap-
proach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REV. 835, 872-75
(2000); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Surrogacy from the Perspectives of Economic and
Civil Liberties, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 435-38 (2001); Carol
Sanger, (Baby) M Is for the Many Things: Why I Start with Baby M, 44 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1443 (2000).






Stern's agreed to cover the costs of fertilization and mater-
nity.
133
The case is interesting because it involves issues of rep-
resentation, framing, and referencing. At the outset we
need to consider the way in which the law represents Ms.
Whitehead's body and that of Baby M. Are they beings en-
dowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, or
are they simply new examples of post-industrial commodi-
ties, available for sale or lease? Is this a case about the deg-
radation of human life or a celebration of the legal com-
modification of children and of the woman's womb? The
case also raises further questions concerning the legal rep-
resentation of family formation, motherhood, and paternity,
among others.
Beyond the above issues, we can frame this case in sev-
eral ways. For example, the transaction might be framed in
at least one of three ways. The transaction might be framed
or represented as one involving the sale of a baby; as pay-
ment for incubation services; or as a lease of space in an
otherwise empty or underutilized womb. The legal system,
given the tragic experience with treating people as objects
of sale in the United States, is generally not inclined to
view these transactions favorably when they are cast as
baby sales. On the other hand, as a contract for services, or
perhaps even as a lease of space, the transaction may be
sustainable.
First of all, the transaction initially appears as consen-
sual between all of the parties. Consequently, it was ini-
tially a pareto efficient arrangement because at least one
party was made better off while no one was made worse off
as a result of the exchange.' The Sterns wanted a child
and had sufficient income to make the payments necessary
to attract a willing person to participate in their plan. Mrs.
Whitehead consented to all of the contract terms and found
that this was a viable way to earn additional income by
taking advantage of her fertility and her ability to carry a
child to term.' Her payment would reflect the value of
other income producing opportunities that she would forego
133. Id. at 412.
134. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 108, 154 (dis-
cussing consent and basic definitional issues with respect to pareto and kaldor-
hicks efficiency).
135. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 413-14.
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in order to perform her part of the contract. In the end,
however, after the baby was born, Mrs. Whitehead had a
change of mind and did not want to give up the baby.136 This
resulted in litigation to enforce the contract.
While an initial review of the case can be framed as a
consensual two-party transaction between Whitehead and
the Sterns, a closer examination indicates the possibility of
another more complex framing. The exchange also involves
Baby M, potential relatives, and the public. First, Baby M is
a person with constitutional rights. The Sterns and White-
head acted in an agency capacity in contracting over the
status and identity of this baby, but Baby M has some
rights independent of the contract and these rights need to
be reflected in the transaction.137 This raises a question of
how these rights or meanings would or could be properly
represented and incorporated into such an agreement. Sec-
ond, the Sterns and Whitehead made a contract that had
implication not only for themselves but also for people that
would be genetic or contractual relatives to Baby M. Other
children of Mrs. Whitehead, for example, would be denied a
relationship with their sibling as a result of this contract.
The contract also had a public implication. Beyond the pub-
lic policy question related to upholding such private con-
tracts there is a public interest in family stability, and in
factors related to the healthcare, schooling, and parenting
implications of new children brought into a community.
Furthermore, what of the situation where the baby might
have been born with severe genetic defects, could the
Stern's have rejected delivery on terms of it being a noncon-
forming good? Would Mrs. Whitehead be able to refuse a re-
turn of the baby under such circumstances, and would the
baby end up as a charge of the public?
When Mrs. Whitehead breaches the contract by seeking
to retain maternal rights, the economic question arises as to
if the breach is efficient. Here we can select from several
economic reference points to analyze the situation. Using a
pareto efficiency test we know that the breach is inefficient
because at least one party is made worse off as a result of
the breach. With reference to kaldor-hicks efficiency we can
136. Id. at 415.
137. See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 124, at 23-78 (discussing
agency issues related to education, health care, and other examples. Agency in
the sense of making decisions for others).
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generate additional views of the case. As between the par-
ties it might be asked if Mrs. Whitehead wins more than
the Sterns lose, or perhaps there is a need to expand the
scope of this calculation to one of asking if Mrs. Whitehead
and Baby M win more than the Sterns and Baby M lose. We
also have to view this from a publicly positioned evaluation
of kaldor-hicks efficiency and ask if the public gains more
than these private parties lose by taking one position or an-
other as to the validity of such transactions. In each situa-
tion one must consider the extremely difficult matter of
valuation on all sides of the exchange. In the actual case the
court decided that the contract could not be enforced.
138
Public policy favored other channels, such as formal adop-
tion, as an alternative way to establish a family.
Thus, the court denied private parties a right to rear-
range public conceptions of the family and the family for-
mation process, at least until such time as the legislature
might expressly provide otherwise. Moreover, the issues in
the case indicate a variety of potential economic outcomes
depending upon the way in which alternative market
framings and references are used. The outcome, in part,
turns on how one defines or frames the relationship be-
tween the parties, and on how one frames and references
the potential interests involved.
More important than recognizing the ambiguity of eco-
nomic calculation in this situation is the understanding of
how the authority to represent the meanings and values of
this relationship inform the outcome. The case illustrates
the flexible nature of an economic calculus, with different
outcomes able to be declared efficient based on the use of
particular framing and referencing devices. Framing the
transaction as a simple two party exchange to be analyzed
under a pareto efficiency standard, for instance, leads to a
very different result than would prevail if it was framed as
a multiparty transaction with numerous public external-
ities, and with a reference to a kaldor-hicks efficiency stan-
dard. The authority, therefore, to set the cultural-interpre-
tive frame and reference has implications for resource
definition and distribution. More fundamentally, and per-
haps more difficult to appreciate, is the matter of represen-
tation in this exchange. Who should have the authority to
define the relationships between the parties, and who
138. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 411.
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should control the representation of meaning and value in
this complex human exchange? These are important ques-
tions because the authority to represent and to interpret
relationships involves the power to create and redistribute
wealth and resources.
A final case to consider in this section of the article is
Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate System. 139 This case ad-
dressed the issue of market power in housing markets when
a claim was asserted with respect to the racially discrimi-
natory practices of Easy Life." Easy Life was in the busi-
ness of rehabbing houses and financing their acquisition by
homebuyers."' The aggrieved homebuyers in the case were
African Americans.'42 They claimed that Easy Life exploited
them in the market, and that Easy Life violated both the
Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act.'
In Honorable, the evidence indicated that Easy Life
targeted a sales market in a neighborhood that was 95% Af-
rican American, and that the products sold in this market
were priced at substantially higher rates than comparable
ones sold to white customers in other neighborhoods." The
basis of the claim was, therefore, that Easy Life was fol-
lowing a dual market strategy and exploiting African
American consumers. Easy Life argued that it did not and
could not exploit African American homebuyers in this way,
and that it could not be held liable for exploitation because
it lacked the market power needed to successfully advance
such a discriminatory strategy. 45 It referenced a Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) guideline for the proposition that
a seller with less than a 35% market share was presumed
not to have the market power necessary to split and exploit
the market. 6
The FTC guideline in question can be understood as
embodying a traditional neoclassical economic assumption
that a seller in a competitive market lacks the power to set
terms and to exploit consumers. In the perfectly competitive
139. Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
140. See id. at 886-87.
141. Id. at 886.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 886-87.




market paradigm, sellers are without power. Power resides
in the consumer because they can easily shift to a new
seller if one seller attempts to deal on undesirable terms.
Easy Life presented economic information about the defini-
tion of the market and of its relevant market share.'47 It ar-
gued that in the absence of market power it could not ac-
complish the ends alleged by the plaintiffs.'48 In essence,
Easy Life asserted an inability to influence the meanings
and values of the exchange because formal equality existed
between the parties in the absence of market power.
The court rejected the interpretive framing and refer-
encing offered by Easy Life. It reasoned that market exploi-
tation was possible in the absence of a 35% market share.'49
It held that markets could be segmented and fragmented
into enclaves informed by certain behavioral and interpre-
tive practices. 15 Here Easy Life controlled information and
market access for the consumers in question. 5' It shaped
the interpretive framework of the exchange relationship
and could, by such practices, exploit a particular set of con-
sumers even if it otherwise lacked broad market power.
The analysis in Honorable worked to frame the market
in terms of potential sub markets, and in terms of the in-
ability of assumptions about perfectly competitive markets
to fully inform the situation. Asymmetrical positioning
within the community made it possible for Easy Life to
segment and exploit an identifiable group within the com-
munity and this raised clear questions of discrimination
that could not be understood or addressed by simplified
concepts of efficiency, wealth maximization, and perfect
competition.
The opinion is important because it confirms the differ-
ence between an economic analysis and a concern for the
authority to represent and interpret meanings and values
in the relationship between law, markets, and culture.
Where traditional economic analysis of law focuses on indi-
viduals stripped of their character, culture, history, and
other human qualities, an interpretive or representational
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 890-91.
150. See id. at 888 (referencing Jon D. Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 630, 635 (1999).
151. See Honorable, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
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approach recognizes these qualities. This means that it does
not assume that people are fungible, detached, and atomis-
tic. To the contrary, it understands the individual as em-
bedded within particular social and market networks that
can vary by such factors as history, race, gender, age, class,
education, and geographic location, among others. Vari-
ances between individuals and groups create asymmetrical
relationships with respect to the authority to influence the
cultural-interpretive framework of an exchange. Conse-
quently, there are real opportunities for market and social
segmentation, and for exploitation that are independent of
broad based and generalized conceptions of market power.
In Honorable, as in each of the cases discussed above,
we find illustrations of the way in which market framing
can shape both the legal and economic approach to an ex-
change relationship. Referencing different assumptions
about self-interest and the public interest, or viewing the
exchange from a variety of different perspectives changes
the way in which the legal argument develops. It also influ-
ences the ultimate outcome of the case. Consequently, the
authority to influence the value framing and referencing hi-
erarchy for decision-making is valuable, and it can be used
to advance a special interest over that of a broader public
interest. It also shapes resource distributions between com-
peting parties, and presents opportunities for capturing and
creating value in the process of mediation.
D. Framing Contested Measures of Market Performance
There are a number of ways in which one can measure
market performance. At an individual firm level one might
look at market share, stock price, or price to earnings ra-
tios, for instance. At a national level one might look at sta-
tistics on gross national product, gross domestic product, in-
flation, or unemployment. Interpreting the importance or
relevance of these measures is once again a matter of
framing.
In this section, I briefly illustrate this problem with ref-
erence to two examples from Amartya Sen's book Develop-
ment as Freedom.'52 The first example concerns the use of a
wealth indicator as a reference for well being in a given
152. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
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community. The second concerns the referencing of unem-
ployment rates relative to social welfare payments.
Sen argues that a variety of measures must be em-
ployed to map a reasonable understanding of well being in a
given context.153 One of the examples he gives involves the
position of African American men in the U.S. economy.'54 He
points out that by reference to a wealth indicator African
American men are among the richest black people in the
world."' As a group they have higher incomes than black
men located almost anywhere else."6 At the same time
when he compares the same population groups for life ex-
pectancy and mortality rates he finds that African Ameri-
can men are doing much worse than black men in some of
the most impoverished countries in the world. 5 ' His point is
that one needs to consider a variety of measures if one is to
gain real insight into the condition of African American
men in the U.S. economy. At the same time his work sup-
ports the observation that the power to frame the interpre-
tive reference of analysis influences the understanding of
the market relationship being investigated. This is impor-
tant because different public policy approaches will be trig-
gered or justified based on the meanings and values pre-
sented in any particular frame.
A second illustration used by Sen references a differ-
ence in economic policy and social welfare in comparison be-
tween the U.S. and Europe. He points out that by American
standards Europe has generous social welfare benefits.'58
The social safety net, as it were, is thicker in Europe than
in America. This, as many Americans like to point out, can
create incentives for staying on welfare and can increase
market costs resulting in higher unemployment rates in
Europe than in the U.S. To better evaluate the difference
between U.S. and European social policy, however, one
must look more closely at the U.S. frame of reference. Sen
points out that the U.S., while providing less of a social
safety net than Europe, focuses much more attention on
employment rate policy."' He argues that the U.S. is able to
153. Id. at 13-14.
154. Id. at 21-24.
155. Id. at 21.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 21-24.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id. at 95.
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spend less on social welfare primarily because it spends
more time and focuses more attention, than Europe, on em-
ployment.16 ° U.S. policy tends to tinker with market mecha-
nisms designed to keep unemployment rates very low by
European standards. This permits it to pay less attention to
social welfare as long as it can hold out the promise of
available employment for those who seek it."' European
policy, by way of contrast, is focused less on low employ-
ment numbers.'62
The basic point to be gathered from the distinction is
that both the U.S. and Europe need to be concerned with
providing for the needs of their citizens, but there are dif-
ferent ways of framing the issues and the responses. In re-
sponse to the effects of unemployment or economic disloca-
tion European countries tend to redistribute resources
through social welfare programs. The U.S., on the other
hand, redistributes resources under policies intended to
create jobs and stimulate employment. Thus, both inter-
vene in the market to advance social policy, and the way in
which they frame their concern has different substantive
impacts in terms of the allocation of resources-there are
different winners and losers under each approach. Under-
standing the interpretive frames and references for differ-
ent situations permits one to gain a deeper insight into the
broader socio-economic considerations at work in each
community.
In both of the above examples we see, once again, that
alternative frames and references highlight different facts
and policies. The point is that interpretation theory helps
us identify alternative understandings and approaches so
that a broader set of facts and values can be investigated as
relevant to mediating and resolving a particular dispute. To
simply conclude that a particular course of action is or is
not efficient, wealth maximizing, or inevitable on a given
set of facts, begs the question. The facts and the values be-
hind those facts are often times contested and subject to in-
terpretive ambiguity. These ambiguities present opportuni-
ties for value enhancing or wealth exploiting exchanges.
Therefore, better-informed legal reasoning and policy
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 95.
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making requires attention to a variety of framing and refer-
encing devices.
II. AN INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK
A primary objective of Part I of this article involved
showing the various ways in which market interpretations
are contested in our society. We witness these contested in-
terpretations in contemporary film, in case law, and in the
various approaches to evaluating market success. The point
of these illustrations is to indicate the way in which market
reasoning, like all reasoning, involves reference to an inter-
pretive framework. Moreover, it indicates that the potential
to interpret the market frame in alternative ways gives rise
to the possibility of using competing economic frames and
references to achieve alternative distributional and value
outcomes.
In this part of the article attention turns to the devel-
opment of a better understanding of the interpretive proc-
ess in law and economics. Using references to the work of
Charles S. Peirce, this part of the article focuses on taking
an interpretive or representational turn in understanding
the relationship between law and market theory.163 It does
this by using semiotic, or cultural-interpretation theory to
investigate the connections between law, markets, and cul-
ture. I call this approach law and market economy, and it
should be understood from the outset that this approach is
not the same as law and economics.' Law and market
economy involves the application of semiotic interpretive
method to the study of the relationship between law and
market theory.6 ' This is very different from the traditional
approach of law and economics, which applies economic
method to the study of such subjects as law and language,
among others.'66
163. See, e.g., HAUSMAN, PIERCE, supra note 30, at 194-225 (Hausman dis-
cusses Peirce's work in terms of a "linguistic turn."); DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW &
TRUTH 71-127 (1996) (discussing the "interpretive turn" in contemporary theo-
ries of jurisprudence).
164. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9.
165. Id. It is important to understand that my method is grounded in a ref-
erence to Peirce's semiotics and is not economic method.
166. Id. Economic method is different and this should be kept in mind when
evaluating this approach. See, e.g., BLAUG, METHODOLOGY, supra note 91;
MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953).
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In developing an interpretive approach to law and mar-
ket economy, this part of the article first briefly summa-
rizes key foundational elements that have been explored in
some detail in Law and Market Economy: Reinterpreting the
Values of Law and Economics.167 Second, it presents an in-
terpretive framework that goes beyond that work. It pres-
ents a framework for understanding the relationship be-
tween law, market theory, and culture. Third, it develops a
way of "mapping" exchange relationships. And, fourth, this
mapping process is explained in terms of the lawyer's role
in formulating legal argument. It is then applied in a later
part of the article.
A. Foundation in Law and Market Economy
In Law and Market Economy I explore an interpretive
approach to the understanding of the relationship between
law and market theory. I make reference to the work of
Peirce to advance this approach, and offer the first compre-
hensive examination of the way in which interpretation
theory enhances our understanding of the relationship be-
tween law and economics.
In this part of the article I will not go into a detailed
discussion of the points that are covered in Law and Market
Economy. Instead, I offer a few brief comments regarding
some of the key points discussed in the book that are impor-
tant for the reader to have in mind in proceeding with this
article.
First, I explain that the market can be understood as a
place of meaning and value formation.168 Meanings and val-
ues arise from the process of people seeking to equate be-
tween different items of exchange.9 In addition, choice in
the marketplace involves a process of interpretation. 70 Un-
derstanding the value and nature of the objects of ex-
change, and the purpose and terms of exchange presup-
poses an interpretive process. This includes the idea that
cost and benefit analysis in traditional law and economics is
really about an interpretation of costs and benefits and not
simply about a calculus of choice. This is important because
167. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9.





the interpretive process is grounded in experience and expe-
rience varies by such factors as culture, race, age, gender,
education level, and rural or urban location, among oth-
ers."' This helps to explain the contested understandings of
the market. It also helps explain some of the differences in
practice when legal and economic concepts are borrowed
from one culture and translated into another culture. The
market process in China is not the same as in the U.S., for
example, because the translation into practice is framed by
a different cultural-interpretive reference.172
The idea of interpretation being grounded in experience
also helps to explain one aspect of the market information
problem. Information and knowledge are fragmented, in
part because experiences are different.173 These experiences
function as key interpretive ingredients for exchange and
are important for market coordination. An important func-
tion of the market involves maximizing the creative and
value enhancing potential of dispersed information and
knowledge.'74 Thus, the more extensive, accessible, and di-
verse the networks and patterns of exchange, the greater
will be the potential for wealth formation. "5
This idea is similar to the concept of a positive network
externality."6 For instance, having a telephone system with
one phone is not very valuable but when you have 2, 4, 100,
10,000, 200 million or a billion users you add value. Value
arises from the potential to greatly multiply the exchange
potential of the system. The more extensive, diverse, and
accessible the exchange system the more information and
knowledge that can be traded. And, the more trading and
exchanging in the system the more potential there is for
promoting and discovering value enhancing relationships.
17
171. Id. at 1-77.
172. Id. at 12-15. See also Hom & Malloy, supra note 56 (the article takes
the form of a unique exchange of letters and observations between the authors
when they worked in China).
173. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 78-105, 148-53.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See DESOTO, CAPITALISM, supra note 24, at 72 (citing to "Metcalfe's
Law" dealing with computer networks). While stand-alone computers are
useful, value really takes off when they are linked in networks. Id. This is my
point as well, market values take off and are made sustainable by extensive
networks and patterns of exchange, and these networks and patterns are
facilitated by institutions of language, communication, and interpretation.
177. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 78-105, 148-53.
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In my analysis the "institutions" of language, communica-
tion, and interpretation function like the "telephone
system," providing the interpretive network that facilitates
exchange and the process of wealth formation.
In Law and Market Economy I also explore the ambi-
guity of efficiency as a criterion for decision-making.178 Us-
ing a market process approach, similar to that suggested by
Hayek and by Kirzner, I show that markets are more fun-
damentally about the dynamic process of exchange than
about the calculation of efficiency.'79 Markets and the proc-
ess of sustainable wealth formation are about extensive
networks and patterns of exchange in environments that
favor experimentation, trial and error, risk taking, shared
information, and convention breaking relationships, even
when efficiency calculations are difficult or impossible to
make. 8 ' More importantly, I demonstrate that efficiency is
an ambiguous concept apart from a given situational con-
text, and with reference to chaos or complex systems the-
ory, I discuss the impossibility of determining an optimal
course of action in a complex system such as a market econ-
omy.8 The best that can be achieved, through careful proc-
178. Id. at 78-105. See generally KIRZNER, CAPITALIST PROCESS, supra note
26; KIRZNER, MEANING, supra note 26.
179. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 78-105, 106-48.
180. Id.
181. Id. Complexity involves complex systems theory or chaos theory and
research in this area holds that there is no optimal outcome that can be deter-
mined in a complex system. Id. at 139-40. See also STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME
IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION 248-62, 268-
69 (1995) (it is impossible to determine an optimal course of action even in a
system with only a few independent variables, much less one with as many
variables and actors as a market economy); SUNNY Y. AUYANG, FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPLEX-SYSTEMS THEORIES IN ECONOMICS, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, AND
STATISTICAL PHYSICS 80-82 (1998) (in a complex system the idea of optimization
is limited and relative, and even then it is in the nature of a set of possibilities
rather than any absolute optima); JOHN BRIGGS & F. DAVID PEAT, TURBULENT
MIRROR: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE To CHAOS THEORY AND THE SCIENCE OF
WHOLENESS (1989); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987)
[hereinafter "GLEICK, CHAOS"]; BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE:
SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY
(1999). In a recent book Richard Epstein addresses the idea of complexity but
his conception of complexity is very confusing if one actually has an under-
standing of complex systems theory, or the more formal meaning of complexity.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) [hereinaf-
ter SIMPLE RULES]. Epstein argues for simple rules to make the market work
better by defaulting to a greater degree of private coordination. He is confusing
in his analysis, however, because a market is the perfect example of a complex
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ess analysis, is the formulation of sets of plausibly good
courses of action.182 Mapping out and identifying these sets
is useful and is facilitated by reference to economic and
market concepts. Economics facilitates the filtering of in-
formation in a way that can assist in developing a finite set
of decisional options. Ultimately, however, selecting a par-
ticular course of action from a number of plausibly good al-
ternatives requires an appeal to values, meanings, and
mechanisms that go beyond traditional economic tools.183
Selecting from among alternatives, just like the process of
market framing, requires reference to Peirce's idea of the
normative sciences of esthetics, ethics, and logic (ideas to be
further developed in a later part of this article). 84 After a
given course of action is selected, on normative grounds,
economics can then be helpful in identifying a more cost ef-
fective, or perhaps a least cost method, for achieving a par-
ticular goal.
In law and market economy attention is also directed at
the promotion of a process of sustainable wealth formation
rather than at the idea of wealth maximization.' 8This is a
broader concept than wealth maximization as it focuses on
a market process approach to creativity as a source of long-
term economic growth.188 It also involves an understanding
of the difference between seeking to improve your position
and seeking to maximize your wealth advantage. In a com-
plex exchange system such as the market it is not always
clear that people act to maximize wealth even if they do
seek to improve their position. A process of sustainable
wealth formation considers a variety of factors, including ef-
system. It has innumerable degrees of freedom because it has so many individ-
ual participants, and contrary to Epstein it is precisely the idea of complexity
that makes for more extensive and wealth enhancing market arrangements.
Legal rules that make property more, rather than less, complex create value. A
property system that only recognizes a fee simple absolute estate creates less
extensive exchange potential then a property system with numerous estates
and interests that can be broken down and targeted to increased numbers of po-
tential investors. The real estate markets in the United States involve trillions
of dollars of activity not because they are simple but because of complexity. Le-
gal infrastructure needs to support complexity. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET
ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 112-13.
182. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra at 139-40.
183. Id. at 139-48.
184. See infra Part IV.B. of this article and accompanying notes.




ficiency, that work together to sustain market operations
and social prosperity over the long-run.
Law and Market Economy addresses the role of crea-
tivity in the process of sustainable wealth formation, and
the need to address the legal and cultural framework of so-
cial organization as a means of better understanding the
creative process.'87 Creativity requires an environment that
encourages and facilitates unconventional, extended, di-
verse, and accessible networks and patterns of exchange.'88
Creativity is dynamic and unconventional; therefore, it can
not be easily understood by reference to traditional concepts
such as efficiency.
With reference to creativity, the book discusses several
studies that support this view.'9 The studies indicate that
countries and companies that promote extensive, diverse,
and accessible networks and patterns of exchange are more
likely to be creative and prosperous.'9 ° In general, however,
it is easy to point to the fact that many of the world's most
prosperous countries, with sustainable market economies,
are governed by pluralistic and democratic forms of gov-
ernment. These forms of government are in many ways less
efficient than alternative forms but they foster environ-
ments that are conducive to creativity and to sustainability.
They facilitate more open, diverse, and unconventional ex-
change relationships and this enhances the potential for
creative value formation. In other words, the nature of the
networks and patterns of exchange is important for reasons
that are not necessarily captured by a wealth or efficiency
criterion.
On this point I make a comparison between the market
economy in the U.S. and that of a developing market econ-
187. Id. at 78-105, 106-35.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 129-35. (The studies look at firms for a micro analysis, and give a
macro analysis at the level of comparing nation states.)
190. Id. at 129-31. The studies look at a variety of companies to consider the
work environment, the communication and exchange networks and the rela-
tionship to creativity. Id. at 132-34. They explain, for example how the idea for
a mini van first died at Ford Motor Company only to later grow at Chrysler,
making millions of dollars for the company. Id. at 132. The studies indicate that
particular organizational structures favor creativity, convention breaking, and
value enhancing interpretive institutions and networks. The same holds true
for the studies related to nation states. Id. at 129-35. The more that the legal
systems gave space to individuals to establish their own meanings and values,
the more prosperous the economy. Id. at 130-31.
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omy like China. 9' Here I explain that the U.S. economy, to
a significant extent, is fueled by creativity - by invention,
new ideas and technology. This creative economy is the ba-
sis for long-term and sustained wealth formation. Emerging
economies are somewhat different. They may generally
start out as what I identify as "copy cat economies."'9 2 This
means that their primary market advantage is not so much
creativity as it is the ability to produce things invented
elsewhere at lower cost. This strategy works well for early
stages of development but has limitations. Ultimately an
economy must facilitate extensive and unconventional ex-
change. It must facilitate accessible, diverse, pluralistic,
and extensive networks and patterns of exchange.'93 It must
tolerate and encourage challenge to convention and
authority, and it must make vast amounts of information
widely available.'94 In many emerging and transitional
market economies this requires basic political and cultural
adjustment. It does not mean, however that one must have
a political system like that of the U.S.1d5 There is a range of
political structures that can work, but in general there
must be space for individual experimentation, and the legal
infrastructure must support dynamic exchanges and trans-
formations of meanings and values. Thus, law and market
economy theory suggest that we need to be concerned about
exchange environments and relationships, as well other
economic factors.
Moreover, my primary thesis in Law and Market Econ-
omy is that "institutions" of language, communication, and
interpretation play an important role in the creative proc-
ess. Wealth formation, development, and creativity expand
with the specialization and transformation of cultural-in-
terpretive frames and references, or semiotic connectors.
Markets are enhanced by increases in grammatical forms,
styles of legal discourse, and by advancing representations
of property capable of extending the networks and patterns
of exchange. Interpretive processes, in other words, have
substantive economic implications, and communities that
are more tolerant, less hierarchical, more participatory,
191. Id. at 113-18.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 62-64, 75-77, 112-36.
194. Id. at 112-36.
195. Id. at 116-19.
[Vol. 51
FRAMING THE MARKET
that have more extensive distributions, and that have
greater semiotic democracy, are more likely to translate in-
terpretive potential into actual market value.
From this brief discussion it should be apparent that
the study of law and market economy differs from the tradi-
tional study of law and economics. This section of the arti-
cle, therefore, provides a foundation for understanding the
difference.196 Unlike traditional law and economics, law and
market economy is not so much about efficiency analysis as
it is about understanding the meanings, values, and proc-
esses of exchange. 197 With this in mind, this part of the arti-
cle presents the basic foundations for understanding and
using a law and market economy approach.
B. Relationship Between Law, Markets, and Culture
Law and market economy theory involves the study of
the sociallmarket exchange process by focusing on the rela-
tionship between law, culture, and markets. This relation-
ship is triadic, dynamic and multi-directional. Moreover, in
this relationship, one can understand the market sphere as
196. It is important to note that law and market economy theory involves a
method grounded in the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. This method is dif-
ferent from the method used in traditional law and economics. See id. at 118-19.
197. Unlike law and market economy, the traditional law and economics
movement is centered on concerns for efficiency. See infra note 43. The tradi-
tional view usually leads to debate about a conflict or necessary trade off be-
tween efficiency and fairness, but a law and market economy approach posi-
tions the primary tension as between efficiency (a status quo analysis) and
creativity (a dynamic analysis). In taking this position, law and market econ-
omy offers an important paradigm shift. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET
ECONOMY, supra note 9. For an example of the traditional debate see A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-11 (1983); Ho-
venkamp, supra note 43, at 835-51; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 5, at 25-31; FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER, supra note 7, at 21-24; Robin Paul
Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner and
the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 210, 210-74 (1988)
[hereinafter "Malloy, Invisible Hand"]; Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law and Econom-
ics Moral?-Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal Critique of Posner's
Economic Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 147 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Law and
Economics is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1990); Robin Paul Malloy, The Lim-
its of "Science" in Legal Discourse-A Reply to Posner, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 175
(1990); Richard A. Posner, Rebuttal to Malloy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 183 (1990)
(collectively, the exchange between Malloy and Posner is referred to as the Mal-
loy and Posner Debate, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 147 (1990)); Robin Paul Malloy,
Equating Human Rights and Property Rights-The Need for Moral Judgment in
an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 163 (1986).
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expressing a concern for individualization, with a market
focus on the pursuit of self-interest. On the other hand, cul-
ture is a collective concept, and therefore the cultural
sphere can be understood as expressing a community per-
spective or a notion of the public interest. The theory also
considers law, culture, and market economy to be complex
representational systems of meaning that can be usefully
connected by a variety of semiotic processes including
rhetoric, linguistics, metaphor, and grammar, among oth-
ers.198 More specifically, law and market economy involves
the study of interpretive choice and the pursuit of interpre-
tive influence over the choice and decision making proc-
ess. 99 As such, law and market economy theory suggests
that alternative cultural-interpretive or semiotic frame-
works can produce different substantive outcomes in terms
of the generation and distribution of resources.2 °0 Given this
perspective, law and market economy employs a multi-val-
ued analysis in identifying wealth enhancing exchange op-
portunities for achieving particular public policy objec-
tives.201
Diagram 1, below, depicts the law and market economy
relationship. The sides of the triangle represent the semi-
otic or cultural-interpretive connectors that link each of the
key spheres of the law and market economy relationship.
These links represent the cognitive processes of value
framing and interpretive reference. They include "institu-
tions" of language, communication, and interpretation, and
such "tools" as metaphor, rhetoric, grammar, and narrative,
among others.
198. See generally supra notes 30, 35, 36 (semiotics as the study of signs).
199. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9.
200. Id. at 153-65.
201. See, e.g., supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text. For example, Sen
argues for the use of a variety of measures of social well being rather than put-
ting too much focus on the wealth based measures of traditional neoclassical
economics. He gives an example related to African American men. See SEN, sU-
pra note 152, at 87-110. He explains that African American men are the richest
black people on earth when we look at a wealth measure, but when we look at
life expectancy and mortality rates they are much below the rates for black men
living in many third world and impoverished countries. Thus, we need multiple
variables for comparison in order to get a proper picture of the fairness, justice,
and social implication of exchange in the U.S. SEN, supra note 152, at 87-110.
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Diagram 2, below, provides a further elaboration of the
basic model. It indicates some of the traditional or typical
categories or concepts to be included within each sphere of




























As these diagrams indicate, law and market economy
theory is not the same as law and economics." 2 Market
theory goes beyond the interests and concerns of econom-
ics.2°3 This is evident to anyone who has ever been to
business school or worked in a commercial enterprise.
Markets involve references to disciplines such as sociology,
organizational theory, marketing, behavioral psychology,
and interpretation theory, among others. Thus, while
market actors can benefit from an understanding of
economics something more is needed to understand the
relationship between law and market economy. In other
words, there is a need for a clear recognition of approaches
that study market activities as relationships and exchanges
that go beyond the traditional boundaries of economics.0 4
And, we need to bring a variety of information, gathered
from multiple disciplines, to bear upon our understanding
of law in its market context.
Law and market economy has, as two of its primary
concerns, a desire to understand (a) the way in which we, as
social beings, experience the relationship between law and
markets, and (b) the way in which this experience, as a
ground in Peircean semiotics, translates and transforms
human relations through an on-going process of meaning
and value formation. In this regard, the intersection of law
and market economy is experienced in a variety of ways. It
is experienced in terms of the networks and patterns of ex-
change in which people participate, and in terms of the way
in which these networks and patterns relate to such charac-
teristics as race, gender, age, education level, income, and
geographic location, among others. It is also experienced in
terms of the way in which the institutions of language,
communication, and interpretation facilitate our under-
standing of choice while bringing coherence and compre-
202. See generally MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9.
203. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 152; ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION
(Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998); NOOTEBOOM, supra note 28.
204. See generally FERBER AND NELSON, supra note 20. This book contains
an informative collection of essays and references with respect to the narrowing
of economic inquiry. In particular, the narrowing has caused the field to pay in-
adequate attention to issues and dynamics relevant to women. See MCCLOSKEY,
RHETORIC, supra note 22; MCCLOSKEY, ECONOMIC EXPERTISE, supra note 23.
McCloskey argues that this narrowing is part of a rhetorical strategy for mak-
ing economics seem more scientific and less subjective.
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hensibility to the process of wealth formation and resource
allocation. Furthermore, law in its market context is expe-
rienced culturally and collectively, with reference to con-
tested interpretations of market functions, outcomes, con-
sequences, and assumptions. It is experienced in ways that
our individualized rather than universal, and in ways that
go beyond the constrained and bounded universe of eco-
nomic calculation.
Law and market economy is also about the human
practice of exchange and the strategies for directing ex-
change toward worthy esthetic and ethical values. It is, in
fact, an esthetic and ethical reference that frames the mar-
ket, and the pragmatic selection of any particular course of
action from the sets of plausibly good courses indicated by
market analysis."5 To this end, law and market economy
theory uses semiotics, or cultural-interpretation theory, to
address the meanings and values of market relationships.2"6
It does this by identifying and "mapping" the networks and
patterns of social/market exchange.
In doing this, law and market economy proceeds from
the proposition that law is the product of human agency,
and a primary motivation for human action is the pursuit of
authoritative influence over the process of cultural-inter-
pretive framing, referencing, and representation. This proc-
ess of framing, referencing, and representing translates and
transforms meanings and values, and the ability to influ-
ence these cultural-interpretive connectors is a primary
concern of self-interest. This influence is important because
authority in this regard informs the process of interpretive
choice and produces substantive outcomes in terms of the
generation and allocation of resources.
This aspect of self-interest can be understood in simple
terms. Self-interest includes a desire to influence or control
the spaces and forms of socio-legal discourse. We seek this
control for a variety of reasons, some of which can not be
easily quantified. All of us recognize a motivation, at some
205. See infra Part LV.B. and accompanying notes.
206. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9; KIRZNER,
MEANING, supra note 26, at 3-54. Kirzner's point is that a dynamic and complex
market system can not be captured in static equilibrium models-creativity is
important yet it escapes proper study in traditional neoclassical economics.
KIRZNER, MEANING, supra note 26, at 3-54. See also KIRZNER, CAPITALIST
PROCESS, supra note 26; Kevelson, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 1-47;
SHERIFF, supra note 30, at xiii-xxi, 9-16, 31-49.
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level, to influence people's opinions and viewpoints. To have
people agree with us on how to improve the economy, fight
terrorism, promote racial equality, and what have you. We
can even observe this in very young children. At an early
age children seek to define and claim space in the world
around them by telling others, "that's my toy, my book, my
mommy, my daddy." In this way they lay claim to specific
resources and power sources. We observe a continuation of
this practice as children get older. As teens, people seek to
define a space of authority apart from their parents and use
clothing, music and other accessories in this process. They
also seek to define who is "cool" and who is not. As adults,
people try to convince others to read certain books or arti-
cles and to understand them in a particular way; they want
other people to agree in judgments as to the best sports
teams, the best computer, and the hottest car. They want to
influence each other on political issues and on voting. These
are all examples of the basic idea of self-interest related to
the desire to shape and influence the process of interpretive
framing and referencing.
The key here is that we understand that success in this
process of framing and referencing results in generating
opportunities for capturing and creating value. We also un-
derstand that various legal forms facilitate this interpretive
framing and referencing process, and give us influence over
extended spaces. We can operate through the corporate
form, for instance, to develop and shape a particular corpo-
rate culture, and to promote the values of commodification
and wealth maximization. We can also work within a non-
profit organization to shape a private definition of the pub-
lic interest, or work within the public sector to direct com-
munity resources at our own conception of the public
welfare. All of these institutional and organizational forms,
in which we can operate, are products of legal convention.
They create mechanisms and manageable frameworks for
exerting influence over interpretive hierarchies that shape
the generation and allocation of resources.
More specifically, the ability to establish or influence a
frame, reference, or interpretive hierarchy, conventionalizes
decision-making authority in favor of a particular interpre-
tive community. This then influences and constrains the
people, groups, and institutions having responsibility for
generating, responding to, or otherwise participating in fu-
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ture decisions or exchanges."7 In this way we use particular
legal forms and conventions to exercise a self-interested
authority over the meanings and values of the world around
US.
For example, if the interpretive hierarchy, expressed in
the corporate form or in a judicial or legislative convention,
requires that cost and benefit analysis be used in all deci-
sion-making, values that are difficult to price will be highly
discounted or ignored.0 8 Correspondingly, the pursuit of
profit will be elevated and extended at the expense of other
normative values such as those related to the environment,
public health, or family services.
As such, the conventionalized aspects of interpretive hi-
erarchy interact with the self-interested pursuit of influence
over semiotic space. The interpretation process of encoding
and decoding meaning is, thus, influenced by conventional-
ized rules and norms, and the individuals and groups with
authority over the production of such rules and norms also
end up exercising authority over the distribution and allo-
cation of resources.
In this way interpretive hierarchies provide continuity
and guidance for future decision making while framing the
boundaries and alternative paths of market exchange. In
the language of semiotics, interpretive hierarchies operate
as indexical referents that mediate and inform the process
of interpretive choice.0 9 In this context, the pursuit of self-
interested behavior is directed at two primary objectives. It
is directed first, at the pursuit of strategic opportunities for
interpretive influence within the given hierarchy (within
the value frame or reference), and second, either at the pur-
suit of reinforcing or replacing the given interpretive hier-
archy. Thus, contested understandings of the market reflect
struggles over the conventionalized decision-making proc-
ess, with the understanding that authoritative influence
over this process results in substantive influence over re-
source allocations and distributions.
207. See NEIL M. KAY, PATTERNS IN CORPORATE EVOLUTION 50-58, 91-93,
234-44 (Oxford 1997).
208. The form of the organization we make is used to structure interpretive
institutions and to organize value and meaning preferences.
209. This means that they operate in a mode of secondness. See LISZKA, su-
pra note 30, at 1-52 (discussing the basic structures including the mode of sec-
ondness). See also Part II.B.,D. of this article and accompanying notes.
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This idea of a cultural-interpretive hierarchy can be un-
derstood by comparison to an operating system in a com-
puter.21 The operating system conventionalizes the com-
puting environment and only compatible software will work
in the system. Any software that is incompatible with the
conventionalized operating system is rendered inoperative.
This control over the meanings and values that are ex-
pressed within the system is very valuable as is evidenced
by the market position of Microsoft Corporation. In a simi-
lar way, control over the cultural-interpretive environment
of law and market economy gives primacy and power to dis-
courses, meanings and values, which are compatible with
the dominant interpretive hierarchy. Dissenting and con-
tested points of view must struggle for recognition. They
must generate doubt in the conventionalized mode of
thinking and they must suggest "better" alternative fram-
ings, references, and representations. Again, different legal
forms and associations can be used to facilitate the influ-
ence and imposition of a particular cultural-interpretive hi-
erarchy.
Similarly, the idea of semiotic space might be compared
to a territorial interest in a geographic or representational
"place." This idea can be better understood with reference to
such concepts as a king or a state having authority over a
defined geographic jurisdiction, or in the old adage of "a
man is the king of his castle." Each of these references re-
flects the idea of control over space as a foundation for
authority and influence within the given environment.
Early rules tended to focus on authority being linked to
clearly definable space and place, as in jurisdictional
authority within a geographically identified state or terri-
tory."' This idea has expanded to include abstract and rep-
resentational spaces, as in the exercise of "long-arm" juris-
diction beyond the boarders of a given state, or as reflected
in arguments in support of the extraterritorial application
210. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 170-71.
211. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Ju-
risdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2001); VED P. NANDA, LITIGATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS (1994); ERWIN CHERMINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION (1989); ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION
(1988). See also ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL




of U.S. law.212 The space in which meanings and values are
formed has also been redefined by the process of globaliza-
tion, with its "fluid" streams of commerce, the chameleon
like nature of corporate identities, and the "virtual" ex-
change networks of the Internet. Authoritative influence
over these spaces creates power in the same way as a king
or geo-political state exercises power over its territorial
place
Another way of viewing the concept of semiotic space is
to think of it in terms of a market actor pursuing a market-
share strategy."' In such a situation, self-interested behav-
ior involves a desire for economic gain but not necessarily
the desire to maximize wealth or efficiency. Gain is under-
stood in terms of defining and controlling authoritative in-
fluence over the market. A market-share strategy can in-
volve a number of criteria and can vary with the scale or
nature of the market, the measures applied to market
evaluations, and the market position of the actor.214 A mar-
ket-share strategy involves a continuous tension between
the need to respond to and conquer indeterminate and dy-
namic exchange spaces, and the desire to preserve conven-
tionalized and determinate control over already "acquired"
spaces. This is just as important when the market space
212. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980); Int'l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877). See generally Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in
Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1998); Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L.
418 (2001); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Michele Taruffo, Rolf Sturner & Antonio
Gidi, Introduction to the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure,
33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 769 (2001); Jeffrey A. Brown, Extraterritoriality:
Current Policy of the United States, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 493 (1986);
Afshin Atabaki, Extraterritorial Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 34 INT'L. LAw. 564
(2000).
213. See generally IAN H. GORDON, COMPETITOR TARGETING: WINNING THE
BATTLE FOR MARKET AND CUSTOMER SHARE (2000); DAVID I. ROSENBAUM, MARKET
DOMINANCE (1998) (the strategy can include efficiency but does not require effi-
ciency); KEVIN B. TYNAN, MULTI-CHANNEL MARKETING: MAXIMIZING MARKET
SHARE WITH AN INTEGRATED MARKETING STRATEGY (1993). A market share strat-
egy might also be compared to an animal "marking" and defining its territory.
Humans use language and other semiotic devices to "mark" their "territory" or
authority over particular cultural-interpretive space. This authority gives rise
to value enhancing opportunities.
214. TYNAN, supra note 213.
20031
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
concerns control over the mechanisms for producing mean-
ing and conventionalizing decision-making authority, as it
is when the market is about labor or various factors of pro-
duction.
A simple way to understand this desire to control semi-
otic space or to follow a market share strategy is to consider
the views of some local community leaders. When I lived in
New Orleans, for example, a number of people expressed a
very limited desire to pursue certain types of economic de-
velopment even when they knew it could have broad based
benefits.21 One reason expressed for this position was that
they did not want New Orleans to become another Atlanta.
The "leading" families wanted to remain in authoritative
positions of influence and this was more important than
certain forms of economic development. Some expressed
their concerns rather bluntly with such phrasing as "after
Atlanta welcomed in all those corporations and rich out-of-
staters, the old families were just pushed aside, we don't
want that to happen here." '216 The locals understood the self-
interested value of controlling the cultural interpretive
frames and references of community decision-making.
Economic concepts remain important in all of this
analysis because economics provides a formal representa-
tional sign system, or "language," for "mapping" the process
of exchange to which semiotics refers." It provides a
215. The author lived in New Orleans between 1988-90 and was on the Tu-
lane faculty.
216. Many rich oil & gas executives complained about an inability to buy
their way into New Orleans society. They complained about the inability to fully
access the private clubs, Crewes, Mardis Gras connections, schools and tradi-
tional teenage girl coming-out parties. As another very different example, con-
sider the position of the Castro government in Cuba. Authoritative control over
place and space seems to be a primary objective for the government. Authorita-
tive control can provide benefits and serve interests that are difficult or impos-
sible to quantify in standard economic terms, but we can still learn from
studying these exchange relationships from an interpretive perspective.
217. See generally KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30 at 167-201; KEVELSON,
PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30 at 199-218. Kevelson explains:
The first decades in the emergence of modem semiotics since the 1960's
brought forth little interest in economics. The legal system... was first
brought into the framework of semiotic investigation by Kevelson, and
from the perspective of structural sociology by Greimas and Landow-
ski...
•..But the triadic linking of law, economics, and semiotics makes its
most recent debut in the work of Robin Paul Malloy.. .Malloy shows
how signification of cultural values evolve and are transformed
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mechanism for conventionalizing decision-making because
it offers a way to understand or map the process of ex-
change, and this is useful even as we appreciate the fact
that "the map is not the territory" - as we acknowledge
that our models are partial and incomplete
representations.218
This can be better understood if one thinks in terms of
the way in which a legal description "represents" a particu-
lar piece of property even though it is not itself the property
to which it refers.21 The legal description simplifies the pro-
cess of identifying and transferring the property, but it is
not the property and it does not represent all of the charac-
teristics of the property. It is a partial and incomplete rep-
through use and exchange in living community. He suggests that it is
by using the instrument of semiotic inquiry, in the sense that all theo-
ries have instrumental purpose, that we can begin to perceive and ex-
plain previously undisclosed processes of value development, i.e., as-
pects of emerging value which appear only as a result of a certain way
of being observed.
This is what I extrapolate from Malloy's study of the iconic function in
law and semiotics... No term and its current definition are mere sub-
stitutes for one another. Every use and mention of a term and every at-
tempt to redefine and sharpen the meaning of a term creates an
asymmetrical relationship between the known and the new, just as
every marketplace transaction changes the value of the objects ex-
changed and increases the meaning of each, so that the value of each
becomes off-balanced from its previous marketplace value and ac-
quires, as if repricing were redefinition, an increase in meaning.
KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 205-06.
218. See also S. I. HAYAKAwA & ALAN R. HAYAKAwA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT
AND ACTION 13-21 (5th. ed. 1990) (the map is not the territory and the symbol is
not the thing symbolized). Likewise, our market models and theories are sym-
bols and sign systems of but are not the real social/market exchange process.
MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 39-44 (discussing the idea
of "the map is not the territory" as related to law and to market theory); GLEICK,
CHAOS, supra note 181, at 92-121 (mapping and measuring depend upon scale
and point of reference-fractals in complex system theory.)
219. I am talking about the formal metes and bounds, government survey or
plat based description that appears, for example, in the deed and mortgage. See
MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 53, at 317-360. Note that representation occurs in
a variety of areas and not just with respect to real estate. For example, the cor-
porate form of organization operates as a representation that extends the
authority and action of an individual or group. It permits action and exchange
with a different and legally distinct identity, and permits the legal entity to act
beyond the identity of the real people whose interests it represents. This ex-
tended representation can itself be limited, however, with such concepts as
acting ultravires (beyond the authority of the entity), or by the process of
"piercing the corporate veil."
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resentation. In a similar sense, economic concepts function
as signs that define, simplify, and facilitate exchange but
like the legal description mentioned above, these concepts
are merely partial and incomplete representations of un-
derlying exchange processes which are complex and dy-
namic.
Thus, economic concepts function as partial and incom-
plete representations even though they are useful for given
purposes and in particular situations. In this way econom-
ics is like a map. A road map, for example, is useful for as-
sisting in the task of driving around town but it tells one
little or nothing about the quality of schools or home prices,
and gives no indication of crime rates, climate or other im-
portant characteristics that collectively give meaning to a
particular property located along a particular street in a
given community. In this respect, the map is not the terri-
tory, and the market model is not the market exchange pro-
cess. Nonetheless, economics, as a cultural-interpretive de-
vice, facilitates the mapping process and can help us
identify a finite set of plausibly useful courses of socio-legal
action. Furthermore, once a normative decision is made
about the particular map or path that we want to take, eco-
nomics can assist in advancing our objective in a more cost
effective or least cost manner.
In a semiotic sense, therefore, markets are important
because they function as primary cultural-interpretive sys-
tems for the process of meaning and value formation. Fur-
thermore, law, markets and culture interact to continuously
transmit, and to encode and decode social meanings and
values. In this transmission process opportunities arise for
generating and capturing value. This process also reveals
the convergence between conceptions of freedom,
sustainability of wealth formation, and the advancement of
a more ethical and participatory social order.22
C. Mapping Exchange Relationships: A Triadic Approach
Law and market economy differs from other approaches
to understanding the relationship between law and eco-
nomics. A primary difference is that it does not seek so
much to ask questions about efficiency as it does seek to ex-
plore the nature, scope, and consequence of various ex-
220. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 78-135.
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change relationships. It attempts to develop a method that
will help us formulate better legal reasoning and public
policy by addressing the process of exchange in terms of al-
ternative cultural-interpretive frames and references. It
seeks, therefore, to understand the market process as a
meaningful human experience, and not merely as an exer-
cise in "scientific" calculation.
In developing the method of law and market economy,
reference is made to the semiotic method of Charles Sand-
ers Peirce."' Peirce developed a theory of semiotics based on
a triadic theory of signs involving three modes of logic.222 He
identified these three modes as firstness (icon), secondness
(index), and thirdness (symbol).223 These three modes of be-
ing, when taken together, function as the semiotic sign or
idea. The relationship between these modes is dynamic, and
the process of semiosis is continuous, with every third re-in-
forming a first.224
221. See supra note 30.
222. See supra notes 30, 31; 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 289-
99 (a brief discussion of the triadic relationship between firstness, secondness,
and thirdness), 276-79 (on the tendency towards habit and regularity in the re-
lationship between firstness, secondness, and thirdness).
223. See generally LISZKA, supra note 30. These three categories are further
broken down and discussed in Liszka's book as Speculative Grammar, Pure
Grammar, Universal Grammar involving deduction, induction and objective
(hypothetical) reasoning, and as Speculative Rhetoric, Formal Rhetoric, and
Universal Rhetoric. Id. at 10. In general, Peirce's classifications for this ap-
proach to signs involve grammar as the "study of formal features of the sign and
its modes of expression," logic as "concerned with the manner in which signs
can be used to discern truth," and rhetorics as "the investigation; the manner in
which signs are used to communicate and express claims within a community."
Id. at 9-10, 78-108. Each of these areas is explained with good illustrations
throughout the book.
224. See infra Parts III., IV., at 176-83, 186-217, 220-25. See also MALLOY,
LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 23-78. The key to this method is in
using Peirce's triadic approach as opposed to the bilateral model of Saussure.
Saussure basically considered the sign to be composed of the "signifier" and the
"signified." NOTH, supra note 30, at 56-63. Thus, we would think in terms of the
word "table" as a signifier for an object being a table (the thing signified).
Similarly, we might view a trademark such as the Nike swoosh as the signifier
of the Nike brand. When we see this trademark on clothing or running shoes we
identify it with the Nike company. In the triadic approach of Peirce the sign is
made up of three parts, the icon (firstness), the index (secondness), and the
symbol (thirdness). Peirce's primary contribution is in recognizing that when we
observe the word "table" or the Nike swoosh, we reference this to other images
or signs already stored in our memory. After making an indexical reference, we
then draw a conclusion. In this way Peirce gave express recognition to the
importance of the indexical reference in the interpretive process. This is im-
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Peirce's theory describes an understanding of the cogni-
tive process. It offers a way of visualizing the mind at work.
Our mind responds to stimuli; to facts and information, and
these are processed and translated into meanings, values,
feelings, and actions, including the triggering of further
thought. Peirce's contribution to our understanding of this
process is his idea of the triadic relationship between
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. This understanding
differs in an important way from the more traditional idea
of a bilateral model of interpretation. For example, consider
the relationship between the word "table" and the object
that we identify as a table. One way to view the rela-
tionship between the word and the object is to see them in a
bilateral relationship. In a bilateral model the word is a
representation of the table to which it refers. There is the
table, and the representation of the table in the word.
Peirce's insight involves the recognition of an intermediary
step in the interpretive process that he called "secondness."
This additional step expands the model into one that is tri-
adic rather than bilateral. In this approach, secondness in-
volves a reference/referent and comparison. In simple
terms, Peirce's logic suggests that between the word "table"
and the object, our mind searches, as a computer might, for
something in its memory that can be used to process the
connection between the word and the object. Upon seeing
the table (firstness), for example, the mind searches its
memory for other objects of similar look, design, purpose,
and quality (secondness). This referencing triggers the con-
clusion, "table" (thirdness). Likewise, when we encounter
the word "table" we search our memory banks for things
that we have previously associated with that word, and we
draw a conclusion about the image of the thing being repre-
sented by the word "table."
This triadic process is key to an understanding of law
and market economy because it permits us to explore the
process of framing, referencing, and representing in the
structure of legal argument. It is this process, as second-
ness, that assists us in understanding economic concepts
portant to law and market economy because it provides the theoretical founda-
tion for discussing the importance of having authoritative influence over the
cultural-interpretive referents. In other words, competition ensues for influence
over the index because the reference influences the conclusion and thereby
shapes the development of social policy and resource distribution.
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and tools as important devices for framing, referencing, and
representing exchange relationships in law. Secondness
also helps us understand the idea of culture and experience
in our model of law and market economy. Culture and ex-
perience play a significant role in shaping the references
and comparisons that are metaphorically stored in our cog-
nitive memory banks. Consequently, they influence our
understanding and meaning of law and of exchange. Fur-
thermore, this idea of secondness also helps us to visualize
the power involved in controlling or influencing the frames,
references, and representations used in the interpretive in-
stitutions of the law. It does this by showing us that
meaning is filtered through the idea of secondness, and
thus conclusions are influenced by and differ with reference
to such things as culture and experience, and these are fur-
ther varied by reference to such characteristics as race,
gender, age, education, class, income, geographic location,
and history, among others.
Using Peirce's method of analysis, law and market
economy positions the market as a complex and dynamic
web of representational networks and patterns of exchange
wherein the nature, scope, and content of these exchange
relationships inform social meaning and value.225 Law and
market economy undertakes an examination of these rela-
tionships by using a multi-valued approach.226
Diagram 3, below, depicts the semiotic process of law
and market economy using Peirce's triadic theory of signs
(icon, index, and symbol)." In this diagram the icon is of
firstness, and of quality. It is the exchange itself, standing
for itself and for all exchange in general. It arises in an ex-
225. Law and market economy examines exchange systems, and the scien-
tific method of inquiry used in semiotics to understand exchange systems re-
veals that they are like a "web" with indefinite boundaries. See PEIRCE,
WRITINGS, supra note 30, at xii. This is also a point raised in general chaos or
complex systems theory. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 181, at 270-87 (discussing
co-evolving webs in complex systems). In studying these webs of exchange it is
important to investigate and understand discourse across a number of conven-
tionalized boundaries. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30 at 11,
63, 78, 109, 131; KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 27-28, 62-
64.
226. See supra note 152 (Sen and multi-valued measures). See also ELAINE
MORLEY ET AL., COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT (The Urban Insti-
tute Press 2001); HARRY P. HATRY, PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING
RESULTS (Urban Institute Press, 1999).
227. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 23-50.
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periential context of social or interpretive conflict or ten-
sion. It involves the generation or identification of informa-
tion fragments or "facts." The index is of secondness, and of
comparative reference. It functions as an interpretive
screen. It frames, filters and influences the encoding and
decoding of socio-legal meanings and values. It "maps" the
relationship between a particular quality or exchange and
other such exchanges or qualities. Alternative mappings are
possible with different cultural-interpretive referents. This
involves the process of understanding the relationship be-
tween particular information fragments or facts, and a
varying set of comparative measures or referents. The sym-
bol is of thirdness, and of argument, action, or contingent
"truth." It is what gets constituted as law, or what gets
justified and represented as a legal rule, holding, or
conclusion. It provides a basis for further investigation of
quality and of exchange. Through semiosis,228 the
continuous relationship between these three modes, we
transform public policy, legal action, and socio-legal
meanings and values. This interpretive transformation is
"real" in the Peircean sense that it affects the material
world of resource definition, allocation, and distribution.
Firstness: Secondness: Thirdness:
(Icon) (Index) map (Symbol)
identify basic exchange networks formulate legal
facts, exchange and cultural- argument, and
relationships interpretive frames, implement policy
and references plan, or take
experiences & representations legal/political action
Diagram 3
In simple terms, Peirce's triadic theory helps us
reframe market analysis in a way that differs from other
approaches to law and economics. The triadic relationship
introduced above and depicted in diagram 3, indicates the
way in which law and market economy approaches the
analysis of legal problems. Law and market economy un-
dertakes the identification and formulation of legal argu-
228. Id. at 21, 33-35, 87.
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ment or action based on the use of particular cultural-inter-
pretive frames and references. The process is not one of
calculating efficiency, but of mapping and representing al-
ternative cultural-interpretive understandings of the mar-
ket as a human exchange process capable of continuously
generating and transforming meanings and values. The
goal is not to assume an ability to calculate an economically
optimal course of action, but to improve legal reasoning and
public policy making by exploring alternative ways of logi-
cally and ethically advancing worthy esthetic values.229
Peirce's approach is also helpful because it enhances
our ability to appreciate a primary focus of tension in law
and public policy. Using Peirce's triadic model it is easy to
grasp the idea that the index, or secondness, is a focal point
for competition between alternative interpretive communi-
ties and socio-legal theories. The greater the ability of an
individual or a group to influence or control the index (cul-
tural-interpretive frames, references, and representations)
the more power she or they will have over the convention-
alizing of an interpretive hierarchy. This provides influence
over future decision-making by constraining the people,
groups, and institutions having responsibility for making
and responding to future decisions and policies. Conse-
quently, an important part of law and market economy in-
volves understanding the competition for influence over the
cultural-interpretive frames and references of exchange. It
also involves a need to explore institutional arrangements
capable of mediating between and beyond the boundaries of
individuals and the particular cultural-interpretive com-
munities in which they are situated.
The development of law and market economy, and the
mapping of exchange using the process depicted in Diagram
3, is also important because it involves matters of resource
allocation and distribution, as well as matters of law and
legal institutions. In this context, law and legal institutions
provide the infrastructure for social and market exchange.
Law operates to define the terms of permissible exchange
and provides the social and public definition of the various
objects of trade. Law also maps the consequences of certain
types of trade, and facilitates the coordination of exchange
with particular importance for multi-party trades, trade be-
229. See text and related notes infra Part IV.B. See also GANIER, supra note
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tween impersonal or distant market actors, and non-simul-
taneous exchanges that take place over extended periods of
time, place, and space.23° In all of these exchange relation-
ships, cultural-interpretive or semiotic theory is at work be-
cause market actors must make choices based on meanings
and values derived from the application of interpretive
frames and references to factual experiences and informa-
tion fragments.23' Moreover, the more distant, extended,
and diverse the networks of exchange the more they need to
be formalized and conventionalized through interpretive
mechanisms facilitated by law."2
In using Peirce's mapping approach, economics helps us
to understand and filter information through a cultural-in-
terpretive "language" of market exchange. Economic con-
cepts can be used initially to help filter a potentially endless
number of viewpoints down to a finite set of plausibly good
outcome choices, or decision paths. And, once normative
analysis directs us to the selection of a given choice option,
economics can direct our attention to more cost-effective
mechanisms for achieving our given objective.
Peirce's mapping process also advances a lawyer's abil-
ity to understand and to generate useful legal arguments.
The lawyer's stock-in-trade involves the ability to draw on
an inventory of familiar patterns of legal argument. By
working through the process of seeking and manipulating
alternative frames, references, and representations the
lawyer continually revises and adds to her inventory of le-
gal argument patterns. And, in seeking to remain attentive
230. See ,MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 136-40, 157-
58, 164-67 (The more predictable, accessible, and transparent the legal system
the more it facilitates the semiotic process and the potential for creative wealth
formation.).
231. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 59-69. When we
reason we bring experience, subjective bias, and various values to the process.
The things that shape our experiences and values will thus effect the meanings
we derive from present and later exchanges. KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at
81-87. It is possible to influence interpretation and meaning by shifting the ref-
erential baseline of inquiry. We can "contribute to the reformulation and trans-
formation of official, ideal Law Language and Law Discourse as authoritative
symbol." KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 115. Rules of inter-
pretation constrain and mediate the privilege of the reader and this would be
similar to the way in which conventionalized theories of the market exchange
process constrain and mediate the market as a text. See generally ECO, LIMITS
OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 36, at 58-60.
232. See supra note 230.
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to the way in which law is experienced by people situated in
various and competing cultural-interpretive communities,
the lawyer expands her mapping and argument tools while
facilitating her creativity.
Her creativity is enhanced by expanding her ability to
understand law and market relationships from an increas-
ing number of perspectives. This creates tension between
the dynamic aspects of exchange as experienced in a dy-
namic world, and the tendency of legal argument to become
conventionalized. This tension fosters a constant re-evalua-
tion of law and creates the potential for developing entirely
new frames, references, and representations.
In this process, we can understand that the primary
professional skill of lawyers and legal actors relates to lan-
guage, communication, and interpretation. Legal actors
read cases, legislation, contracts, court proceedings, and a
variety of other texts. They write memoranda, pleadings,
briefs, position papers, contracts, wills, and legislation.
They make oral arguments, take depositions, conduct inter-
views, address the jury, appear before boards, negotiate
with one another, and make a variety of persuasive appeals
in formal and informal settings. In order to do their work
they must be able to interpret the meanings of the texts and
arguments they encounter, and they must make sure that
their own writings and arguments embody the intended
meanings that they hope to express. To be persuasive they
must understand their audience, and work effectively
within and around legal conventions. They must appreciate
the way in which the intended and unintended interpreter
will read and hear their words, their mannerisms, and their
entire delivery. All of this involves cultural-interpretation
theory and an indirect, if not direct, knowledge of semiotic
connectors such as linguistics, metaphor, rhetoric, narra-
tive, and logic.233 It also involves working through Peirce's
three-step process to identify and organize basic facts, to fil-
ter those facts through a variety of frames and references,
and to construct logical and persuasive justifications for the
selection of given frames and references, while advancing a
specific legal argument and course of action. Therefore,
when we think about law and market economy we focus our
233. See NOTH, supra note 30; BERGER, supra note 35; HODGE & KRESS, su-
pra note 35; ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS, supra note 36; ECO, SEMIOTICS AND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, supra note 36.
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attention on the relationship between our skills of inter-
preting and creating meaning, and the way in which these
meanings can influence or facilitate particular allocations of
resources.
In law we do not simply write or tell stories, our words
have consequences that go beyond mere story telling. Our
words may sentence a man to death, or spare him from that
fate. Our words may allow a grandchild to enjoy an inheri-
tance, or permit the development of a multi-million dollar
mall or office building, or assure a disabled child's access to
medical treatment. Legal words and legal texts exist in a
market context and they shape the distribution of resources
within society.2"4 The structure of these "texts" or semiotic
signs can also facilitate the process of economic growth and
wealth formation.235
Law can be used to help shape the distribution of re-
sources in society by the way in which it indexically
"frames" the issues, questions, facts, consequences, and
interpretive environment of the disputes and exchanges to
be mediated.236 In simple terms, familiar to all lawyers and
law students, indexical framing or shifting of interpretive
reference involves positioning or characterizing our
situation in a manner that most favors an advantageous
outcome. For example, if my client is injured because a new
lawn mower he purchased was defective I might consider
framing the claim for recovery as one in contract, for breach
of warranty, or as one in tort or products liability.237
Shifting from contract to tort law allows for different
remedies and requires different elements of proof. It also
involves a moving away from the idea of a fully informed
and consensual exchange between market participants to a
concern for under-informed or nonconsensual exchange.
Similarly, one can often reframe a long-term land sales
contract as a lease relationship, or as a constructive
conveyance subject to an implied or equitable mortgage.238
234. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 136-65.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See generally Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir.
1989); Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Laboratories, Inc., 661 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1981);
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir. 1980); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
238. See, e.g. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 53, at 813-46 (discussing exam-
ples related to mortgage substitutes, disguised mortgages, and installment land
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Reframing the situation works to change the meaning of
the exchange relationship and implicates different elements
of substantive and procedural law.239 It also raises issues
related to resource allocation, as the different parties to the
exchange will seek an interpretive frame or reference that
is most favorable to her or him.
This framing and referencing process includes the abil-
ity to create value opportunities from innovations in struc-
turing tax planning, real estate transactions, financial in-
vestments, and other exchange relationships. Generating
"loopholes," developing new financing techni4ues, and cre-
ating other legal devices involves careful and insightful use
of language, communication, and interpretation skills.24 ° In
these and numerous other ways legal actors generate and
capture value through the interpretive process.
There are also important moves to be made in framing
the manner in which the legal system itself is understood.
This involves the framing of underlying assumptions about
the legal system that inform us about the kinds of moves or
categories that are available.
To understand this point just think of a time when you
may have visited a different country or culture, or even just
a family from another neighborhood, and discovered that
they did not do everything the way that you did. 41 They had
different customs, different assumptions about the roles of
women and men, or about shaking hands, bowing, or eat-
ing. Perhaps you discovered that in this other country or
place it is thought to be unheard of that a private person
can own a lake or a beach, or that a woman would question
the authority of her husband in public. What one discovers
in these situations is that certain basic assumptions are so
fundamental to a system of social organization or cultural-
interpretive hierarchy that they are not even made visible
until someone challenges them in a direct or indirect way,
or in an intentional or unintentional way.2 42
contracts).
239. See, e.g., this article, text and related notes infraPart I.C.
240. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 43-49, 78-90,
106-35.
241. See, e.g., Horn & Malloy, supra note 56 (discussing interpretive issues
confronted by working on law and market issues in a non-U.S.A. cultural-inter-
pretive context); SINCLAIR & PO-YEE, supra note 56 (one in a series of tour guide
books for travelers).
242. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 12-19, 66-70.
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This is also true when we think about the relationship
between legal and economic systems. In the United States,
for instance, we are accustom to validating private property
ownership and to keeping detailed records to protect title to
valuable land holdings. Under Marxism, however, land had
no value except to the extent that labor was applied to the
land. Consequently, the Russian legal system, under the
Soviet Union, did not keep records of land ownership but
rather focused its attention on recording the ownership of
buildings and improvements to the land.243 The underlying
frames and r~ferences resulted in a different approach to
legal action. In a similar way we have a number of compet-
ing interpretive frames and references at play in our own
legal system. We have liberal and conservative views of law,
we have feminist and critical race views of law, and a vari-
ety of other conceptions each competing for authoritative in-
fluence over the way in which we interpret and understand
law. Each of these interpretive frames and references seeks
to influence, through law and legal institutions, the alloca-
tion of scarce resources and the access to decision making
authority. Each attempts to indexically frame and influence
the process of interpretation, and thereby the process of so-
cial/market choice.
Standard market models and concepts are also impor-
tant because they function as interpretive frames and ref-
erences for justifying and validating standards and criteria
used in the allocation of resources and access to decision
making authority.24 For example, legal concepts such as
fairness, justice, and reasonableness can be given meaning
by reference to ideas or signs of "competition" and "market
opportunity." Likewise, legal outcomes can be justified by
reference to various economic concepts such as efficiency,
externalities, transactions costs, and other interpretive de-
vices. In a similar manner legal and cultural mechanisms
embrace interpretive frames and references that give sub-
stantive form to market development. These may include
reference to transparency, stability, liquidity, reciprocity,
accountability, diversity, and tolerance. " All of this is im-
243. Conversation with Ivan Velev of Land and Real Estate Initiative
(LARI) Group of The World Bank, Washington, D.C. April 10, 2001.
244. See SEN, supra note 152. Sen argues for a variety of measures of eco-
nomic well-being because different measures focus on different information and
criteria.
245. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 76-77. This is
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portant to the form and structure of persuasive legal argu-
ment, and to the way in which law and legal institutions
generate value-enhancing opportunities."'
D. The form of Legal Argument
In discussing the form of legal argument, law and mar-
ket economy borrows from the conceptual work of Charles
Sanders Peirce on semiotics and interpretation theory. Ba-
sically it breaks legal argument down into three related
modes of forming and shaping meaning as depicted in Dia-
gram 3, above.24 This section of the article relates the form
of legal argument to Peirce's three modes of logic.
As indicated, Peirce referred to these modes as
firstness, secondness, and thirdness.248 All argument forms
also a theme promoted by DeSoto in his recent book, DESOTO, CAPITALISM, su-
pra note 24. DeSoto makes an important contribution to our understanding of
the role of law and legal infrastructure for development. It is particularly im-
portant that he addresses law in terms of its ability to create symbolic represen-
tations (semiotics) that have value in exchange, and which promote economic
activity. Even so, there are major weaknesses in his approach. First, he dis-
counts cultural context and historical differences between people and countries.
This is a typical assumptional move in economics, but it is not very persuasive
in his work. Second, he argues that the key to economic success in the West is
the presence of various legal rules. In making this point he argues as if none of
these rules are present in poor or developing countries, but in fact many South
American countries have the type of legal rules discussed. The problem is that
the rules and the legal institutions do not work the same as they do in the de-
veloped West. Thus, I think he needs to tell us more about why they do not
work the same way, rather than asserting that the legal rules are simply ab-
sent. This would, of course, raise cultural and contextual issues that he seeks,
as an economist, to avoid.
246. In order to influence and mediate this referential process of market in-
terpretation, the law and market economy movement is developing a theory of
interpretation, and this theory must be capable of going beyond the "predictive"
confines of positive economics. See, e.g., MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY,
supra note 9; Malloy, New Discourse, supra note 21; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, New
Law and Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
1-30 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Robin Paul Mal-
loy, Letters From the Longhouse: Law, Economics, and Native American Values,
1992 WISC. L. REV. 1569 [hereinafter "Malloy, Longhouse"]; MCCLOSKEY,
RHETORIC, supra note 22; MCCLOSKEY, ECONOMIC EXPERTISE, supra note 23;
Malloy, Review: If You're So Smart, supra note 23; McCloskey, Lawyerly Rheto-
ric, supra note 23; MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23; KEVELSON, LAW, su-
pra note 30.
247. See this article supra at Part II.C. (diagram).
248. Id. Part II.C. (text and notes).
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can be understood within these three modes.249 Firstness in-
volves basic elements or the facts of a relationship.
Firstness is experience based.25 Secondness involves the
referencing of the facts to a cultural-interpretive referent,
model, theory, or convention.251 It is reflective, comparative,
and indexical (meaning it points to or references). Third-
ness is the bringing together of firstness and secondness to
form an argument, a plan of action, or conclusion.252
The relationship between these modes is continuous."
Thus, the conclusion reached in thirdness influences the
further understanding of a first. Likewise, these modes are
249. The relationship between these three modes involves semiosis. Semio-
sis is the process of "synthesis" between Peirce's three modes of logic and it is
continuous. NOTH, supra note 30, at 39-47. Peirce uses a complex triadic struc-
ture to analyze the relationship of signs. Id.; SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 31-47;
LISZKA, supra note 30, at 18-52 (explaining the triadic relationship and provid-
ing definitions of various classifications of signs); HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, supra note
30, at 106-74, 272; PEIRCE, REASONING, supra note 30, at 68-150; PEIRCE,
WRITINGS, supra note 30, at 74-119. In Peirce's triadic approach there are three
modes of logic or trichotomy and each of these has three ways in which it can be
categorized, and each of these has three correlates such that there are twenty-
seven classes of signs in Peirce's system. NOTH, supra note 30, at 44-45. The




(across) of the of relation to of relation to
Category (down) representamen object interpretant
Firstness Qualisign Icon Rheme
Secondness Sinsign Index Dicent
Thirdness Legisign Symbol Argument
See NOTH, supra note 30, at 45. All of the classes are described but much of the
technical detail is unnecessary for purposes of my explanation in this article.
See also PEIRCE, WRITINGS, supra note 30, at 74-119; LISZKA, supra note 30, at
18-52 (explaining the triadic relationship and providing definitions of various
classifications of signs).
250. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 29-36.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See supra note 249.
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dynamic.254 As an example let us consider the simple proc-
ess of using precedent in law. Let us assume that our client
was just involved in an automobile accident at a busy inter-
section. We can proceed to question the client and any wit-
nesses about what happened. In doing this we are gather-
ing and establishing the "experiential" facts of the exchange
as a mode of firstness. Then we go to our office and compare
these facts against statutes and earlier cases. This indexical
referencing process involves secondness. Finally, after de-
termining the rules applied in earlier cases and applying
them to our facts we put together an argument for a par-
ticular result. This argument operates as a mode of third-
ness. Notice that we took our facts then referenced prece-
dent and reached a conclusion. We might just as easily have
proceeded by gathering basic rules on car accidents (legal
precedents), as a mode of firstness, and then referencing
our facts to these rules, in a mode of secondness, to reach
our conclusion. Furthermore, in each instance the initial
conclusions drawn, as a mode of thirdness, actually operate
to focus and shape our consideration of the first."5 Simply
put, our initial conclusions lend guidance and further re-
finement to our interpretation process. They help us iden-
tify and justify which facts and which rules are most impor-
tant for any given or particular purpose. In this way we are
always refining and reading back into our analysis as we
move between these modes. In other words, we do not have
simple dualistic or binary relationships. We have integrated
webs of triadic relationships.
254. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 29-36. This
same dynamic nature is found in economics and in chaos or complex systems
theory. See generally KIRZNER, CAPITALIST PROCESS, supra note 26, at 157. Crea-
tivity is a process and it is one that can not be captured using models of tradi-
tional neoclassical economics. See KIRZNER, CAPITALIST PROCESS, supra note 26,
at 1-168. KIRZNER, MEANING, supra note 26, at 3-54. Kirzner's point is that a
dynamic and complex market system can not be captured in static equilibrium
models - creativity is important yet it escapes proper study in traditional neo-
classical economics. KIRZNER, MEANING, supra note 26, at 3-54. See also
KAUFFMAN, supra note 181, at 19-22 (stating that we live in a nonequilibrium
universe and that all free living organisms are in nonequilibrium systems);
GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note 181, at 140 (focusing on points of equilibrium is not
that helpful since the system is always in flux and you never pass through the
same point twice).
255. It is the relationship between the modes of logic that is significant and
not that a particular one must be first in the process of semiosis. SHERIFF, supra
note 30, at 37-47; KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 253 (according to Peirce
anywhere is a place to begin).
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In moving through these modes we employ a number of
semiotic devices. We make reference to logic, metaphor,
analogy and story.256 We construct a beginning, middle and
an end as we tell the story of what happened on the fateful
day when our client became involved in the car accident.
We use metaphor when we explain how the rain falling on
the road that day left the surface as slick as ice causing our
client to lose control of the vehicle through no fault of her
own. We use analogy when we explain how these road con-
ditions and our client's response are just like the facts in an
earlier case and that the court should therefore follow the
decision of that earlier case. We are descriptive and persua-
sive in our narrative. We appeal to logic in setting up the
premises of our case and ask others to follow us through to
the logical and favorable conclusion we seek. We also em-
ploy references to a variety of other quasi and non-legal
sources such as statistics on car accidents, engineering and
design information on cars and road intersections, insur-
ance tables and costs. All of these devices rely for success
upon our ability to master the skills of constructing persua-
sive arguments. This means that they rely upon our ability
to understand and to shape the way in which others inter-
pret the facts, the rules, and the contextual environment
surrounding the accidental exchange involving our client.
More generally, we can create value as well as redis-
tribute resources by inventing and transforming legal con-
vention-by creating new grammatical forms, styles of
discourse, and representations of property. Developing cul-
tural-interpretive skills, therefore, is important for anyone
interested in being an effective lawyer or legal actor. In a
world of diverse and multi-valued interpretive communi-
ties, one must be able to understand exchange with refer-
ence to multi-factor references and intermittent framing
variables. It is no longer sufficient to simply rely on knowl-
edge of traditional legal categories sounding in contract,
property, or tort, for example. To be competent one must be
able to understand the meanings and values of exchange
from a variety of legal, market, and cultural positions.
Peirce's triadic theory of signs helps us to better under-
stand these complex relationships. It also provides a useful
method for understanding the way in which particular ap-
256. See MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC, supra note 22; MCCLOSKEY, ECONOMIC
EXPERTISE, supra note 23; FERBER & NELSON, supra note 20.
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proaches to exchange facilitate more extensive, creative,
equitable, and wealth promoting relationships.
In a similar manner, semiotics helps us to understand
better the strategic and representational function of legal
concepts as cultural-interpretive signs. Consider, for exam-
ple, the idea of property."' In semiotic terms property is not
a bundle of sticks, property is a representational sign refer-
ring to a particular web of exchange relationships.2 " This
distinction is important because property rights do not exist
as independent sticks or objects of coherent investigation in
the absence of an interpretive web of relational exchange.
The idea of property functions as a cultural-interpretive
referent and operates to organize exchange relationships in
accordance with particular conventionalized interpretive
hierarchies. Property in other words, organizes social
status, defines power over semiotic space, and allocates re-
sources according to conventionalized rules.2"9
Property law, in a semiotic sense, functions in a repre-
sentational capacity and allows us to deal with relation-
ships in abstract terms.26 ° For instance, a leasehold estate
and an interest in air rights are representational. Such
property interests organize exchange relationships between
owners, landlords and tenants in the one case, and between
257. See, e.g., Kevelson, Rhetoric, supra note 33; Joan Williams, The Rheto-
ric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1998); Denis J. Brion, The Ethics of Prop-
erty: A Semiotic Inquiry Into Ownership, 12 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW
247 (1999).
258. Law and market economy examines exchange systems, and the scien-
tific method of inquiry used in semiotics to understand exchange systems re-
veals that they are like a "web" with indefinite boundaries. See PEIRCE,
WRITINGS, supra note 30, at xii. This is also a point raised in general chaos or
complex systems theory. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 181, at 270-87 (discussing
co-evolving webs in complex systems). In studying these webs of exchange it is
important to investigate and understand discourse across a number of conven-
tionalized boundaries. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30 at 11,
63, 78, 109, 131; KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 27-28, 62-
64.
259. See generally KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 181-93. "From this
point of view, the legal idea of Property is taken as the name of the game of a
certain set of moves and countermoves for the purpose of bringing about, or re-
alizing, continually changing social-status significances." Kevelson, Rhetoric,
supra note 33, at 203. And significance is related to the result or consequences
of the sign's relation to its final or ultimate interpretant. LISZKA, supra note 30,
at 80.
260. See DESOTO, CAPITALISM, supra note 24, at 153-205 (explaining how le-
gal rules allow for representation of rights and this furthers exchange and par-
ticipation in both markets and social life).
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surface, subsurface and above surface interests in the other
case. These concepts tell us something about the character-
istics of exchange and the infrastructure of exchange. They
also inform us about the distribution of power, authority,
and the allocation of resources between the parties to an
exchange. A leasehold estate or an air right, however, is not
something that one can physically put in a box and move.
Leaseholds and air rights are representational signs that
convey meanings and values about the relationships be-
tween people, places, and things.
Using Peirce's triadic approach, the physical object of
property, a specific parcel of land for instance, stands as a
mode of firstness. In its physical sense the property is of
quality and stands for itself as a specific item of property,
and at the same time stands for and represents similar
categories of property more generally. The abstract legal
devices we create to represent interests in property, such as
recordable deeds, leases, and air rights, are in a mode of
secondness. These devices refer to the physical object in
some way and allow us to capture and create value by en-
hancing our ability to use property as collateral and as an
item of exchange. Thirdness involves the various meanings
and values that can be generated from the legal conventions
linking property to its various representative forms.
Understanding the function of representational signs in
the process of exchange is important because it is central to
an appreciation of the way in which ideas and categories
evolve, and to the way in which they are borrowed and
transferred between communities. The cultural-interpretive
representation of a legal right is not, in other words, the
same as the idea or the right itself. Consequently, under-
standing exchange and market economy as a human prac-
tice involves a communicative study of the networks and
patterns of exchange. Furthermore, it involves an apprecia-
tion of the central function of indexical referents in shaping
resource allocations. While there are numerous ways of
working through the interpretive process of exchange, the
point of law and market economy is that one needs to start
by recognizing the semiotic connection between law, mar-
kets and culture.26' This is the key starting point for under-
261. See, e.g., KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30. In addition to discussing law
in this book Kevelson also discusses economics. Id. at 167-193. See also
KEVELSON, METHOD, supra note 30, at 83-96 (discussing money); KEVELSON,
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standing exchange as a process of meaning and value for-
mation, and of developing a multi-valued framework for
imagining more extensive, participatory, equitable, and
creative social arrangements. It is also the starting point
for understanding the way in which institutions of lan-
guage, communication, and interpretation can be used to
create new value.
Moreover, semiotics informs us of the changing nature
of value in social understanding. Value is not simply based
on labor inputs or on consumer preferences, value arises
from the continuous expansion and transformation of ideas
through exchange. By informing us about exchange systems,
semiotics reveals that all such systems involve a continuous
process of substitution and permutation,262 and since, in a
semiotic sense, there are no perfect substitutes, all substi-
tutions or exchanges generate the potentiality of new
meaning and new value.6
PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 202-12 (discussing law and economics);
REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 1-2
(Stuart Hall ed., 1997) [hereinafter "REPRESENTATIONS"].
Culture... is not so much a set of things - novels and paintings or
T.V. programs and comics - as a process, a set of practices. Primarily,
Culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of mean-
ings - the 'giving and taking of meaning' - between members of a so-
ciety or group. To say that two people belong to the same culture is to
say that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can
express themselves, their thoughts and feelings about the world, in
ways which will be understood by each other.
REPRESENTATIONS, supra, at 1-2.
... 'culture' is... a set of attitudes, beliefs, mores, customs, values and
practices which are common to or shared by any group. The group may
be defined in terms of politics, geography, religion, ethnicity or some
other characteristic .... The characteristics which define the group
may be substantiated in the form of signs, symbols, texts, language, ar-
tifacts, oral and written tradition and by other means.
DAVID THROSBY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 3-4 (2001).
262. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 29-77. See
also KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30. Dialogic exchange charac-
terizes all semiotic interactions and dynamic evolution. KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND
SCIENCE, supra note 30, at i. "This method assumes that inquiry, always dia-
logic, is a process of communication or message exchange by means of signs and
sign systems. Law is one such sign system, as are other social institutions, e.g.,
language, economics, politics, the family, and so on." KEVELSON, LAW, supra
note 30, at 3. Semiosis is a structure of exchange. See KEVELSON, LAW, supra
note 30, at 49.
263. KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 8. "[B]ut even the
mere repetition of a sign is a new sign which creates a new dimension of mean-
ing that holds within itself a cumulative meaning and value of all that which
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Thus, law and market economy investigates exchange
because an understanding of the networks and patterns of
exchange is important. Furthermore, exchange is not so
much concerned with efficiency as it is with the idea of fa-
cilitating accessible, extensive, transparent, reciprocal, and
participatory market or sign systems. In this regard, inter-
ventions or redistributions may be desirable in order to
change or alter certain conventionalized networks and pat-
terns of exchange." 4 This may be an important element in
dealing with people or groups that find that they are con-
tinually excluded from important market activities such as
access to housing and mortgage markets. It may also be
important for helping people "trapped" in intergenerational
dependence on welfare, or in the criminal justice system.
Mapping exchange relationships and using this as a start-
ing point for law and public policy reform is important, and
it can be both liberating and empowering.
265
preceded it and which it represents in each successive 'here and now.' " Id. at
198. "[W]e cannot observe the same thing twice, and not only that we cannot
observe a given thing exactly as someone else claims to observe it or can be
shown to have observed it ....." KEVELSON, METHOD, supra note 30, at 7. "[A]
semiotic methodology will assume that a mark of a mark is not a 're-mark' but
an Interpretant, or new potential subject." KEVELSON, METHOD, supra note 30,
at 8.
264. I take this view even though such a view is not a part of traditional law
and economics. Generally, law and economic analysis ignores the prior distribu-
tion problem which is to ignore a great deal of historical context. For discussion
of these types of problems see MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 88, at
45-58; FERBER AND NELSON, supra note 20; Malloy, A New Law and Economics,
in LAW AND ECONOMICS NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES supra note 246, at 1-
30; Malloy, New Discourse, supra note 21; Jeffery L. Harrison, Class, Entitle-
ment, and Contract, in LAW AND ECONOMICS NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 246, at 221-48; (arguing that one's prior position and distribution
may effect how one feels about alternative contract arrangements, how they
value alternatives, and how one values ones own self worth); Jeffery Evans
Stake, Loss Aversion and Involuntary Transfers of Title, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 246, at 331-60 (citing studies on
how original allocations can effect later values and trades, and applying this
concept to real property issues concerning adverse possession).
265. Peirce was very interested in the idea of mapping. See KEVELSON,
PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 12-14. Peirce thinks of maps as attempts
to represent our experiences of the real world-to present the real in ideational
form. Id. In an open-ended and dynamic universe these ideas or representations
are always provisional and limited by the constraints over boundaries of the in-
terpretive tools we use. Id. at 1-42. Thus, our models and theories are by defini-
tion always partial, incomplete and provisional. In a logical and scientific com-
munity they are always open to revision, correction and fallibility. On the idea
of partiality in economic analysis see also Helen F. Longino, Economics For
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In this approach to the relationship between law, mar-
kets, and culture, a primary function of law involves the
mediation of conflicting claims to interpretive authority,
and the objective of this mediation process is not so much
one of achieving efficiency, or some abstract notion of jus-
tice, as it is to facilitate convergence toward the successful
pursuit of common goals and purposes within and between
competing interpretive communities. Understanding this
mediation process also means appreciating the way in
which legal actors create value through the development
and transformation of cultural-interpretive frames and ref-
erences.
Having provided a broad sketch of the general founda-
tions for an interpretive framework on the relationship be-
tween law and market economy, this article proceeds by
discussing some additional examples.
III. SOME BASIC EXAMPLES OF MAPPING EXCHANGE
RELATIONSHIPS
As I have said, law and market economy positions the
market as a place of meaning and value formation. It con-
tends that choice involves a cultural-interpretive process,
and that this process influences the generation and alloca-
tion of resources. To understand better the relationship be-
tween law, culture and markets, law and market economy
"maps" exchange relationships.
The mapping process involves the identification of basic
exchange relationships with reference to Peirce's triadic
approach. This involves examining legal disputes from a
variety of cultural-interpretive perspectives to gain a better
"picture" or "map" of the contested facts and values. This
approach can be used to examine problems of choice, two
party exchanges, multi-party exchanges, commons prob-
lems, Coase problems, public goods problems, agency and
externality problems, among others."'
To gain a better sense of this process I offer two exam-
ples. First, I explain concepts of scale, measure, and posi-
tion, as they relate to the use of alternative cultural-inter-
Whom?, in FERBER AND NELSON, supra note 20, at 158-68.
266. See, e.g., MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 90-99
(Coase); id. at 29-105 (public choice); id. at 144-46 (efficient breach).
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pretive frames and references.267 Then I examine two
specific exchanges: an exchange for sexual favors;268 and an
exchange involving automobile sales.269
A. Interpretive Reference: Scale, Measure, and Position
Law and market economy involves a socially contextu-
alized approach to market theory because it is grounded in
the simple belief that markets involve exchange, and ex-
change implies interaction by and between people.27 ° It,
therefore, centers attention on the social process of ex-
change rather than on the "optimal" or efficient exercise of
purely rational choice.271 Exchange, in a market sense, does
not take place on an isolated island of individual autonomy
no matter how many choices a person must make under
conditions of scarcity and uncertainty.272 Meaningful ex-
change occurs when there is a community of people in-
volved, and law and market economy primarily concerns it-
267. See id. at 123-27.
268. See id. at 140-41 (I develop this example in more detail in this article
than in the book).
269. See id. at 40-41 (I add more detail to this example than in the book).
270. Exchange does not happen in an isolated way. Exchange happens be-
tween people in community. Exchange, in Peirce's theory, must always proceed
in a dialogic way-as a dialogue. See HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 119.
Peirce also says, that an individual person is, by himself, incomplete-it re-
quires a referential relationship to another to make the meaning of individual
provisionally determinate. KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 147. According to
Peirce, "the initial assumptions one brings to the process of reasoning are syn-
theses of values shared between an individual and a community. All logical
methodology has its origin in the identification of self-interest with the interests
of one's community." KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 81. Furthermore:
It is one thing to show that all value exchange is relational.... It is
quite another to assume that to go beyond the notion that our acts and
ideas are relative with respect to their ability to evolve into new sig-
nifications is to say that value is merely the expression of arbitrary
power and will. From this viewpoint ... a consensus is never the result
of relativism, and neither is it the determination of an external
authority upon members of a community. Rather, the capacity for self-
determination-for self-governance and self-organization-pertains to
choosing partners or relates in self-binding and contractual ways.
KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 45.
271. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 137-48. See
generally KAUFFMAN, supra note 181, at 248-62, 268-69. It is impossible to op-
timize a course of action in a complex system - one can only hope to make a rea-
sonable compromise within a wide range of constraints. KAUFFMAN, supra note
181, at 268-69.
272. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 57-78.
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self with the examination of the exchange process-with the
study of the networks and patterns of exchange in society.
As a consequence, law and market economy is about people
interacting in and between interpretive communities - it is
about individuals participating in reciprocal relationships,
relationships that are not given and finite but which are
continually evolving and transforming.
In law and market economy, markets function as com-
municative networks of exchange responding to and simul-
taneously influencing law and culture. These responses and
influences filter and frame the process of choice and shape
the contours of resource allocation. As a semiotic sign sys-
tem, or cultural-interpretive process therefore, the market
gives meaning and value to human action while making the
exchange process comprehensible.
In a sense, law and market economy involves taking an
interpretive or representational turn in the understanding of
the relationship between law and market theory, but not a
radical anti-realist turn.273 It involves a "Peircean turn" - a
turn that Carl Hausman has identified with pragmatic evo-
lutionary realism.274 It is a turn that recognizes both deter-
minate and indeterminate logic in the human practice of
exchange, and the process of meaning and value forma-
tion.275
Exchange is a dynamic process and within this process
choice involves, not simply mathematical calculation but in-
terpretation and representation-it involves a certain de-
gree of freedom, creativity, and indeterminacy as well as
predictability.276 Moreover, the question of how we make
choices is different from the question of how we exchange.
Exchange is a continuous relationship whereas choice is a
point on the continuum.
The examination of the networks and patterns of ex-
change involves an inquiry into the way in which we relate
to each other. It involves an investigation of the way in
which meanings and values are created, exchanged, and
273. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 194-225; PATTERSON, LAW &
TRUTH, supra note 163. Patterson's book examines the interpretive turn from a
variety of viewpoints including reference to legal positivism, legal realism,
Dworkin and Fish. He gives an excellent account of the concept of "truth" in law
and jurisprudence while offering his own innovative theory of the same.
274. HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 140-225.





We understand the meanings and values of exchange by
reference to semiotic or cultural-interpretive connectors.
These connectors function as important elements of an in-
terpretive value frame and reference hierarchy, and operate
as a referential lens or screen for understanding. The refer-
ent process is indexical,277 to use Peirce's terminology, and
involves a multi-factor set of frame and reference shifting
devices. The devices described in this part of the article in-
clude scale, measure, and position.
In the context of complex systems, of which the so-
cial/market exchange process is one, scaling is important
for focusing in on habit taking patterns of interaction.278 As
a dialogic process, the market exchange system needs in-
termittent/variable scaling in order to get at the process of
meaning and value formation as well as to explore the con-
sequences of alternative market structures and conven-
tions. In other words, it is necessary to think beyond the
scale of atomistic individuals. We must think in these terms
while also making inquiry into larger units of social organi-
zation and while focusing on the dynamic elements of com-
munity(ies) to which individuals are attracted and in which
they find themselves situated.
Examining groups and environments of varying dimen-
sions raises the possibility of enhanced scaling and is im-
portant for presenting a more complete picture of the ex-
change process. Small groups and environments such as
families, churches, clubs, work teams, and professional or
277. An index is a mode of secondness and performs a referencing function.
NOTH, supra note 30, at 44-45. Whereas a sign is an icon if it represents its ob-
ject, a sign is an index if it indicates contiguity with its object. LISZKA, supra
note 30, at 38. Contiguity can be of three different sorts: (1) Deictic (referential)
in the sense that there is a perception of direct continuity between the sign and
its object; for example, as the way in which a pointing finger draws an imagi-
nary line to the object it refers to; (2) Causal (existential) where the index is
caused by the object it represents; an example would be the way in which the
wind pushes a windvane into a certain pointing position; and (3) Labeling-this
type of index has a close relationship to symbol. LISZKA, supra note 30, at 38.
Here when a symbol becomes clearly associated with an object it takes on an
indexical function because of its association with a particular object-for exam-
ple my written name or signature, or the letter beneath a diagram. LISzKA, su-
pra note 30, at 38-39. See also SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 31-47; HOOKwAY,
PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 125-39; PEIRCE, WRITINGS, supra note 30, at 98-119.
278. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 123-24
(scaling). See also GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note 181, at 83-186; KAUFFMAN, supra
note 181, at 17 & 248-62.
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trade associations are significant because they tend to func-
tion as primary mediators for cultural-interpretive under-
standing. They are, therefore, central to understanding the
interpretive frames and references at work in the exchange
process. They are also important when thinking about eco-
nomic and public policy. This is because the key to such
programs as welfare reform or urban revitalization, for ex-
ample, may have more to do with reaching and investing in
community groups than it does in targeting individuals.2
In general, the process of scaling can be thought of as
one similar to the work of a photographer in selecting the
appropriate lens and setting for a picture. A zoom lens
highlights the individuals or the two primary parties to an
exchange, whereas a wide-angle lens includes third parties,
externalities, and a broader community context. Changing
the lens, or the scale of reference brings different informa-
tion into view. By strategically changing the scale of an ex-
change relationship one can influence the meanings and
values of interaction, and this can influence resource alloca-
tions.
A second referent device involves measure.28 This de-
vice can also influence our understanding of exchange rela-
tionships as it provides strategic opportunities for manipu-
lating meaning. The issue here is one of measurement. For
example, how should one calculate damages, what discount
rate should be used, and what is the appropriate time hori-
zon for determining a reasonable investment-backed expec-
tation? Likewise, should we make reference to pareto or
kaldor-hicks efficiency, and include hedonic or contingent
valuation methods in our market calculations? By strategi-
cally shifting the measuring referent one can change the
meaning and value of an exchange relationship. 21W c
A third referent device involves positioning. We can
supplement our tools of scaling and measure by investigat-
ing and imagining particular market predictions and policy
prescriptions from the alternative positionings of various
individuals and groups within the system. If, for instance,
we look at housing or mortgage markets from the point of
279. See, e.g., Robert L. Woodson, Race and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1989).
280. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 124-25 (meas-
ure).
281. Id. at 126-27 (positioning).
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view of a college educated white or Asian American we may
have a different view of the market than if we position our-
selves as a poor Hispanic or Bosnian female renting a gov-
ernment housing unit in the inner city."2 We will also see
government intervention in the marketplace quite differ-
ently. Thus, by shifting the positioning referent one can
change the understanding of given networks and patterns
of exchange. One can also use strategic positioning or iden-
tity references to shift or transform an interpretive hierar-
chy.
Mapping exchange with reference to a variety of cul-
tural-interpretive frames and references, and using inter-
mittent scales, measures, and positions is important be-
cause it begins the process of identifying the relational webs
of exchange. This process of multi-valued analysis is signifi-
cant to a Peircean type of approach because it plays a pri-
mary role in developing the skills of speculative inquiry or
abductive reasoning283 , and facilitates creativity by reveal-
ing and traversing conventionalized hierarchies. More fun-
damentally, it directs our attention to a broad set of issues,
facts, and values to be considered in developing public pol-
icy, and in advancing legal reasoning.
In the language of the popular media, the manipulation
of scale, measure, and position within the context of shift-
ing frames, references, and representations is similar to the
idea of "spin." Putting a favorable "spin" on a story involves
the manipulation of these cultural-interpretive devices such
that a fact or story is presented in a favorable or unfavor-
able light in accordance with the objective of the "spin-
maker."
In the two examples that follow we can see how scale,
measure, and position work in our mapping model to create
cultural-interpretive alternatives, or different spins, for the
facts and values that are under investigation.
282. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES C. SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
703-84 (1st ed., 1998) (reporting on studies in the mortgage and housing mar-
kets). See generally ANDREW HACKER, TwO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (data on market access and economic dis-
tribution based on race).




1. Example One: Sexual Favors: Let us consider the
question of legalizing transactions for sexual favors.2 4 More
specifically, consider the idea of legalizing prostitution. At
first glance the exchange itself, as an iconic event in a mode
of firstness, seems to be a simple two party exchange, but
we can quickly show how it becomes more complex when we
seek a better understanding of the exchange relationship by
applying the different frames and references of scale, meas-
ure, and position. These indexical concepts involve a mode
of secondness.
If we address our inquiry to only the immediate parties
to the transaction, we might conclude that the seemingly
voluntary and consensual nature of the exchange of money
for sexual services is a wealth-maximizing move. Under
such a scenario an efficiency driven legal economist, as a
mode of thirdness, might argue for the legalization of pros-
titution. If, on the other hand, we change the scale of our
investigation and look at the way in which these activities
affect third parties we might reach a different conclusion.
Assume that we include estimates of the "cost" impacts of
this activity on the families and friends of the participants,
the communities they live in, and the potential for extended
health related consequences across multiple communities.
By including these third party costs we change our effi-
ciency calculations and, thus, we might reach a different set
of conclusions. Scaling, therefore, raises the problem of
what to count. Should we even worry about accounting for
externalities, and if we do, then how should we decide on
where to draw the line between impacts that count and
those we deem too far removed from the transaction to be
relevant. Depending upon how we chose to define the rele-
vant scale, our conclusions will vary even if we profess a de-
sire to operate at the most efficient point.
Still further problems can be raised when we consider
alternative ways to measure the third party impacts of
these exchanges. How should we quantify such things as
health, emotional, esthetic, and family values, for instance?
Slight variations in pricing estimates, or in assessing dis-
284. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 140-41 (citing a
less developed example than the one in this article).
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tributive implications, may lead to significantly different
outcomes.
Similarly, we can introduce positioning problems to our
investigation if we relax the presumption that consent is
evident in the exchanges being observed. Perhaps the mar-
ket under investigation reveals that actions of the parties
are not based on consent. Maybe there is historical, cul-
tural, or institutional bias in the exchange, or some per-
sonal considerations that result in the woman feeling com-
pelled to participate. Seen from the position of the woman,
this transaction may have very different dynamics from
those presumed under an assumption of rational consent
theory. A change in positioning might, once again, change
our conclusion.
An important point here is to appreciate the power of
being able to influence the interpretive referents, the in-
dexical mode of secondness, used to analyze this exchange
relationship. The authority to set the legally applied scale,
measure, and positioning determines the meaning and
value of the exchange. For example, from a masculine point
of view the transaction might be considered consensual, but
from a feminine point of view it may be viewed as socially
coerced. Likewise, viewed as a two party voluntary ex-
change it might be considered efficient, but viewed in terms
of third party costs and externalities it might be considered
otherwise. Furthermore, these alternative references may
be grounded in potentially contestable ideas with respect to
the meaning of "appropriate" female sexual behavior or
"family values," and externalities may be positive or nega-
tive.
In a complex system like the market exchange process,
factors of scale, measure, and position involve degrees of
freedom and they suggest, as illustrated above, a number of
transactional influences. Consequently, we need to focus
more attention on the dynamic nature of the networks and
patterns of exchange that are being observed. We need to
develop a better understanding, for example, of the way in
which men, women, families and communities interact. We
need to transform our point of reference from one of concern
for calculating economic efficiency to one that investigates
the nature, scope, dynamics, and consequences of particular
exchange relationships.
We need, in other words, to inquire as to the manner in
which prostitution affects the social/market exchange proc-
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ess and not merely as to the efficiency of making it legal.
We also need to ask about other ways of understanding
these exchange relationships, and the ways in which they
can best advance positive ethical and esthetic values. This
involves a process of mapping-a process of seeking to un-
derstand the exchange relationship from multiple frames
and references, as illustrated in the above example. This
process facilitates a better basis for pragmatic and informed
decision-making.
2. Example Two: Car Sales. As a second example let us
consider the market for automobile sales. 2" This example
also illustrates the use of shifting interpretive frames and
references. First, assume that we have collected basic data
about the market for automobile sales, a mode of firstness.
Our data indicates that product offerings are essentially the
same across brands, prices for similar products by different
manufactures are close to identical, and purchase or lease
terms are virtually the same. The raw data that has been
collected makes up a Peircean mode of firstness-it is basic
information about the nature of the thing or product itself.
In the process of interpreting the data so that we can draw
a conclusion or response, we make a reference to an
interpretive or indexical mediator that functions as a Peir-
cean mode of secondness. The mediating point of interpre-
tive reference is important because it shapes our economic
and legal conclusion in a mode of thirdness. For instance, if
one reviews the data through a "Chicago School" lens of
neoclassical economics he may very well conclude that the
data reveals the presence of a perfectly competitive mar-
ket.286 In such a market no seller has the power to set terms
but must, instead, take its terms from the marketplace, and
as a consequence we would expect to find close similarity
between product lines, prices, and sales terms. Such a com-
petitive market makes the consumer the "king" or "queen"
while the producer acts as servant. The conclusion, as to the
meaning of the data, functions as a Peircean mode of third-
ness and further informs our interpretation of the market
as we use it to reexamine the data in light of our newly
achieved understanding.
285. Id. at 40-41 (drawing on a less developed example from the book).




Now, to better understand this process, imagine re-
viewing the data through an alternative interpretive refer-
ent or frame of reference. From the point of view of some
positions in critical theory, for example, one might conclude
that the data reveals strong corporate power in a market
where sellers band together to set terms of exchange in a
way that leaves the consumer helpless.2 87 The signs of uni-
formity between products, prices, and terms, are inter-
preted as evidence of market power rather than as indica-
tions of market constraints. In other words, rather than
concluding that there is a competitive market, one might
readily conclude just the opposite.
Interpretation of the data, in a mode of thirdness, is
important because our conclusions about the meaning of the
exchange process will implicate particular responses. If we
believe, for instance, the Chicago School interpretation we
have no need for concern because we have a voluntary and
consensual exchange process in which consumers are pro-
tected by competition. In such a setting, consumers receive
exactly what they want. Therefore, we would reject any
proposed intrusion by government into the marketplace. On
the other hand, if we reach the opposite conclusion based
upon the use of an alternative interpretive frame or refer-
ence, we may advocate a need for government regulation to
protect consumers and to break up the power of corporate
dominance in the marketplace. Importantly, the point is
that the facts themselves (the raw data as a mode of
firstness) tell us little without the mediation of those facts
through an interpretive frame of reference (a mode of sec-
ondness). The conclusions drawn from this indexical media-
tion process function as a mode of thirdness and implicate a
course of action or inaction. They also serve as a "touch
stone" for further investigation and analysis of the "facts."
In this way they effect the continuity of semiosis in moving
from firstness to secondness and thirdness, and back to
firstness in an on going process. Moreover, we see that the
conclusions reached in the mode of thirdness shape and in-
fluence the allocation or resources between producers and
consumers.
The point of this example is not to show the real world
of exchange as unknowable or completely indeterminate. It
is to illustrate the process of mapping the exchange rela-
287. Id. at 157-70 (discussing critical theory).
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tionship, and to show that people positioned in alternative
interpretive communities use different interpretive frames
and references. Thus, different people understand the world
in different and sometimes conflicting ways. Therefore, we
must be aware of a variety of cultural-interpretive perspec-
tives as they influence the direction of law and social policy.
Consequently, we must understand the relationship be-
tween law, markets and culture, and we must realize that
by shifting interpretive perspectives we can alter authorita-
tive influence over the interpretation process. Furthermore,
we must appreciate the need to develop and address com-
parative sources of information that will advance legal me-
diation of conflicts between people situated in competing in-
terpretive communities.
IV. PEIRCE'S INTERPRETIVE MODEL: A FURTHER
EXAMINATION
This part of the article presents a further examination
of Peirce's interpretive model of semiotics. The purpose is to
provide additional theoretical background and support for
understanding the interpretive approach to law, markets,
and culture. Beyond clarifying some basic semiotic terms
and concepts, there are three main objectives to this part of
the article. The first objective involves explaining Peirce's
understanding of meaning in the relationship between the
real world of exchange and the cultural-interpretive signs
we use to understand the real. It is here that we explore
Peirce's idea of abductive logic and speculative rhetoric.2 88 It
is here that we also address Peirce as a pragmatic evolu-
tionary realist and examine the limits of interpretation. The
second objective involves an explanation of the connection
between esthetics, ethics, and logic in law and market econ-
omy.289 It is here that we identify a need for an implicit, if
not express, reference to the normative sciences of esthetics,
ethics and logic when using market concepts in legal rea-
soning. The third and final objective involves explaining the
community context of meaning and value formation.
288. See LISZKA, supra note 30 at 53-77; 2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note
30, at 299 (abduction described).
289. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30 (explaining Peirce's




A. Exchange and the Limits of Interpretation
In order to understand better Peirce's idea of firstness,
secondness, and thirdness we need a more detailed discus-
sion of social meaning in exchange. According to the Peir-
cean semiotics that influences my work, social meaning in
the exchange process emerges out of an original state of
chaos or indeterminacy.29° This is a state of pure chance,
nothingness, or ambiguity that becomes real with the
emergence of a habit or formation of a pattern(s) of regu-
larity.91 The tendency toward habit and pattern formation
is normal according to Peirce and, thus, potentiality always
gives rise to an actuality.92 Peirce's notion of the original
state, and the tendency toward habit formation based on
conventionalized patterns, is consistent with the idea of a
"strange attractor" in chaos and complex systems theory,293
and with the role Adam Smith ascribed to the Deity in his
model of evolutionary transformation.294 One need not de-
bate this understanding of the original position, however, in
order to benefit from Peirce's insights on the transformation
of value and meaning in the process of exchange.
Peirce's point is that signs are... anything we know or claim to
know we know because it is a sign and interpretable. Persons,
places, things, systems-are all signs. Peirce's argument is that
signs interpret signs. It is only through the methods of semiotics-
the method of methods-that we are able to account for the proc-
ess whereby our system of signs interprets another system of signs
and thus grows, and give birth to new signs.
295
290. SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 8-16.
291. Id.; KAUFFMAN, supra note 181, at 277-79. (explaining that complex
systems have a tendency to move from chaos to sets, patterns, habits, redun-
dancy, and replication. This tendency is similar to that ascribed to Peirce's the-
ory of signs).
292. SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 9. "[Tjhe possibility evolves the actuality."
Id.
293. See GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note 181, at 121-53 (discussing the case of
strange attractors).
294. See Jerry Evensky, Setting The Scene: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy
in ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-29 (R. P. Malloy
& J. Evensky eds. 1994); GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note 181, at 121-53 (a strange
attractor causes infinite possibility to inevitably become patterned in the sense
of spontaneous organization).
295. KEVELSON, LAw, supra note 30, at 239. Importantly, these new signs
are the product of exchange and substitution, and thus continually give rise to
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Meaning, according to Peirce, arises from a continuous
process of relational exchange operating within an envi-
ronment of chance/indeterminacy and habit/continuity.296 It
is an evolutionary and dynamic process in which meaning
and value continually evolve in a synthesis of indetermi-
nacy and continuity.
In market theory we can see this connection when we
think in terms of simple cost and benefit analysis. 298 From
the chaotic activities of numerous independent market ac-
tors emerges a set of patterns that formulate a habit and
results in a temporary equilibrium.299 The information pro-
vided by the equilibrium is useful and influential in think-
ing about extending the meaning/consequences of that rela-
tionship to the next exchange. For instance, current prices
influence, or inform, thinking about alternative investment
trade-offs. At the same time, new information is constantly
emerging in the marketplace, and chance, surprise and
other factors all play a part in destabilizing the observed
equilibrium. As a consequence, a new pattern emerges and
a new equilibrium is located. This new equilibrium once
again provides meaning for market actors and once again
stands ready for revision in the dynamic interplay between
new meanings and values. Peirce has a theory of how everything began, but for
our purposes the more appropriate focus is in the understanding of meaning
and value that emerges from his understanding of relational exchange. SHERIFF,
supra note 30, at 8-16. "[Pleirce reminds us that the beginning of all ideas-all
sign systems-come to us by chance. But then, a kind of 'welding process' takes
place, according to the 'law of association'.... ." KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE,
supra note 30, at 164.
296. See SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 9-16. Relational exchange "is the basic
unit of meaning in a legal semiotics." KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra
note 30, at 154.
297. SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 8-59; Kevelson, Rhetoric, supra note 33;
KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 1-47.
298. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 32-33.
299. SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 9-59. Also note how this idea of a pattern
arising out of chaos corresponds to chaos theory. See GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note
181; KAUFFMAN, supra note 181. Furthermore, it also corresponds to Hayek's
theory of spontaneous social order. See KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 168
("The freedom to interpret and reinterpret leading principles is antithetical to
closed societies, but such indeterminate review constitutes the basis of a free
marketplace, in the context of what Hayek refers to as the 'spontaneous order'
of the open society."); F. A. HAYEK I. LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND
ORDER 35-54 (1973) (discussing spontaneous social order related to law and so-
cial cooperation); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL
ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 1-60 (1991) (general rules
and spontaneous social order with reference to Hayek).
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conventionalized regularity and chaotic indeterminacy. The
same process happens in law. The common law, for exam-
ple, with its case-by-case analysis continually revises the
meaning of legal rules. Continuity is preserved by reference
to precedent and legal doctrine, yet endlessly variable fact
patterns give rise to constant extensions and revisions of
meaning. ° Chance and indeterminacy work toward diver-
sity and freedom, while regularity and habit work toward
continuity and convention." The synthesis of these states,
or modes of being, results in the continuous creation and
recreation of meanings and values in an infinite process of
referential and substitutional exchange.
In Peirce's semiotics there are three modes of being as
described in an earlier part of this article; firstness, second-
ness, and thirdness."°
All logical thought consists of these modes and thus all
semiotics involves a triadic relationship between these
modes. 3 ' The semiotic synthesis between firstness and sec-
ondness gives rise to a new meaning or value that stands in
the position of a third. °4 This continuous synthesis is re-
ferred to as the process of semiosis and it is present in all
systems of exchange.
Since every sign creates an interpretant which in turn is the rep-
resentamen of a second sign, semiosis results in a series of succes-
sive interpretants ad infinitum. There is no "first" nor "last" sign
in this process of unlimited semiosis... thinking always proceeds
in the form of dialogue. . . "every thought must [adhere] itself to
300. See generally, GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note 181, at 140 (complex systems
raise the prospect of infinite points of possibility within a limited space).
301. SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 9.
302. NOTH, supra note 30, at 39-47; SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 14, 31-47;
LISZKA, supra note 30, at 18-52; PEIRCE-REASONING, supra note 30 at 68-102;
HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 106-18, 121, 151, 166-80; PEIRCE,
WRITINGS, supra note 30, at 75-93, 101-19; APEL, PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM, supra
note 30, at 23.
303. See references, supra note 302. Also note that this triadic relationship
is a key distinguishing factor from Saussure. Saussure focused on detection of
oppositions in a dyadic relationship of signifier and signified whereas Peirce
seeks to disclose trichotomies, in a triadic relationship of object, sign, and inter-
pretant. See COLAPIETRO, PEIRCE-SELF, supra note 30, at 5; SHERIFF, supra note
30, at 41.
304. See references, supra note 302. "Our only experience of Firstness or
Secondness is mediated by Thirdness. That is we experience only signs (which
are already triadic relations) of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness." SHERIFF,
supra note 30, at 32.
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some other". . . "this endless series is essentially a potential one.
Peirce's point is that any actual interpretant of a given sign can
theoretically be interpreted in some further sign, and that in an-
other without any necessary end being reached. The exigencies of
practical life inevitably cut short such potentially endless devel-
opment.3 °5
Importantly, depending upon the point of inquiry, the
positional designation of firstness, secondness, and third-
ness may change or shift.
[T]herefore a part of every thought continues in the succeeding
thoughts. Every sign is interpreted by a subsequent sign or
thought in which the-relation-of-the-sign-to-its-object becomes the
object of the new sign. Not only does a sign refer to a subsequent
thought-sign that interprets it, it also stands for some object
through a previous thought-sign .... Meaning, then, "lies not in
what is actually thought [immediately present], but in what this
thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent
thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something
virtual." Meaning exists only as the dynamic relation of signs. To
the degree that life has meaning, it is a train of thought.
3 0 6
In the simplest of terms, this idea can be expressed
with reference to the age-old question of the chicken and
the egg. As such, one might understand this semiotic ap-
proach as not so much concerned with determining whether
the chicken or the egg came first but rather with investi-
gating the relationship between chickens and eggs in an on
going process of evolutionary change.
Focusing on dynamic relationships over time does not
mean that meanings and values are completely indetermi-
nate. For example, Umberto Eco explains that Peirce's idea
305. NOTH, supra note 30, at 43 (defining the idea of unlimited semiosis).
See also references, supra note 302.
306. SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 37. See also references, supra note 302. This
idea is fully explained and diagrammed in SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 33-47. Eco
provides a similar interpretation of Peirce. See, ECO, LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 36, at 28-30, 60.
The idea of interpretation requires that a "piece" of ordinary language
be used as the "interpretant" (in a Peircean sense) of another "piece" of
ordinary language. When one says that/man/means "human male
adult," one is interpreting ordinary language through ordinary lan-
guage, and the second sign is the interpretant of the first one, as well
as the first can become interpretant of the second.
ECO, LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 36, at 60.
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of unlimited semiosis does not mean that there are unlim-
ited meanings to a text or a sign.0 7 While there are multiple
ways to interpret a sign it does not follow that a sign or a
text can mean anything a reader wants it to mean."8 To a
certain extent signs, like texts, are anchored in convention,
and the community constrains the individual's ability to in-
terpret meaning.
Carl R. Hausman elaborates on Eco's point. Hausman
argues that Peirce believed in real dynamical objects that
existed independently of our opinion about them, and that
Peirce was concerned with a search for an external perma-
nency that was discoverable in the reality of science."' In
other words, the world is not only what we can describe or
understand in our language. Our language may be unable
to describe the real that surrounds us, but that does not
simply make everything purely subjective or indetermi-
nate.3 Thus, signs cannot simply mean whatever one
wants them to mean because there is ultimately a real
307. Eco explains that Peirce's idea of unlimited semiosis does not mean
that there are unlimited meanings of a text or a sign. Eco, LIMITS OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 36, at 57. Peirce's semiosis is constrained by a
community of inquiries and a final judgment of meaning emerges as habit or
convention. See id. at 37-42. There is an objective meaning in a contextual, fal-
lible, dynamic and revisionary sense. See id. Unlimited semiosis is not, there-
fore, the same as hermetic drift. See id. at 27-32. Unlimited semiosis means
that there are multiple ways to read a text but not that a text can mean any-
thing a reader wants it to mean. See id. at 148-49
308. See id. See also 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 63.
309. See supra text accompanying note 307.
310. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 140-225.
311. Kevelson describes Peirce' thoughts in this regard by saying:
Peirce insists that our ideas.., in law must also be an evolving process
which begins and concludes with reference to the experiential world,
i.e. that world which we acknowledge as the basis for our ideas of the
Real but which we can never know in entirety. The Real is always
greater than our knowledge, our understanding. It is represented in
sign-relations, and it is more approximate. In this respect every sign
process must have as its object some aspect of a world which is not con-
fined to ideational strata but which has a locative aspect, and is con-
tingent upon something which exists.
Kevelson, Rhetoric, supra note 33, at 197.
Semiotics is not concerned so much with what is true as with establishing the
conditions for what is to count as true. LISzKA, supra note 30, at 5. Our theories
and models represent ideas that we construct as a way of getting at a real or
provisional truth value. But since truth and the real are future oriented, we can
only really construct logical methods of inquiry for approaching and getting at
the truth or the real. See SHERIFF, supra note 30, at 48-59. See generally,
PATTERSON, supra note 163.
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world constraint on interpretation. In the law and market
economy context, this means that we can have some delib-
erate influence on the market process in which we are em-
bedded, but we are not separate and independent of the
market.
In making his argument Hausman suggests that Peirce
was a pragmatic evolutionary realist.o" By this term he
means that Peirce was committed to a belief in an inde-
pendent reality as a semiotic sign or cultural-interpretive
idea, but he also understood that this reality was itself dy-
namic and evolutionary, and thus unattainable.313 The idea
of the real, however, is important. This is because the idea
of the real constrains us even if it is dynamic and evolu-
tionary. Likewise, the idea of the real causes us to question
and doubt our theories, models, and interpretive frame and
reference hierarchies as we continually measure our own
actions and experiences with reference to various conven-
tionalized interpretive referents. We come to doubt, for in-
stance, theories of rational choice, or theories of creationism
when our experiences diverge from the expectations gener-
ated by these beliefs. Our experiential encounter with the
factual world (firstness), diverges from the expectations of
our indexical referent (secondness), and causes us to have
314doubt (thirdness). This doubt leads to a need for revision.
The idea of an external and independent reality drives
Peirce's pragmatic understanding of the sciences, and it
serves an important semiotic function by continually pro-
moting doubt in the face of belief. For Peirce, value arises
from doubt and from the process of fine-tuning through
question and answer. Value arises from alertness to doubt
and the mediation or reformation of belief. This involves a
process of creative discovery and the revision of conven-
tion.1 5 When experience causes us to doubt convention-
312. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 140-225.
313. See id. at 194-224.
314. Charles Sanders Peirce believed that our experience with doubt, in-
quiry and interactive exchange in community could cause a shift in view and
reframe our interpretive reference points or ground. See HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, su-
pra note 30, at 119-25 (experience as a subjective ground); See also PEIRCE-
WRITINGS, supra note 30 at 8-12 (on shifting views); 2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE,
supra note 30, at 336 (doubt is the starting point for critical inquiry). See also,
LISZKA, supra note 30, at 53-77; HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 194-225
(arguing that the contexts of interpretive schemes shift).
315. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 78-153. See
also KIRZNER, MEANING, supra note 26, at 1-54. Kirzner's point is that a dy-
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when we identify divergence between conventional refer-
ents, models or theories and our own experience, we begin
to doubt. 16 This doubt creates semiotic resistance to conven-
tionality and this resistance facilitates the potential for
creativity.317 This is why extensive, diverse, and accessible
networks and patterns of exchange are valuable. The more
and different types of information we are confronted with,
the more likely we are to confront divergence between con-
vention and experience, and the greater the semiotic resis-
tance and the potential for value enhancement will be.
In seeking to mediate this semiotic resistance or cul-
tural-interpretive dissonance, we engage in a form of rea-
soning that Peirce identified as abductive reasoning or
speculative rhetoric or logic."8 Abductive reasoning involves
the development of new theories and explanations in an ef-
fort to mediate resistance and reclaim convergence between
our experience of the real, and our idea or semiotic repre-
sentation of the real.19 This process of abductive reasoning
namic and complex market system can not be captured in static equilibrium
models - creativity is important yet it escapes proper study in traditional neo-
classical economics. KIRZNER, MEANING, supra note 26, at 1-54. See also,
KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 1-47; SHERIFF, supra note
30, at xii-1, 9-16, 31-49.
316. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 165-78; Denis J.
Brion, Naming and Forgetting, in SEMIOTICS (C.W. Spinks & John Deely eds.,
1996). Furthermore, the general rules, conventions, and codes that define our
models are grounded in experience. Peirce argued that we learn through experi-
ence. See HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 119-25 (discussing how experi-
ence is subjective). Experience is subjective and serves as a ground for inquiry,
reasoning, and interpretive meaning. See KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30, at 81-
87. These views can shift as a result of an ongoing response to doubt, inquiry,
and proceeding to a new belief based on the interactive exchange and dialogue
between individuals and their community. See PEIRCE, WRITINGS, supra note 30,
at 8-12. Adam Smith made a similar point with respect to the formation of gen-
eral rules of morality, ethics, and social conduct when he said they were:
Ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances,
our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve
or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular
actions, because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or in-
consistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the con-
trary, is formed by finding from experience that all actions of a certain
kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disap-
proved of.
SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 37, at 264.
317. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 198-201 (discussing resistance
in the semiotic process developed by Peirce).
318. See LISZKA, supra note 30.
319. Market theory stands in reference to, and as an interpretive sign of, the
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or speculative logic is very important to the concept of law
and market economy because the idea of examining con-
tested interpretations of the market, and mapping alterna-
tive value frames and references, is to identify value en-
hancing opportunities for interpretive exchange.
It is, therefore useful to examine one of Hausman's ex-
amples for understanding the relationship between the con-
straints of the real and the implications of speculative, de-
liberative, or thoughtful action. In the example, Hausman
makes reference to C. G. Prado in explaining the idea of a
reality independent of language.12' He does this to explain
Peirce in relation to radical anti-realists.3 2' The point is to
explain that while language may not be able to fully cap-
ture the real, and may constrain our ability to understand
the real, it does not follow, in a Peircean sense, that there is
no real beyond our language or opinion.
This point is important because it tells us that even if
our models, theories, and representations of the market are
incomplete, partial, or problematic, it does not mean that
they are useless or purely the product of social construction.
Similarly, the idea that we can take deliberative and
thoughtful action to influence the market exchange process
does not mean that the market can simply take any form or
meaning that we desire. The market is neither the purely
subjective and biased construction of social organization as
suggested by some critical theorists, nor is it the objective,
neutral, and scientific process suggested by some tradi-
real world but it is not, itself, real. "Ultimately we do not know this phenomenal
world of which we are part. But we do know or are capable of knowing that
which we construct as a means of knowing better and more fully the unknow-
able, everchanging circumstances of existence." KEVELSON, LAW, supra note 30,
at 269. In this respect the market, as idea, stands as a referential mode of sec-
ondness. It helps us to interpret the real world that is, in all its evolving poten-
tiality, which is positioned as a mode of firstness. The conclusions and mean-
ings to be drawn from this relationship are, in the process of semiosis, a mode of
thirdness. See also HAYAKAWA, supra note 218, at 13-21. Likewise, our market
models and theories are symbols and sign systems of but are not the real so-
cial/market exchange process. Adam Smith made a similar observation with his
metaphor of a clock. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at
41-42. Adam Smith describes the face of the clock as attracting our attention
but its internal structure remains hidden, remains invisible and the subject of
speculation. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 41-42. This,
he said, was also true of the universe in general. MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET
ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 41-42. My point is similar to Smith's metaphor.
320. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 198-200.
321. See id. at 140-225.
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tional advocates of law and economics. There is both regu-
larity and irregularity in a complex system such as the
market. Reaching a deeper understanding of these relation-
ships requires an ability to use interpretation theory as one
way of approaching the connection between law, markets,
and culture.
Turning to Hausman's example, he explains:
In explaining the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, C. G. Prado ar-
gues that the pre-Copernican seamen who found that they did not
fall off the earth where its flat surface was supposed to end could
have revised the way they were willing to talk and believe. And
they could have continued to insist that the world is flat if they
had "readjusted their beliefs to allow for odd events."; It must be
kept in mind, however, that the initial condition that supposedly
prompted the seamen to change or adjust their ways of speaking
was not itself a change in the language, or in belief. The initial
condition that they encountered was expressed as a resistance to
their accepted language and belief. It was a resistance to expecta-
tions. The initial condition of their resistance was not language,
even if its interpretation takes place in inescapable language or
vocabularies. The seamen would have found it increasingly diffi-
cult to stick by their adjusted beliefs as they gained more experi-
ence. Their adjustments would not have been arbitrary.
The constraints given with resistances (the surprises and discov-
eries) do not guarantee that specific sentences are true or false, al-
though they do function negatively to prompt the abandonment or
modification of what were regarded as "true," or as justifiable and
acceptable. What such constraints do is prompt changes that bring
about evolution in thinking and language. What justifies the kind
of changes is continued growing agreement, or at least the expec-
tation that if the changes seem to be anomalies, they will eventu-
ally be reconciled - in future situations in which networks of be-
liefs or sentences fit together.
32 2
Hausman's example of the relationship between experi-
ence and constraint has useful applications for taking an
interpretive turn in law and market economy. Law and
market economy adopts Peirce's notion of constraint and of
infinite potentiality (present in the dynamic nature of the
real).323 It does not purport to function as an objective and
neutral model of exchange. It functions as a complex sign.
322. Id. at 199.




In this sense it is a representation of the real world, or dy-
namical object of exchange, but it is not, itself, the real to
which it refers. 324 This means that it is a dynamic and in-
terpretive representation of exchange relationships, and
that the market is an idea open to deliberate and thought-
ful influence while being simultaneously constrained by
real boundaries-boundaries that are more than mere so-
cial constructions.
By working through the mapping of exchange, as de-
picted in Diagram 3 in an earlier part of the article,325 law
and market economy affirms a need to take an interpretive
turn away from the "objective" and heroic spectator view of
traditional economic approaches to law and market theory.
At the same time it acknowledges a constraint on individual
and communal subjectivity. Market exchange can be
viewed from a variety of perspectives and subject to alter-
native scales, measures, and positions, but the meanings
and values of these relationships are not purely self-refer-
encing, nor are they without an anchor in the real world.
Furthermore, in making an indexical reference to
multi-factor referents and intermittent framing variables,
law and market economy forces us to imagine alternative
points of cultural-interpretive reference, and this brings
new information into view. In this way, the continuous shift
in focus and refining of the mapping process creates the po-
tential for resistance, giving rise to doubt, and the need for
abductive reasoning. Thus, the mapping process is valuable
because it continually repositions the tension between belief
and doubt, and between conventionalized interpretive hier-
archy and the shifting sands of authority over semiotic
space. More importantly, these interpretive processes, in
themselves, generate substantive consequences for meaning
and value formation, and for the distribution and allocation
of resources.
324. See id.
325. See text of this article, supra at Part II. C. (diagram 3 in the text).
326. See HAUSMAN, PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 224.
Peirce's picture recognizes what is vital to those who have taken the
linguistic turn... It affirms the need to turn away from a spectator
view, but without abandoning something valuable in that view: the ac-
knowledgment of constraints on our communal and individual habits,




In thinking about market concepts with reference to
Peirce's three modes of logic, therefore, law and market
economy theory draws attention to the embedded meanings
and values of social/market exchange. This is important be-
cause it helps us to better understand the conventionalized
interpretive hierarchy of a given market exchange commu-
nity, and because it alerts us to the potential for change. In
doing this it also expands and transforms ideas, and this
creates real value.
B. The Connection to Esthetics, Ethics, and Logic
Interpretation theory helps us to understand the limita-
tions of using economic science to solve complex legal prob-
lems. Economic concepts are useful in legal reasoning but
the market exchange process can not be fully captured by
an economic calculus. More importantly, while economics
may provide a useful logic for promoting a particular end, it
is ill equipped to address fundamental questions regarding
the choice of value framing and of interpretive or indexical
reference. Selecting the appropriate interpretive frame and
reference involves normative analysis outside of the scope
of traditional economics. The questions of interpretive
framing and reference are normative ones that would come
within Peirce's notion of the relationship between esthetics,
ethics, and logic.327 Therefore, this section of the article pro-
vides a brief definition of Peirce's use of the terms esthetics,
ethics and logic. It then explains the relationship between
these concepts and the idea of law and market economy.
Peirce developed a theory for normative analysis that
made reference to the traditionally recognized categories of
esthetics, ethics, and logic.32 The meaning he ascribed to
these categories was not, however, completely traditional.329
In general, Peirce's categories can be briefly defined. For
327. See POTTER, NORMS & IDEALS, supra note 30; 2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE,
supra note 30, at 196-207 (discussing the normative sciences as including es-
thetics, ethics, and logic).
328. See POTTER, NORMS & IDEALS, supra note 30, at 8-51. In Peirce's triadic
theory of signs esthetics is of feelings and is a mode of firstness; ethics is of ac-
tion and is a mode of secondness; logic is of thought and is a mode of thirdness.
See id. at 19.
329. See id. at 31-46. Peirce used these terms because they were close
enough to what he wanted to discuss and it was useful in terms of directing the
attention of his audience. See id. at 31.
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Peirce, esthetics was not to be understood in terms of beauty
because the beautiful and the ugly were categories within
esthetics.33° Instead, esthetics has to do with establishing
the criteria for determining that something is either beauti-
ful or ugly.33' Esthetics is, thus, about the normative justifi-
cation for identifying something as worthy of admiration. It
is the basis for justifying the use of a particular interpretive
value frame or indexical reference. In a similar way, Peirce
did not believe that ethics was about what is right.332 In-
stead he defined ethics as related to what one would delib-
erately aim to accomplish as an end.333 Ethics, therefore, in-
volves the deliberate selection of a particular course of
action designed to promote an admirable or esthetic end.
Finally, for Peirce, logic involved thinking as a deliberate
activity, and this activity was directed at evaluating ways
to achieve an end-an end that is admirable.334 Thus, logic
concerns the process of working through the various ways
to accomplish an end. It involves mapping the plausibly
good and useful alternatives for achieving an end.
This process relates directly to understanding the rela-
tionship between law, markets and culture, and to the sub-
ject that I have identified as law and market economy. At
the outset esthetics is involved. This is because any such
analysis must make a normative justification for its inter-
pretive value frame and reference. It must identify, for ex-
ample, the reasons for why a legal system should promote
creativity, a process of sustainable wealth formation, effi-
ciency, wealth maximization, or any other value. One
should not merely assume that a legal or economic system
should promote a given aim. To the contrary, one must per-
suade a given cultural-interpretive community of the
grounds for making such aims the basis or criteria for
judging the goodness of a given socio-legal order. Estab-
lishing these interpretive frames and references requires an
appeal to the humanities, and to the experiences of others.
Ethics and logic come into play as one attempts to im-
plement strategies for achieving a desirable end. As I ar-
gued previously, the market exchange process is a complex
330. See id. at 32-33.
331. See id.
332. See id. at 31-34.
333. See id.
334. See id. at 32-41.
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system in which it is impossible to calculate an optimal
course of action. This results from the fact that there are
multiple ways for determining efficiency, and from the fact
that different results emerge as one changes the scale,
measure, or position of any particular exchange relation-
ship. Consequently, the best that can be done is to identify
"sets" of plausible good, useful, and wealth promoting
courses of action. This means that we can map plausibly
useful ways of approaching and mediating a dispute but
that we must also recognize the ambiguity present in any
given economic solution. In this context, logic involves the
mapping of alternative ways of understanding and mediat-
ing the dispute-of understanding the dispute from alter-
native cultural-interpretive positions. Ethics involves se-
lecting and justifying a given course of action or a
particular legal strategy from the identified set of options.
The ultimate importance of this analysis is to point out
that even though we are all part of the market process of
exchange, we are also capable of shaping and influencing
market outcomes. We are fully embedded within the mar-
ket, but we are not completely subject to it. Consequently,
we must be engaged in a logical, ethical, and esthetic
evaluation of our aims, our ends, and our choices within the
market. Economics can not adequately assist us in these
normative and interpretive areas. We must identify the ap-
propriate interpretive frame and reference. Only after the
interpretive frame and reference are selected can economics
be used to assist in the evaluation of the consequences.
Arguing that economic analysis eliminates the problem
of value conflicts or contested philosophical viewpoints is
simply unpersuasive. As interpretive beings we are always
subject to these problems. The real question is one of de-
ciding on the best way to be an active participant in the de-
bates over the interpretive frames and references of legal
reasoning. One can use economics and market analysis to
further one's position in the debate, but one can not avoid
the circumstances that every alternative frame or reference
is grounded upon a particular set of meanings and values.
Thus, if one accepts the idea that the reference to positive
economics avoids the need to engage in normative and
philosophical discourse in legal reasoning, one simply de-
faults to the acceptance of the normative and interpretive
hierarchy of positive economics.
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There is, in other words, no meaningful escape from the
need to engage in an ethical and esthetic discourse. Even
Richard Posner, in his recent book, The Problematics of
Moral and Legal Theory, engages in such a discourse as he
attempts to persuade the reader to shift from one set of
ethical and esthetic frames and references to another.13 5 The
very structure of his argument is an application of Peirce's
pragmatic theory of signs. 6 For example, Posner's book is
written in the style of an appellate brief for his particular
point of view-for his particular value frames and refer-
ences. He makes an appeal to the esthetic by suggesting cri-
teria for admiring his economic and social science approach
to law and legal reasoning. He appeals to ethics in mapping
out a particular course of action for improving legal rea-
soning to achieve his objective (esthetic goal), and he uses
logic to present the argument (justification) for selecting his
given approach. Posner's argument falls flat, in a Peircean
sense however, because its entire structure is based on the
use of normative elements while he simultaneously argues
against the use of normative analysis.
Moreover, Posner's analysis is confusing because he
cites and favorably discusses Peirce in this book as well as
in his earlier book on The Problems of Jurisprudence.337 In
some respects, however, Posner's analysis is hampered by
his failure to develop a fuller appreciation of Peirce's cul-
tural-interpretive theory of pragmatics. 38 This prevents
335. See POSNER, MORAL & LEGAL THEORY, supra note 5. See also, Guyora
Binder, The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary Criticism of Law Offers
Posner, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1510 (2001) ("Pragmatism has benefited Judge
Posner in many respects, but it has not overcome one disabling idiosyncrasy:
His persistent antipathy toward the humanities seems to blind Judge Posner to
the role of aesthetic value in practical judgment and justification."); Brian E.
Butler, Posner's Problem with Moral Philosophy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCHOOL ROUND
TABLE 325, 343 (2000) ("The real problem with The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory, though, is that it is a book where Posner confuses an attack upon
one academic field (moral philosophy) with the completely different project of
the legitimization of another type of investigation (social science).").
336. See POSNER, MORAL & LEGAL THEORY, supra note 5.
337. See, POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5.
338. Judge Posner cites to Peirce in each of POSNER, MORAL & LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 5, and POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5,
but his writing fails to demonstrate a depth of knowledge about Peirce's com-
plex theory of pragmatism and its relationship to Peirce's theory of semiotics. In
fact, Posner demonstrates little more than a passing knowledge of Peirce as a
figure who is referenced as a founder of "American Pragmatism." Posner rejects
philosophical pragmatism and expresses his desire to "ground policy judgments
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Posner from fully appreciating the role of ethical and es-
thetic discourse in law and market theory, and makes it dif-
ficult for him to understand the significant value of the
humanities in setting the frames and references that inform
and shape his search for "facts" in legal decision making.
This lack of a fuller understanding of Peirce's theory of
pragmatics also makes a number of Posner's criticisms of
other legal scholars confused and confusing.339
on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualism and generalities."
POSNER, MORAL & LEGAL THEORY, supra note 5, at 227.
Peirce, on the other hand, was very concerned with philosophy and metaphys-
ics as the basis of his pragmatics. He understood pragmatism as emerging from
the normative sciences, which he identified as esthetics, ethics, and logic, and
his semiotics was about discovering generalities. See POTTER, NORMS & IDEALS,
supra note 30, at 1-7. Posner's work does not seem to recognize that Peirce spilt
with both William James and John Dewey over the philosophical foundations of
pragmatism. APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30, at xix - 18. To Peirce
pragmatism is linked to a more general theory of language and signification,
and his work has been looked to for guidance in developing a new dialectical
synthesis. APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30, at xxii. Peirce has be-
come increasingly relevant to those people exploring the "linguistic turn" or in-
terpretive turn. APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30, at xxi. Peirce's
work denies the ability to sustain a theory, such as the one offered by Posner,
which is based on a fact and value distinction. APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, su-
pra note 30, at xx-xxi. Values, and moral and normative issues are and ought to
be part of the pragmatic focus. APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30, at
ix-xxiii, 1-67. "Other pragmatic positions... are only fragmentary... [t]hey lack
the unity provided by a theory of the normative sciences, and this deficiency has
led those positions into error. . ." POTTER, NORMS & IDEALS, supra note 30, at 4.
See also 2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note 30, at 133-144, 331-433 (discussing
some elements of his ideas about pragmatism).
339. Because Posner seems to use a mixed language of pragmatism with no
clear philosophical ground to his position, I find his critique of other views at
times confusing. This to me is the product of his failure to clearly define a
workable and sound understanding of pragmatism. In the place of a theory that
deals with both facts and values he offers a prolonged justification for support-
ing his own value frames and references as pragmatic, and then uses this posi-
tion to reject, in a fragmented way, the cultural-interpretive positions of others.
For a useful example of the application of a Peircean approach to pragmatism
and constitutional interpretation see Brion, supra note 66. A much more useful
analysis of such people as Rawls, Fish, Hart, Dworkin, and others is found, for
instance, in the recent book LAw & TRUTH by Dennis Patterson. PATTERSON, su-
pra note 163. Patterson grounds his work in that of Wittgenstein but there are
many similarities between this approach and that of Peirce. Much about lan-
guage, practice and experience are similar. Patterson offers a real theory to
ground his analysis and this makes his work much more coherent and meaning-
ful than that offered by Posner. In contrast to Patterson, I think Posner reduces
pragmatism to a theory of his own personal and subjective preferences. The
frames and references that he likes (value choices that he passes off as fact dis-
tinctions) are presented as reasonable and pragmatic while others (that he dis-
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The need for esthetic and ethical references can be
made more understandable, and linked to our earlier dis-
cussion of the limits to interpretation, with an example.
Therefore, let us assume that we work in a large hotel.
Imagine that we have been instructed by the hotel manager
to prepare a large ballroom for a meeting that will be taking
place later in the day.34 ° We are instructed to go to the room,
examine the various pieces of furniture in the room, and to
arrange the room in the most efficient manner. When we
get to the room we are confronted with a space of a given
size and shape, with particular lighting fixtures, and other
characteristics. We also take note of a variety of furniture
including chairs and tables of various styles and shapes.
The physical characteristics of the room can not be changed
(size, shape, etc.) and we are instructed that none of the
furniture can be taken from the room.
In this situation the nature and characteristics of the
room and the furniture operate as constraints on the ways
in which the room can be arranged. In other words, there
are real world constraints to the way we can "socially con-
struct" the relationships within this particular room. At the
same time, however, there are also numerous ways in
which we might exercise some influence over relationships
in the room by virtue of our authority to re-arrange the fur-
niture. The arrangement of the furniture by itself may sig-
nal important meanings, as in identifying important people
with a head table, or it might shape conversation or influ-
ence physical movement based the spacing we use around
and between tables. An important problem from the outset,
however, involves our ability to determine the most efficient
arrangement of the furniture in the absence of a predeter-
mined use for the room. If the room is to be used for a lec-
ture we may want to arrange a head table or podium with
likes) are cast aside. This style of argument is similar to that which he used in
his latest book to dismiss countless public intellectuals as unpersuasive, inept,
and generally useless. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY
OF DECLINE (2001). See also, David Brooks, Notes From a Hanging Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, Sec. 7, page 9 (book review of RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC
INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2002), saying that argumentation is poor).
340. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 147-48 (in
this article I use a much more developed version of the example); DEELY, supra
note 35, at 42 (1990) (using a home furnishings example to discuss semiotic re-




all the other tables or just the chairs facing the "front." If,
on the other hand, the room is to be used for a round table
discussion, or for a job fair, we might arrange the room
differently. Likewise, if the room will be used for dancing
we will need to push tables and chairs to the side so that
ample space can be left open for the activity. In short, the
idea of efficiency can be ambiguous in the absence of a
predetermined goal or objective. Once we are clear about
the use of the room we can begin to make progress at
identifying plausibly good alternatives for arranging the
room in a useful way. Once a normative decision is made
with respect to our given objective we can then seek to
achieve that goal in a more cost-effective manner.
The point of this example is that efficiency analysis and
much of what we can learn from using market theory in
law, presupposes a normative frame and reference. Organ-
izing the room in an efficient manner requires a value de-
termination with respect to how the room is, or might, be
used. Likewise, determining the best way to organize law
and legal institutions requires an implicit, if not express,
reference to normative consideration of the social, political,
legal, and market objective(s) to be achieved. Economics
and other social sciences can not eliminate the need to en-
gage in the exploration of the meanings and values of wor-
thy human objectives. And, even though we operate and
make decisions within a world of constraints, we also have
an ability to influence and facilitate the values and mean-
ings of social organization. Thus, we can improve legal rea-
soning and public policy by paying more attention to the
human experience of exchange, and by expressly recogniz-
ing the need for esthetic and ethical references in legal de-
cision-making. As lawyers and legal actors we have an obli-
gation to participate in this normative discourse and to
work for a more informed and inclusive process of decision-
making.
C. Exchange Communities: Beyond Methodological
Individualism
Finally, it must be noted that law and market economy,
using the method of semiotic interpretation theory, does not
focus on the idea of an autonomous individual engaged in a
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science of choice.341 Law and market economy examines the
exchange process by positioning the individual within a de-
liberative community.42 An interpretive approach, in other
words, considers methodological individualism as only one
of several frames and references available for market
analysis. Rather than looking at the atomistic calculus of
choice, it seeks to understand the human practice of ex-
change. Thus, law and market economy involves the study
of decision-making based on the relationship between an
individual and her point(s) of community reference.343 As
Roberta Kevelson explains it:
•.. although Freedom is the key term, or value, from which semi-
otic method derives its basic principles, Peirce is not concerned
with the notion of "free individuals" but rather with freedom of in-
dividuals in community. The Peircean method of methods is an
overt rejection of Cartesian principles of inquiry, and therefore it
rejects implicitly the notion of the individual as a referential
model, or sign. It supports, instead, the kind of model which repre-
sents communal or dialogic inquiry.344
In this context the exchange process is one of relational
substitution, and it is an experience in which the individu-
341. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 57-70. (Dis-
cussing the problem of methodological individualism. Also making reference to
an example of a castaway on an island who is later joined by a second person.
While traditional approaches to an economic analysis of law focus on the science
of rational choice as exercised by one individual, law and market economy is in-
terested in exploring the networks and patterns of exchange as they arise be-
tween people. This is a different focus and it asks different questions while re-
vealing different insights.)
342. Id.
343. In this sense Peirce rejects Buchanan's notion of methodological indi-
vidualism and instead focuses on dialogue, community, and habit. PEIRCE,
WRITINGS, supra note 30, at xiv. Science requires a community of inquirers to
work continuously toward agreement. Id. But Peirce is not anti-individual - the
individual is understandable only as a relate, in relation to community. Id.
344. KEVELSON, METHOD, supra note 30, at 11. Peirce tells us that meaning
only arises within community. It emerges from a dialogue in which the individ-
ual is not the key referential sign. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra
note 30, at 1, 60, 88-90; KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 30, at 140.
"Peirce sees the individual as partisan only, as a relate in precisely the same
sense that the words "father," "son," "teacher," "student" are relates since what
they represent is linked with another." KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra
note 30, at 28. Meaning comes from the interaction of individuals within com-
munity. KEVELSON, LAw, supra note 30, at 147, 208. See also HAUSMAN, PEIRCE,
supra note 30, at 60-66 (explaining the anti-Cartesian basis of Peirce's pragma-
tism).
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als simultaneously leave their imprint on, and are im-
printed by the drama in which they participate.345
The upshot is that there is no pure, absolutely autonomous "I" or
self. No sign-or self- is an island, an entity unto itself and abso-
lutely autonomous. We, all signs, are thoroughly socialized. The "I"
addresses itself to its otherness, its social other as well as the
other of physical "reality," both of which are "out there" in contrast
to the self s own "inner" other. Part of that social otherness is that
which is emerging and that into which the "I" is merging: the "I" is
incessantly flowing into the otherness of which it is a part of and
at the same time apart from. For, to repeat Peirce's words, "a per-
son is not absolutely an individual," and at the same time, a4per-
son's "circle of society" is a sort of "loosely compacted person.
By exploring a semiotic approach to law, markets, and
culture, therefore, we begin to focus more clearly upon the
complex meanings and values embedded within market
concepts, and we begin to address a new set of questions
and challenges. We begin to understand the way in which
exchange informs us about the meaning and value forma-
tion process, and since there are no perfect substitutes, we
345. In this context, it is important to remember that the rational allocative
"individual" of traditional law and economics is, itself, merely an idea or sign
and the idea of "individual" stands in reference to a real person but it is not the
person to which it refers. Real people are affected by the environments in which
they participate. The idea of the individual, therefore, like that of "person,"
"alien," "family member," or "refugee" is continually evolving within the market
context and is givcen coherence by its reference to a real person and also by ref-
erence to a particular legal framework. When we forget the distinction between
the idea of the individual and the real person to whom it refers we collapse an
essential element of their semiotic relationship and fall prey to the constraints
of habitually blinding conventionalism that can deny us the possibility of envi-
sioning further substitutional interpretation or change. See KEVELSON, PEIRCE
AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 165-178. Peirce said that man not only uses
signs but that he himself is a sign. APEL, PEIRCE-PRAGMATICISM, supra note 30,
at xxii. See also KEVELSON, PEIRCE AND SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 165-178;
MERRELL, PEIRCE-MEANING, supra note 30, at 52-68.
For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with
the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so that
every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an external
sign.... Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is
the thought.
MERRELL, PEIRCE-MEANING, supra note 30, at 62 (quoting Peirce). See also
MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 57-70.
346. MERRELL, PEIRCE-MEANING, supra note 30, at 61. See also Malloy,
Longhouse, supra note 246 (concerning how one imprints and is imprinted by an
environment).
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come to know that with every exchange there is some ele-
ment of expansion or transformation of value.347
Moreover, in focusing on the process of exchange, rather
than the calculus of choice, a law and market economy ap-
proach embraces a fundamental role in the marketplace for
judicial, legislative, and administrative institutions. These
institutions do not stand in opposition to the market; they
function as the mediating and conventionalizing infrastruc-
ture that facilitates the market. These institutions assist in
allowing individuals to transcend the frames and references
of various and competing cultural-interpretive boundaries.
Successful market economies connect individuals to
each other through institutions capable of mediating and
transforming meanings and values across cultural-interpre-
tive boundaries. Individuals are given meaning and trans-
actions are given value by reference to their connection to
others. Thus, the counter intuitive conclusion may be that
successful market economies achieve success precisely be-
cause they implicitly understand and construct institutions
that support an "other regarding," or public interest rather
than relying on the fragmented and disconnected actions of
innumerable individuals.48 This, at least, forms a basis for
future study and inquiry.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Semiotic interpretation theory, as used in law and mar-
ket economy, gives us a new way to understand the markets
in which we are embedded. It is a theory that is receptive to
347. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 29-31 (no
perfect substitutes), 41-48, 70-71, 83-90 (substitution), 161-62 (discussing the
impossibility of sustaining an "equality of outcome" because equality of outcome
assumes an ability to repeatedly "pass through the same point"); SMITH, ESSAYS,
supra note 37, at 155 (we never see the same thing twice). See generally
KAUFFMAN, supra note 181; GLEICK, CHAOS, supra note 181 (the idea applied to
complex systems which are dynamic and out of equilibrium - you never pass
through the same point twice).
348. For example, recording acts with respect to real property, and disclo-
sure rules with respect to securities offerings are designed to enhance transac-
tional exchange by protecting potential third party interests. Likewise, "Tak-
ings" cases involving issues of a regulatory taking focus on the implications for
exchange and for exchange value as reflected in a concern for a property owner's
reasonable investment backed expectations. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110 (1978).
2003] 123
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a variety of political and legal approaches and it provides a
means for investigating a variety of interpretive contexts or
environments. Thus, we can use it to discuss law in general
or to look at particular institutions such as courts, the leg-
islature, or various formal and informal organizations. We
can also use it in trying to address issues of globalization,
when market activities extend across an increasingly di-
verse set of cultural-interpretive boundaries.
In writing this article, I hope that I have established a
foundation, or as Peirce might say a ground, for thinking
about the meanings and values of law and market economy.
I believe that an important part of understanding law, cul-
ture, and market theory involves the consideration of social
relationships as meaningful relationships, and not merely
as economically efficient positioning. In this regard, it is
important for us to understand what we exchange, with
whom, and on what terms. Rather than focusing on the
problems of efficiency and economic calculation, we need to
study the networks and patterns of exchange in society. We
need to study problems of market access, distributional ine-
quality, and entrepreneurial opportunity as affected by
such variables as race, gender, age, education level, income,
geographic location, ethnicity, class, and culture.
In this process we can look at representations of
meaning and value in a variety of areas such as property,
contracts, and civil rights. We do this by mapping the net-
works and patterns of exchange using multiple frames and
references. Our interest in mapping exchange is not driven
by a need to simply advance more efficient relationships,
but by a desire to equalize and enhance authoritative access
to the cultural-interpretive process.
A cultural-interpretive approach to law and market
economy recognizes that law operates in a market context,
just as it acknowledges that markets operate in a legal con-
text. It also recognizes that the role of the lawyer or legal
actor is different from that of an economist.349 Legal actors,
unlike economists, have to mediate tensions and disputes
between parties from different cultural-interpretive com-
munities. Legal actors and legal institutions need to ad-
dress a variety of values, assumptions, and worldviews.
349. See MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 9-10 (ex-
plaining the very different nature of the legal actor from that of the economist).
350. See id. at 10.
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A law and market economy approach permits us to un-
derstand the interpretive and subjective elements of the
market exchange process. It informs us about the lack of
universality in borrowing economic concepts for legal rea-
soning. It indicates that there are value-enhancing oppor-
tunities from segmenting the market into different inter-
pretive communities, from gaining authoritative influence
over the interpretive frames and references of market
choice, and from generating and transforming legal repre-
sentations. It also demonstrates that references to market
theory in legal reasoning need to go beyond simple notions
of efficiency and wealth maximization. Such concepts are
ambiguous and highly contested. Consequently, improved
legal reasoning and public policy making require reference
to normative theory including esthetics, ethics, and logic.
Furthermore, extending market relationships beyond nar-
row cultural-interpretive communities requires use of legal
institutions that can transcend interpretive boundaries and
conventionalize extensive networks of interconnected space.
This may require legal institutions to represent an "other
regarding" interest that is not necessarily advanced by the
pursuit of fragmented notions of self-interest.
In the final analysis, an interpretive approach to law
and economics is not a rejection of market theory, but a new
way of understanding the meaning of law in a market con-
text. In considering the interpretive aspects of exchange, it
suggests that important insights can be gained, and it of-
fers a new and analytically useful way of referencing the
humanities for purposes of gaining a better understanding
of the relationship between law and market theory. Using
this improved understanding, we can begin to carefully re-
consider a variety of legal and policy conclusions.351 This in-
351. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION
TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING (forthcoming 2003, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press). In this book I build on of the theory set out in this article. This
article forms the basis for the approach taken in the book. The book provides a
basic introduction to economic terms and concepts, explains how they work, and
how they can be used in legal argument. It also provides numerous examples of
case analysis, and has problems that direct attention to the way in which these
ideas work in law and in legal reasoning. The book offers a complete and non-
quantitative guide to using ideas of law and market economy in legal argument.
It addresses such concepts as the Coase theorem, prisoner's dilemma, transac-
tions' costs, public choice, cost and benefit analysis, the tragedy of the commons,
efficient breach, and multiple definitions of efficiency, among others. It is de-
signed for the reader that is looking for a very different approach from that
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cludes beginning to reform and transform practices that
have been imperfectly shaped and influenced by a tradi-
tional economic analysis of law-an economic analysis of
law that has generally been uninformed as to interpretation
theory, and as to the relationship between law, markets,
and culture.
found in traditional work on the economic analysis of law. The book is for people
interested in jurisprudence, Law & Society; Law, Culture and the Humanities;
and in a humanities based approach to the relationship between law, markets,
and culture.
352. See Emily Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law, 88
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). In this excellent article the author recon-
siders the good faith rule in contract law. With specific reference to race and
employment matters, she uses critical theory and law and market economy the-
ory to rethink and restructure the established approach in the area. In inte-
grating her approach she reforms our think about the good faith rule in contract
law and develops a new cultural-interpretive pattern of legal argument.
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